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Abstract 
Through an analysis of the work of Virginia Woolf and T.W. Adorno’s theory of the 
aesthetic, this dissertation seeks to develop a poetics of criticism that takes account of 
the philosophy of the non-identical in subjective experience. As the subversion of the 
positivist and subjectivist tendencies of identity thinking, Adorno’s negative dialectic is 
read here in parallel with Woolf’s work as an example of a discourse that preserves the 
particularity of experience. Much of Woolf’s writing about music is in the form of diary 
entries,  letters  and  notes  or  jottings  and  is  singularly  unfinished.  Her  writing  about 
music pushes her to the extremes of essayistic practice where she is forced to improvise 
and  invent  a  musical-critical  voice.  This  dissertation  argues  that  subjectivity  and 
aesthetic experience are constructed negatively in Woolf’s diaries, letters and essays and 
by reading her tendency to resist describing musical experiences as a resistance to the 
domination of conceptual subsumption, I hope to show that Woolf’s writing could offer 
a new perspective on criticism. The present work attempts to develop a three-fold thesis, 
the presentation of which will constitute a poetics of criticism. Firstly, Woolf’s attempts 
to write a critical selfhood actually serve as a critique of transcendental subjectivity and 
undermine the ideology of a priori subjectivity. Secondly, Woolf’s essays complement 
work done by Adorno on genre theory which asserts that contradiction remains essential 
to the critical essay, contradiction which secures the identity of negative dialectics and a 
contradiction that can simultaneously be read as fundamental to the architectonics of a 
modernist subjectivity. Woolf’s essays, therefore, will be read for their potential status 
as a means of critique. And thirdly, the technique of parataxis as a form of writing that 
Adorno thought best expressed the inaccessibility of objectivity will be shown to be 
decisive  in  analyzing  Woolf’s  fragments.  What  I  hope  to  assemble,  therefore,  is  a 
constellation of ideas that map several points of connection between Adorno and Woolf. 
By effecting a salvaging of Woolf’s musical marginalia this thesis argues that ostensibly 
ill-informed  or naïve testimony can be given legitimacy within contemporary music 
criticism. In addition, this thesis presents all the references to music found in Woolf’s 
diaries and letters, and, as such, the appendices found at the back of the dissertation 
constitute not only the first attempt to bring this material together, but are also presented 
in such a way so as to reinforce the paratactical nature of Woolf’s writing about music. 
That is to say, structurally, the appendices appear as they appear in Woolf’s original 
texts,  and  this  thesis  has,  self-consciously,  tried  to  resist  the  conceptual  over-
determination  of  these  fragments.  This  structural  consideration  implies  that  this 
dissertation fulfils a performative, as well an analytical function.  
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Introduction 
 
We went to Salome (Strauss, as you may know) last night. I was much excited, 
and  believe  that  it  is  a new  discovery.  He  gets  great emotion  into  his  music, 
without any beauty. However, Saxon thought we were encroaching upon Wagner, 
and we had a long and rather acid discussion. He has an amazing knowledge of 
detail – I can’t think why he doesn’t say something more interesting…I must start 
for the opera.  
 
(Virginia Woolf, letter to Vanessa Bell from Tuesday 24 August, 1909
1) 
 
Woolf’s veiled attack on Saxon Sydney-Turner’s urbane musical literacy reveals a 
question about the nature of musical criticism that precipitates much of the work done 
in this dissertation. Her accusation that ‘knowledge of detail’ does not necessarily yield 
something ‘interesting’ exposes more about the complexity of the relationship between 
aesthetic experience and criticism than this seemingly incidental remark would have us 
believe.  But  therein  lies  its  importance.  Woolf’s  distracted  afterthoughts  about  the 
limitations of technical interpretation touch on a potentially philosophically rich terrain, 
and  yet,  she  resists  developing  it.  This  dissertation  will  continually  evoke  Woolf’s 
critical exemplarity via her own eschewal of intellectual mastery of the domain of music. 
Her  writings  about  music  are  framed  by  an  anxiety  arising  from  the  practical 
impossibility of sound judgement around music. She writes to Ethel Smyth in 1932, 
‘My taste is very limited. I can’t judge music any more than someone else can judge 
articles in the T.L.S.’ (L4: 135) It is with this in mind, then, that my approach to Woolf 
focuses on a less well defined area of her work and of Woolf scholarship in general, 
namely, her music criticism.  
Even at this early stage, it might be a little misleading to speak in “concrete terms” of 
Virginia Woolf's music criticism as a bona fide subgenre of her oeuvre. Such a category 
might imply that a well-defined body of work of music criticism already exists, waiting 
to be examined. However, this is not the case. Many of Woolf's thoughts, musings, and 
opinions about music were articulated in the form of letters, diary entries and essays, 
and often did not reach the form of a finished piece of prose. It is well-known that 
Woolf felt passionately about music, and, certainly, in many instances in her fiction, 
                                                
1 (Woolf, 1975: 410)  
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music and musicians play an integral role in the narrative and through quite abstract 
invocations of musical qualities in the composition of the fiction itself. Rachel Vinrace 
is a pianist in The Voyage Out (1915); Cassandra is a flautist and keenly appreciates 
Mozart in Night and Day (1919); Between the Acts (1941) is replete with references to 
musical performances, singing and dancing during the staging of a village pageant. In 
addition to this, several of her short stories also have explicit musical content, ‘The 
String Quartet’ (1921), ‘A Simple Melody’ (1925) and ‘Slater’s Pins have no Points’ 
(1928). Interestingly, though, and as Emilie Crapoulet points out in her study Virginia 
Woolf: A Musical Life, what is significant about Woolf’s relationship to music is the 
relative silence she maintains with regards to any development of broader philosophical 
or aesthetic arguments: 
 
It is particularly noticeable […] that any aesthetic, artistic or philosophical inquiry 
into the nature and role of art is constantly avoided: thwarted by a narrator who 
breaks off from giving us the full conversations […] conversations are implied but 
never fully disclosed. (Crapoulet, 2009: 7) 
 
This dissertation seeks to develop arguments that accommodate Woolf’s reticence, 
by theorising that music, for Woolf, is a way of sustaining a specific kind of subjective 
stance that resists fully determining its own experiences. Furthermore, I will suggest 
that from this, it is possible to speculate that music functions as a vanishing point in 
Woolf’s  non-fiction  and  organises  its  discourse  in  such  a  way  as  to  reinforce  and 
legitimise  the  postulate  of  a  fragmentary  subjectivity.  Some  commentators  have 
recognised that Woolf’s non-fiction has still to be comprehensively analysed. As Leila 
Brosnan  points  out  in  her  study  Reading  Virginia  Woolf’s  Essays  and  Journalism, 
Woolf’s  non-fiction  'has  been  viewed  from  angles  that  disguise  its  shape  and 
dimensions.'  (Brosnan, 1997: 2) My reading of her non-fiction will contribute to the 
development of these hitherto overlooked aspects of Woolf’s criticism.  
However, this salvaging of these overlooked aspects of Woolf’s non-fiction is also 
motivated  by  the  potential  to  realise  the  philosophical  rigour  that  is  implicit  in  her 
thought. To that end, it is my intention to show that by reading Woolf's thoughts on 
music in parallel with T.W. Adorno’s aesthetic theories, we are propelled to significant 
insights into Woolf and to the wider context of modernist criticism. And beyond that, 
this work will bear upon the practice of criticism and the role of the critic.  
Broadly speaking, therefore, this dissertation will analyse the work of Woolf in the 
light of Adorno’s theory of the aesthetic. The principal outcome of this endeavour will  
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be to effect what I have termed a salvaging of Woolf’s musical marginalia, and a small 
selection of her essays, by exploring the construction of subjectivity, and the ways in 
which music functions as a  site  for  the articulation  and  stabilisation  of a  particular 
subject position.
2 This will be done by reading Woolf’s work in parallel with Adorno’s 
philosophy  of  the  non-identical  in  order  to  suggest  that  subjectivity  and  aesthetic 
experience are constructed negatively in her diaries, letters and essays. That is to say, by 
reading her tendency to resist describing musical experiences precisely as a resistance to 
the subsumption of experience under concepts, this thesis will construct perspectives on 
criticism in three domains. These three domains are tantamount to a poetics of criticism. 
Firstly, Woolf’s attempts to write a critical selfhood, I argue, actually serve as a critique 
of  transcendental  subjectivity  and  undermine  the  ideology  of  a  priori  subjectivity
3. 
Secondly,  Woolf’s  essays  complement  work  done  by  Adorno  on  genre  theory  that 
asserts that contradiction remains essential to the critical essay. It is this contradiction 
that secures the method of negative dialectics, and is a contradiction that is fundamental 
to the architectonics of a modernist subjectivity. Woolf’s essays, therefore, will be read 
for their potential status as a means of critique. And thirdly, the technique of parataxis 
as a form of writing that Adorno thought best expressed the inaccessibility of objectivity 
will be shown to be decisive in analyzing Woolf’s fragments.  
At  this  juncture,  it  is  worth  trying  to  characterise  the  precise  nature  of  the 
relationship between Woolf and Adorno here. Woolf is not an example of an Adornoian 
thesis or concept. What I hope to assemble,  instead,  is a constellation of  ideas  that 
potentially map several points of connection between Adorno and Woolf. The adoption 
of the rhetoric of the constellation betrays certain sympathies with Adorno’s paratactic 
philosophy, and in this sense the following work self-consciously approaches reflection 
as  the  expression  of  an  attitude  towards  objectivity  and  not  as an  act  of subjective 
determination.
4  
 
 
                                                
2 By  using  the  word  salvage  I  make  tentative  reference  to  the  Benjaminian  notion  of  Die  Rettung 
(redemption/rescue). This has strong theological connotations of redemption that go beyond the scope of 
this dissertation, but do at some level inform my thinking. It also brings into view the idea of radical 
remembrance of what might be lost or overlaid by writing and history. 
3 Adorno refers to the transcendental subject as an agent of ideology, ‘The definition of the transcendental 
as that which is necessary, a definition added to functionality and generality, expresses the principle of the 
self-preservation of the species.’ (ND: 179) 
4 In Negative Dialectics, Adorno writes that, ‘The constellation illuminates the specific side of the object, the 
side which to a classifying procedure is either a matter of indifference or a burden.’ (ND: 162)  
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Literary Resources 
 
From Woolf’s oeuvre, I began by looking at the marginalia and three essays which 
refer  specifically  to  music,  but  as  this  study  has  developed,  I  have  broadened  this 
reading of Woolf and now include reflections on the following essays, ‘The Common 
Reader’ (1925), ‘The Modern Essay’ (1925), ‘Street Haunting: A London Adventure’ 
(1927), ‘Sketch of the Past.’(1939) and ‘Evening over Sussex: Reflections in a Motor 
Car’ (1942). Strictly speaking, Woolf wrote only three essays on music,
5 and the rest of 
her musical marginalia consists of copious diary entries and letters that often did not 
reach the form of a finished piece of prose. Instead, what is left is a series of fragments 
that could, in essence, give us an insight into how she appropriated music and aesthetic 
experience in her writing. The present study is original in that it brings together as many 
of these extracts as has been possible and argues that Woolf has something significant 
to say about musical experience and the nature of musical criticism. No other work has 
yet tackled this particular subject.  Of recent Woolf scholarship that also concerns music, 
Emma  Sutton  has  written  numerous  papers  on  Wagnerism  and  Woolf  that  address, 
predominantly, the cultural politics of music. Elicia Clements has taken up the socio-
psychological role of music  in Woolf’s fiction in her article,  ‘Virginia Woolf, Ethel 
Smyth and Music: Listening as a Productive Mode of Social Interaction’ (2005), David 
Dowling, in ‘The Aesthetic Education of Virginia Woolf’, mentions music in passing as 
having  an  effect  on  the  general  development  of  Woolf’s  aesthetic  faculties.  Karen 
Smythe  in  ‘Virginia  Woolf’s  Elegiac  Enterprise’  (1992)  makes  analogies  between 
Woolf’s work and the musical form of the elegy. A chapter in the collection of essays, 
The Multiple Muses of Virginia Woolf (1993) entitled ‘“The Second Violin Tuning in the 
Ante-Room”:  Virginia  Woolf  and  Music’  pays  homage  to  the  musical  influences  in 
Woolf’s upbringing.  
But perhaps the most important text of recent scholarship concerning Woolf and 
music, for  the  purposes  of  this  dissertation,  has  been  Sanja  Bahun’s essay,  ‘Broken 
Music, Broken History: Sounds and Silence in Virginia Woolf’s “Between the Acts”’ 
which is part of a forthcoming edition on Woolf and Music.
 6 Bahun’s essay begins by 
                                                
5 In chronological order, ‘Street Music’, ‘The Opera’, and ‘Impressions at Bayreuth’ can all be found in The 
Essays of Virginia Woolf: Volume 1 1904-12, ed. by Andrew McNeillie, 6 vols (San Diego; New York; London: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986).  
6 Virginia Woolf and Music, ed. Adriana Varga (Indianapolis: University of Indiana, forthcoming).  
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recognising Woolf’s (and in this instance Schoenberg’s) concern to develop a means of 
expressing  ‘the  variegation  and  simultaneity  of  impressions  received  by  the  human 
mind/body’ (Bahun, forthcoming). Bahun makes the connection between Schoenberg 
and  Woolf  by  drawing  out  a  shared  preoccupation  with  the  fragmentary  nature  of 
experience  and  their  concordant  desire  to  make  these  fragments  whole,  ‘To  capture 
heterogeneity – or, if one wills, isolation – of these fragments and yet present them as a 
“unified whole,” becomes a common mission of modernist music and literature.’ (2) 
Their common mission, as Bahun puts it, highlights ‘the congruity between Woolf’s 
mature art and the modernist music poetics.’ Moreover, ‘this correspondence is based 
neither on transposition nor on emulation; it is expression wrought by shared history.’ (5) 
This  shared  history  is  one  which  seeks  to  redeem  itself  through  the  ‘(re)generative 
powers  of  art’  (6),  and  thus,  modern  aesthetic  techniques  are  forced  to  adapt  and 
respond to the ‘annihilating work of history’ (6) by finding a way of articulating the 
‘(im)  possibility  of  human  agency  at  the  beginning  of  the  Second  World  War.’  (6) 
Woolf’s  Between  the  Acts  is  read  for  the  ways  in  which  it  might  represent  ‘the 
emancipation of sounds’ (15), presumably in reference to Schoenberg’s emancipation of 
dissonance  in  which  there  is  no  formal  obligation  to  resolve  harmonic,  melodic  or 
rhythmic tension. The dialectic is reinterpreted as being agonic in Bahun’s essay: 
 
For Woolf as much as for Schoenberg, the self-reproductive way in which history 
unfolds  is  a  continuous  recurrence  of  agons  between  conjoined  opposites  –  a 
structure of unrest that may take the form of historical games, struggles between 
the  sexes,  chords  in  tension,  verbal  juxtapositions,  and  epistemic  or  harmonic 
unresolves. (14) 
 
This implicit mode of contradiction is precisely what this dissertation seeks to interpret 
in reference to Woolf’s rendering of a self, and in this sense, could be said to be a 
developing of the ‘self-reproductive’ movement that Bahun refers to. 
In addition to these explicitly musical essays, the present thesis is also indebted to 
the following books which aided my research on Woolf’s essays and the discourse of 
criticism: Ann Banfield, The Phantom Table: Woolf, Fry, Russell and the Epistemology 
of Modernism (2000), Leila Brosnan, Reading Virginia Woolf’s Essays and Journalism 
(1997), Claire de Obaldia, The Essayistic Spirit: Literature, Modern Criticism and the 
Essay  (1995),  Graham  Good,  The  Observing  Self:  Rediscovering  the  Essay  (1988), 
Elena  Gualtieri,  Virginia  Woolf’s  Essays:  Sketching  the  Past  (2000),  Beth  Carole 
Rosenberg and Jeanne Dubino (eds.) Virginia Woolf and the Essay (1997).   
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In addition to Woolf’s writing, I will be working closely with two of Adorno’s 
essays, ‘Subject and Object’ (1969) and ‘The Essay as Form’ (1958), as well as his 
major works Negative Dialectics (1966) and Aesthetic Theory (1970). My reasons for 
choosing to focus on Adorno’s late work Negative Dialectics and the posthumously 
published  Aesthetic  Theory  is  because  they  represent,  amongst  other  things,  two 
extremes of Adorno’s post-war thought that must be read as one and the same effort to 
sustain  writing, and indeed,  aesthetic experience  in  the  dialectic  of melancholy  and 
redemption. If Negative Dialectics is a diagnosis of the failure of philosophy and the 
Western Marxist tradition, then Aesthetic Theory can be read as the attempt to salvage 
something from the failure of reason through the redemptive power of art. Both works 
confirm  Adorno’s  commitment  to  the  concept  of  the  non-identical,  that  is,  to  the 
resistance to the dominating impulse in thought that seeks to synthesise experience with 
conceptual thought and resolve immanent dialectical tensions. This commitment to the 
non-identical presents itself formally in Adorno’s work; neither Aesthetic Theory nor 
Negative  Dialectics  are  written  in  continuous  prose,  both  resist  paraphrase  (true 
thinking,  for  Adorno,  resists  paraphrase),  and  both  to  some  extent  resist  easy 
comprehension. But Adorno’s refusal to organize his arguments and observations into 
subordinating  hierarchies  which privilege one position over another were more than 
choices  in  style,  they  were  fundamental  to  his  rhetoric  of  the  constellation;  a 
Benjaminian term that he adopted to characterize a mode of theorization which clusters 
contrasting,  as  opposed  to  homogenous,  elements  so  as  to  resist  any  reduction  to 
fundamental  essences  or  grounding  principles.  Woolf’s  mirroring  of  Adorno’s 
paratactic style through the presentation of formal techniques like ellipses, juxtaposition, 
bathos and fragmentary, non-linear passages of text confirm the possibility of reading 
Woolf’s as paradigmatic of a non-synthesising, non-dominating discourse.  
I characterise my use of Adorno as facilitating a salvaging of fugitive experience 
in  Woolf.  The  idea  of salvaging  signifies  a  potential  rescuing  of  material  that  may 
otherwise go unnoticed. The peripheral nature of the remarks about music and musical 
experiences  contained  within  Woolf’s  oeuvre  means  that  they  could,  ostensibly,  be 
regarded as biographical debris; remnants of daily life that are without value, the scraps 
or  detritus  of  a  writer  who  is  perhaps  better  known  for  her  achievements  in  and 
contributions to British modern letters, rather than for her insights into music. A survey 
of recent literature on Woolf suggests that interest in the critical import of her essays 
and other non-fictional writing continues to gather force. But what is distinctive about 
my study is  the explicitly theoretical nature of the analysis. The work done  here  is  
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therefore dependent on the veracity of Adorno’s theses. Given the highly speculative 
nature of his reflections on the aesthetic and artistic life, it is not my intention here to 
provide  advocacy  for  Adorno’s  cultural  theory,  rather,  by  reading  Woolf  through 
Adorno, I will argue that it is possible to find points of mutual elucidation in their 
respective work. 
This  elucidation  might  also  be  thought  of  in  terms  of  Martin  Heidegger’s 
Entsprechung
7, a term he uses to imply that any questioning and subsequent response to 
something be vital, alive, a resonant receptiveness, or a ‘responsion’ in the liturgical 
sense of participatory engagement. (Steiner, 1978:34) Any reading of Woolf’s work, 
therefore, must not be a passive reading, it must not simply present an analysis or give 
an  interpretation  of  a  given  text  because  the  term  Entsprechung  implies  that  a 
correspondence  takes  space  between  thinker  and  thought,  between  the  fundamental 
question and the response. The thinker, der Denker, and the critic, is responsible in and 
for his practice of thinking. Considering Woolf then becomes more about listening to 
her  texts,  hearing  what they  might  say and  being  receptive to  whatever  they  might 
present  to  us.  In  answer  to  the  question  ‘What  is  philosophy?’  Steiner  notices  that 
Heidegger actually makes use of a musical analogy to describe what he considers to be 
the only genuine kind of response to such a question: ‘Where there is true matching and 
correspondence,  where  question  and  response  are  in  harmonic  relation,  there  is  a 
phenomenon of accord, of right tuning.’ (1978: 35) To look for moments of accord 
between  Woolf  and  Adorno  might  also  be  a  way  to  phrase  the  nature  of  the  work 
undertaken here.  
Much  Anglo-American  scholarship  subsequent  to  Adorno’s  arguments 
reconfigures  itself  around  the  philosophy/art  dialectic,  and  of  that  subsequent 
scholarship the present work is indebted to, amongst others, J.M. Bernstein’s chapter on 
Adorno  in  Fate  of  Art,  (1993)  Andrew  Bowie’s  location  of  Adorno  within  wider 
philosophical conceptions of subjectivity in his book Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From 
Kant to Nietzsche
8 (1990), and Lambert Zuidevaart’s Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory: The 
                                                
7 See Martin Heidegger, What is Philosophy? (London: Vision Press Limited, 1956) from p.69 for a lengthy 
exposition on Entsprechung. 
8 The importance of the tradition of musical-aesthetic thought is described by Andrew Bowie who, in his 
chapter ‘Music, Language and Literature’ from Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche gives us a 
reason why it would be useful to remember G.W.F. Hegel when we consider the treatment of the concept 
of  music  in  late  19th  Century  German  aesthetic  thought:  ‘His  remarks  in  the  Aesthetics,  though 
enlightening in themselves, are probably most notable because of the way they epitomize a subsequent 
view  of  music  which  plays  a  role  in  much  subsequent  aesthetic  theory,  particularly  in  the  Marxist 
tradition.’. Bowie, A., Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1990) p.180.  
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Redemption of Illusion (1991) for its clear explication of some of the more politically 
charged aspects of Adorno’s theory. Many of these texts have in common the shared 
acknowledgement of how problematic it is to try to re-frame and reconsider Adorno’s 
arguments given the inordinately complex and, at times, inaccessibly dense nature of his 
writing. A consequence of this re-framing and reconsidering of Adorno’s work is that 
much secondary literature chooses to focus its summation of Adorno’s thought towards 
different  apexes.  In  other  words,  it  is  not  just  the  complicated  and,  at  times, 
contradictory nature of Adorno’s thought that one must come to terms with, but also the 
fact that so much of what has subsequently been written, can only ever, in truth, refer 
with any great authority, to one or two aspects of his theory. This is, however, likely to 
be more an indication of the diversity and overwhelmingly vast scope of Adorno’s work 
than it is a reflection of those who commit to understanding him. 
In  the  figure  of  Adorno,  then,  we  have  on  the  one  hand  the  philosopher, 
aesthetician, social theorist, music critic, musicologist, composer, and on the other hand 
there is Adorno the essayist and literary theorist, and it is with these latter identities that 
this  dissertation  will  be  concerned.  One  of  the  chief  concerns  of  my  analyses  of 
Adorno’s work has been their form, and  the  fact that, independent of their content, 
much of his work acquires its own aesthetic; the texts presented here are aphoristic, 
incomplete and fragmentary. And in this sense, they could be seen to be ‘in tune’ with 
Woolf’s marginalia which are also sketchy, faltering and unfinished.  
It can be shown that Woolf’s relationship with Bloomsbury was another example of 
the ways in which an essayistic approach to criticism was being fostered. Furthermore, 
the rhythms and pace of the ‘essayistic spirit’ can be seen to be supported and reinforced 
by an urban environment.  In a letter to Vita Sackville-West written on 13
 April 1926 
she writes: 
 
We all chatter hard, about music – Eddy explains about 19
th Century music and 
rhetoric – Duncan attacks: but seldom uses the word he means: he sometimes has 
to  unbutton  his  waistcoat  while  endeavouring:  very  interesting:  we  compare 
movies and operas: I'm writing that for Todd: rather brilliant. All, to me, highly 
congenial, and even a little exciting, in the spring light; hammers tapping outside; 
trees shaking green in the Square: suddenly we find it’s 7 and all jump up. (L3: 
255) 
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‘Chattering  hard’  about  music  was  a  pastime  Woolf  and  the  Bloomsbury  Group 
indulged in frequently; in fact, chattering about music was more often done by Woolf 
than, say, playing or performing music. Though not explicitly ‘musical’ herself (musical 
in the sense that we might understand somebody to be who can, for example, play an 
instrument or read musical notation) Woolf, as has been shown, expended a great deal 
of time and energy not just attending actual musical performances and concerts, but also 
participating in and contributing to the discourse that surrounded music at the time. In a 
letter to Vanessa Bell on Monday, 10
 August 1908 she writes: 
 
 
By this mornings post, too, I got a card, with musical hieroglyphs; halfway though 
breakfast, I sang my song to keep myself in spirits, and saw it, as though in a 
mirror before me – mocking me. I at once changed my tune, and sang the second 
song; which no one knows. Tell the Chipmonk [Clive] his malice is thwarted; I 
sang for half an hour, and all the house crouched on the step to listen. (L1: 348) 
 
 
Woolf very much enjoyed music and wanted to be good at music, and at talking and 
writing about music. Most of her musical culture revolved around the London scene at 
the time, and a lot of her diary and letter entries simply state that she was going to or 
had been to a concert. In fact, though, there is reason to believe that music played more 
than  a  supporting  role  in  the  development  of  Woolf’s  critical  vocabulary.  She  was 
continually searching for the kind of established critical framework that would allow her 
to write fluently about any given art form, and although she could rely on the well-
established literary canon of criticism, she would often express her frustration at the 
lack of a canon of music criticism. It may well be, then, that Woolf’s frustration at the 
absence of a more formal critical language for music was compounded by the informal 
nature  of  her  immediate  intellectual  and  cultural  surroundings,  most  notably  the 
Bloomsbury Group. But it may also be that this frustration led Woolf to developing an 
essayistic  approach  to music,  as  opposed  to  a  more  formally  coherent  one  that  she 
thought she lacked.  
Woolf’s developing critical style in the context of Bloomsbury demonstrates this 
perfectly: the informality of the intellectual style of Bloomsbury fostered a longing for a 
more formal set of critical-analytical tools with which she could write about music, yet 
at the same time, this informality also allowed her to develop the hypothesis that a 
critical response to a work of art could manifest itself in the preservation of the distance  
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between the art-work and the viewer, listener or reader. Rather than attempting to over-
determine  the  work  of  art  through  interpretation  or  explanation  (both  of  which  a 
rigorously formal musical-technical vocabulary might facilitate), Woolf intuited that an 
adequate response to a work of art might mobilise and deploy alternative, essayistic 
critical strategies that emerged from a more sense-oriented, more immediate kind of 
engagement  with  art.  It  is  my  intention  here  to  go  into  more  detail  about  the 
Bloomsbury Group, and they are discussed as an example of how the essayistic spirit 
may have come to be fostered in Woolf, a spirit that begins with the people she lived 
and worked amongst. 
 
 
Bloomsbury and Musical London  
 
The Bloomsbury Group has come to promote, stand for, even, the development and 
radicalisation of aesthetic and artistic ideals, and they may also be remembered for their 
commitment to the art of criticism, and the discourse of judgement concerning art and 
literature.  Speaking  straightforwardly  (following  from  Woolf’s  own  example  on  the 
subject), Bloomsbury could be considered a place, a group, a specific juncture in history, 
an artistic assemblage, a collection of friends, or an intellectual clique. And, for the 
most part, all of these labels would possess an element of truth and could be regarded 
individually (and collectively) as a reasonably accurate summation of what Bloomsbury 
was. S.P. Rosenbaum writes in the introduction to Victorian Bloomsbury: The Early 
Literary History of the Bloomsbury Group: 
 
The Bloomsbury Group was a collectivity of friends and relations who knew and 
loved one another for a period of time extending over two generations. Because 
friendships were the original and enduring bonds of the Group it is somewhat 
misleading to think of Bloomsbury as a movement based on philosophical, moral, 
artistic, or political affinities. The Group had such affinities, and understanding 
them is essential to its history, but the affinities came with the friendships, not the 
other way round. (Rosenbaum, 1987: 3) 
 
  In terms of people,
 the Bloomsbury Group was a collection of English writers, 
philosophers and artists who frequently met between about 1907 and 1930 at the houses 
of Clive and Vanessa Bell in Bloomsbury. They discussed aesthetic and philosophical 
questions and were strongly influenced by G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica (1903) and by 
A.N. Whitehead's and Bertrand Russell's Principia Mathematica (1910-13).
 Nearly all  
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the male members of the group had been at Trinity or King's College, Cambridge and 
most of them had been "Apostles", i.e. members of the "society," a select, semi-secret 
university club for the discussion of serious questions, founded at Cambridge in the late 
1820s  by  J.F.D.  Maurice  and  John  Sterling.  Tennyson,  Arthur  Hallam,  Edward 
Fitzgerald, and Leslie Stephen had also been Apostles. By the early 1900s, the literary 
critic  Lowes  Dickinson,  the  philosophers  Henry  Sidgwick,  J.M.E.  McTaggart,  A.N. 
Whitehead,  G.E.  Moore,  and  the  art  critic  Roger  Fry,  who  became  one  of  the 
Bloomsbury group himself, were all members of the group. The Bloomsbury Group also 
included the novelist E.M. Forster, the biographer Lytton Strachey, the art critic Clive 
Bell, the painters Vanessa Bell and Duncan Grant, the economist John Maynard Keynes, 
the  Fabian  writer  Leonard  Woolf,  and,  of  course,  Virginia  Woolf.
  Other  members 
included Desmond McCarthy, Arthur Waley, Saxon Sidney-Turner, Robert Trevelyan, 
Francis Birrell, J.T. Sheppard, the critic Raymond Mortimer and the sculptor Stephen 
Tomlin, Bertrand Russell, Aldous Huxley, and T.S. Eliot.  
In order to contextualise the development of Woolf’s essayistic spirit, it is necessary 
to remember some of the ideas that influenced the artistic and intellectual thinking of 
the  Bloomsbury  Group.  These  ideas  (very  broadly  speaking)  could  be  said  to  be 
concerned with the influences of the growth of Socialism and the artistic movements of 
Impressionism and Post-Impressionism. For the purposes of this dissertation, I wish to 
focus on a more oblique aspect of the Group’s intellectual and artistic nature, an aspect 
which I think supports the notion of Woolf’s developing essayistic practices. I will refer 
to this aspect as the dialogic
9 nature of Bloomsbury. In a letter to Vita Sackville-West 
written in 1927 Woolf comments that: 
 
English village life seems to me stark raving mad – their feuds, their jealousies, 
their  suspicions  –  Oh  and  does  it  strike  you  that  one's  friendships  are  long 
conversations, perpetually broken, but always about the same thing with the same 
person? With Lytton I talk about reading; with Clive about love; with Nessa about 
people; with Roger about art; with Morgan about writing. (L3: 337) 
 
 
It could be said that of the many influences that the Bloomsbury Group had on 
Woolf, it was their conversation and dialogue that is most relevant to the concept of 
essayism and to this dissertation. The nature of the intellectual and artistic dialogue that 
was  characteristic  of  Bloomsbury,  in  which  individual  positions  could  be  seen  as 
                                                
9 The Bakhtinian term ‘dialogic’ is developed in his work, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, trans. by 
Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, ed. by Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981).  
 
19 
 
changing and mobile, ill-drawn, perhaps, directly pertain to essayism and the notion that 
the essayist works out his position in dialogic fashion. Moreover this approach means 
that a critical subjectivity can come to be represented by the momentary, haphazard, 
even aimless character of conversation that eventually finds form in Woolf’s essays, 
diary entries and letters. Furthermore, not only does this approach make essayism an 
extension of a critical practice that already occurs, (that of dialogue, sophistry, debate, 
Plato etc) it also seems to reflect the inherently unstable quality of Woolf's (indeed so, 
perhaps all of our own) evaluative judgements about art, and in particular, about music. 
 Reading any biographical history of Bloomsbury, one cannot but be struck by the 
seemingly exhaustive nature of Bloomsbury's dialogue, and the practically symbiotic 
relationship between intellectual and artistic contemplation or reflection, and talking, or, 
as was often the case judging by Woolf's correspondence, arguing. Quentin Bell says 
this about the group's capacity for and level of dialogue: 
 
Nothing is more indicative of a group than its talk, nothing is more difficult to 
reconstruct. Even of those latter conversations...little now remains...I should say 
that the talk was not brilliant. By that I mean that there was not so much in the 
way  of  pyrotechnics,  none  of  that  launching  of  mots,  that  conscious  soaring 
scintillation...It is true that Maynard  Keynes was fond of  paradox, that Lytton 
Strachey could suddenly produce remarks of devastating acuteness, and that the 
whole of Desmond McCarthy’s astonishing charm seemed to lie in his tongue, 
while Virginia Woolf was able, in later life, to enchant her friends with a particular 
kind of conversational fantasy. But the tone was, I think, derived from G.E. Moore, 
which meant that there was a certain high seriousness in the conversation despite 
its gaiety, that there was quite as much argument as gossip, and that in argument it 
was  supposed,  at  all  events,  that  the  contributors  were  looking  for  truth,  not 
victory. (Bell, 1968: 33) 
 
 
In  many  ways,  as  important  as  it  is  to  shed  light  upon  the  aesthetic  debates 
surrounding the Bloomsbury group, any consideration of their reflections on art must to 
some degree be conditioned by the political climate at the turn of the century. Despite 
the fact that Woolf and her contemporaries could be said to have been entering an ethos 
of modernism, or could be thought to have produced work belonging to a modernist era, 
many  of  Bloomsbury's  and indeed  many  of  Woolf's  early  engagements  with  art  and 
literature  contained  the  residue  of  a  Romantic  idealism  that  stubbornly  refused  to 
disappear from the discourse of art. This, of course, is not a feature specific to Woolf but 
is characteristic of modernism in general, even in its most brutal forms.  
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Indeed, according to E.J. Hobsbawm, the development of artistic culture in Britain 
from the late 1870s to 1914 was reflective of a much more complex divide that seemed 
to be appearing across sections of society. For instance,  the status of art during this 
period was indicative of a much wider sense of crisis that revolved around the terms 
'modern' and 'contemporary' and which questioned the very identity of bourgeois society. 
Hobsbawm argues that this crisis could be identified in the differences between those 
who made art and those who consumed it. Whilst artists, he suggests, were invested in 
the 'flight forward' into progress and development, the general public were left stranded 
by  contemporary  art  practices  that  displayed  a  growing  interest  in  the  concepts  of 
utopianism and theory. The general public: 
 
Unless converted by fashion and  snob-appeal, murmured defensively  that they 
'didn't know about art, but they knew what they liked', or retreated into the sphere 
of  'classic'  works  whose  excellence  was  guaranteed  by  the  consensus  of 
generations. (Hobsbawm, 1987: 219-20) 
 
We see then that early twentieth century Britain was itself concerned with the nature 
of criticism and its epistemological status. Unable to judge whether what they liked was 
permissible, the British public relied on the established repertoire of musical classics. 
Such 'classics' in music at least could be found, very generally speaking, in the work of 
Mahler,  Strauss,  Debussy,  Elgar,  Vaughan  Williams  and  Sibelius,  and  could  also  be 
detected in the continual growth of the operatic repertoire, with Wagner, Strauss and 
Puccini constituting the main stock of composers whose work was being played in the 
concert  halls.  In  literature  too, the  names  of  writers  such  as  Thomas  Hardy,  Marcel 
Proust  and  Thomas  Mann  were  on  the  cusp  of  becoming  commonplace  and,  on  the 
whole, one could argue that the status of 'high art' at the turn of the twentieth century had 
never been more secure. However, the most  obvious threat  to what had  come to  be 
considered the 'serious' arts was the simultaneous growth of more popular forms of art; 
operettas and popular song, musical comedy and bandstand orchestras, reproductions of 
paintings  and  books,  the  genre  of  jazz  and  the  beginnings  of  the  cinema  were  all 
symptomatic of a shifting cultural demographic that was revolutionising technology and 
discovering the potential mass market appeal of art. Quite simply, it was 'the sheer size 
and wealth of an urban middle class able to devote more of its attention to culture, as 
well  as  the  great  extension  of  literate  and  culture-hungry  lower  middle  classes  and 
sections of the working classes' that make it possible to view the early years of twentieth 
century Britain in terms of its relative artistic and cultural achievements. However, all  
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this obvious change and apparent 'progress' in cultural life could not disguise a persistent 
uncertainty about the concept of the 'modern'. (Hobsbawm, 1987: 221) 
 
Woolf  was  well  aware  of  these  tendencies  and  worried  away  at  the  problem  of 
consumption, the turnover of novelty, and of the very real and problematic effects of 
cultural inundation (which arguably also define early 21st Century cultural economies). 
In ‘The Decay of Essay Writing’ she writes: 
 
But if you have a monster like the British public to feed, you will try to tickle its 
stale  palate  in new  ways; fresh and amusing shapes must be  given  to the old 
commodities.  (SE:3)  
  
 
As a final remark of this introduction, it is worth pointing out that many of the marginal 
texts that come under scrutiny in this dissertation are not directly intended to feed “a 
monster like the British public”. Rather, they belong to sites of personal privacy or 
intersubjective  intimacy.  And  writing  that  occupies  this  peculiar  register  is  perhaps 
difficult to subject to rigorous scrutiny since it was not composed in a manner that was 
conditioned  by  the  criterion  of  defensibility.
10 But  what  remains  significant  about 
Woolf’s  marginal  writings  is  that  fugitive  experience  becomes  a  site  of  intense 
reflection.  
 
                                                
10 It is arguable that as Woolf became more self-consciously ‘a writer’, she would have begun to compose 
her diary entries and letters. But, still, the point remains that she would not have composed them in 
anticipation of them being subjected to any overtly philosophical scrutiny.  
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Chapter 1 
Philosophical and Methodological Considerations 
 
  In this chapter, I will survey and analyse the decisive philosophical concepts that 
underpin this thesis and will draw out their methodological implications. Rather than 
setting out methodological principles from which systematic conclusions can be drawn, 
what this chapter will do is acclimatise the reader to a philosophical approach that is 
suspect  of  over-rationalising  the  process  of  generating  knowledge.  I  am  presenting, 
therefore,  philosophical  styles  which  are  self-critical,  self-reflexive,  hesitant,  and 
therefore, at times, torturously slow in building their intellectual resources. But this is 
precisely  what  it  required  for  this  examination  of  criticism.  In  a  sense,  criticism  is 
constituted by unstable and often ill-defined practices and concepts. Woolf occupies 
these unstable domains in a remarkable way. The first, and most fundamental idea that 
is pertinent here is that of dialectics. Arguably, many of the key insights of dialectical 
theory have been mislaid, along with the problematics that gave way to the theory in the 
first instance. 
 
The Dialectic 
 
The concept of dialectics is crucial to the arguments presented here. In order to get 
at the interior of many of the rhetorical constructions of criticism, it is important to 
subject  them  to  their  epistemological  presuppositions.  I  am  arguing  throughout  this 
dissertation that these presuppositions have been ruthlessly examined since the high 
point of Idealist philosophy in the late Eighteenth Century. It has been acknowledged 
countless  times  that  Hegel's  philosophical  aesthetics  has  been  crucial  to  many 
subsequent reflections on art and experience. Most importantly though, for criticism, 
was his development of the concept of dialectics - precisely because it challenges the 
idea that we are obliged to make distinctions, either metaphysical or actual, between 
categories of understanding. By removing the limitations or boundaries of separation, 
dialectics  undermines  many  of  the  dualisms  inherent  within  a  philosophical 
understanding  of  art  (true-false,  beautiful-ugly,  etc.).  Thus,  dialectics  fundamentally 
destabilizes our relation to objects and concepts, and for Adorno, dialectical thought 
was more representative of what it is actually like to be in the world.   
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Though  Hegel  never  wrote  explicitly  on  the  philosophy  of  music,  or  on  the 
philosophy  of criticism,  his  work  is  still  relevant  here  by  virtue  of  his articulations 
regarding the cognitive processes of thinking and the consequent relationship between 
epistemology  and  aesthetics.  One  of  the  most  powerful  connections  between 
epistemology and aesthetics came to be epitomised by the Romantic concept of Bildung, 
(as  will  be  mentioned  in  Chapter  5  of  this  dissertation)  in  which  it  is  considered 
plausible, if not preferable, that one attain complete self-consciousness by way of an 
aesthetic education. For Hegel, however, it was conceptual thought that represents the 
greatest source of knowledge about the possibilities and potential of experience. It was 
essential, for him, that as thinking subjects we fully understand the various ‘stages’ and 
‘movements’  of  thought,  and  that  as  rational  beings  we  strive  for  the  objective 
articulation of self-consciousness and reality.  
It  was  in  the  Phenomenology  of  Spirit  (1807)  that  Hegel  first  set  out  his 
conceptions  of  forms  of  consciousness  as  part  of  his  system  of  idealist  philosophy 
(indeed,  Hegel  thought  of  the  Phenomenology  as  an  introduction  to  the  Science  of 
Logic). In part, his project was to expose the dialectical nature of consciousness through 
its inherent contradictions. Broadly speaking and contra Kantian philosophy, Hegel is 
critical of the idea that reality appears to us through our faculty of knowledge, and that, 
in order to get access to this reality, we must therefore analyse knowledge. In fact, he 
dismisses Kant's argument – which states that as a consequence of our reliance on the 
subjective  faculty  of  knowledge  we  are  unable  to  know  things  in  themselves,  and 
reinterprets  the  problem  as  one  that  is  focused  on  the  immanent  critique  of 
consciousness itself. It is almost as if Hegel is unwilling to engage with our potential 
capacity  to  know  what  is  'outside'  consciousness,  or,  indeed,  whether  this  is  at  all 
possible, before he has examined what we first come to encounter this 'outside' with, 
namely, consciousness. Furthermore, to truly understand this consciousness, we must 
begin  with  only  consciousness,  with  nothing  outside  consciousness,  so  that  the 
dialectical  process  can  articulate  itself  as  the  self-movement  of  consciousness,  ‘The 
series of configurations which consciousness goes through along this road is, in reality, 
the detailed history of the education of consciousness itself to the standpoint of Science’ 
(Hegel,  1807;  1977:  50)  Consciousness’s  self-relation  is  further  articulated 
‘Consciousness provides its own criterion from within itself, so that the investigation 
becomes a comparison of consciousness with itself’ (Hegel, 1807; 1977: 53). 
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The  Hegelian  dialectic  seeks  to  examine  the  conditions  of  our  conceptions  of 
knowledge, that is, it asks whether the material reality of knowledge corresponds with 
our conception of that knowledge. What things appear to be and what things really are 
is another way of understanding this distinction, and, for Hegel, the contradictions that 
arise within this relationship constitute much of his dialectical theory. Interestingly, it is 
useful to conceive of Hegelian dialectics as both historical and ontological, for whilst, in 
the first instance Hegel commits to engaging with reality in the historical sense, i.e., he 
explains dialectics through processes of human action (Master-Slave), he also devotes 
much time to understanding the nature of our conceptions of reality (perception, sense-
certainty  etc.,)  before  'applying'  his  theory  to  material  existence.  Nevertheless,  as 
Charles Taylor argues, these two strands of Hegelian dialectics are intimately bound: 
 
This  means  that  the  perfection  of  knowledge,  where  knowledge  of  the  world 
comes together with self-knowledge, has not always been realised. The practice of 
knowledge,  unlike  that  of  playing  hockey,  say,  cannot  be  divorced  from  our 
conception of it. Knowledge is ipso facto imperfect if it is in error about its own 
nature.  Hence  perfect  knowledge  can  only  be  attained  when  men  reach  an 
adequate  conception  of  it.  Thus  the  dialectic  of  theories  of  knowledge  is 
connected to a dialectic of historical forms of consciousness. (Taylor, 2005: 132) 
 
Criticism, in the broadest sense therefore, both institutionally and culturally, could be 
seen to constitute knowledge as such. But further inquiry into knowledge, as Adorno 
argues, inevitably results in the tendency to synthesise or master our experience in the 
name  of  knowledge.  The  concept  of  knowledge  carries  a  teleological  burden  that 
criticism  seeks  to  escape.  Moreover,  and  more  importantly  for  our  purposes  here, 
knowledge  can  only  ever  speak  to  universal  concepts,  thus,  the  non-identity  of 
experience is passed over in the pursuit of knowledge.  
In  Phenomenology  of  Spirit,  Hegel  presents us  with  the  idea that sense  certainty 
constitutes immediate and absolute knowledge. We sense things, they are just there, and 
we know them to be because they simply are. Initially, this register of understanding 
appears to be extremely rich, our sense certainty affords us seemingly inexhaustible 
access to knowledge and content. If we accept the notion that our senses can lead to an 
unobstructed account of the world and of objects, for example, there is a table because I 
can see it, I can see that it is blue, that it is smooth, then we seem have an unrivalled, 
'full' account of experience. However, merely stating that something just is, involves us 
simply registering the being of things, and is in fact, according to Hegel, the poorest 
type of knowledge. We are not required to do any thinking and the immediacy of the 
object  appears  to  be  sufficient.  Furthermore,  what  sense-experience  does  not  
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acknowledge, what it leaves out is the content, the particulars or details of a thing. There 
is a tension, therefore, between the seemingly inexhaustible richness of sense-certainty, 
and the awareness that this sense-certainty is in fact, rather empty. Because, according 
to Hegel, we try to make out, to perceive what is before us, this act of perceiving is in 
fact our consciousness acknowledging that our sense-certainty is not as sufficient as we 
first think it to be. Sense-certainty deludes itself into thinking that it can account for the 
particulars  of  an  object  or  a  thing,  but  in  truth,  all  it  is capable  of  is  expressing  a 
universal. All sense-certainty allows us to consider is the universal. What remains to be 
accounted for is the particularity of an object or experience.  
Adorno’s philosophy of the non-identical, essentially, his Negative Dialectics, was 
intended  to  produce  a  materialist  thinking  that  could  go  beyond  idealism  without 
incurring  the  double  accusation  of  transcendence  or  immediacy.
11 Identity  thinking 
claims that conceptual thought can seize hold of all and any object, including humans 
and human experiences, through manipulation of concepts alone. This thinking, Adorno 
strongly associates with the rise of the bourgeois class. The critique of identity thinking 
therefore, is a kind of ideology critique. However, any attempt to go beyond identity 
thinking from within the confines of transcendental thought,
12 gives rise to an equally 
untenable position; that is to say, it becomes self contradictory. In order to put into effect 
the  counterclaims  to  idealism,  one  would  have  to  believe  in  the  possibility  of 
transcendence and of a discourse in which things are merely given. These ‘givens’ of 
experience present thought with a fait accompli; inquiry can go no further. The way of 
out this problem for Adorno, was through immanent critique of the concept, but in such 
a way as to preserve the illusion of constitutive subjectivity.
13  
                                                
11 Negative Dialectics  was supposed  to  represent  a  critique  and  a development  of  Hegelian dialectics. 
Adorno’s primary concern was with the relinquishment of the drive to resolve dialectical tension, ‘As the 
thinker  immerses  himself  in  what  faces  him  to  begin  with,  in  the  concept,  and  as  he  perceives  its 
immanently antinomical character, he clings to the idea of something beyond contradiction.’ (ND: 146) 
12I  am  working  here  with  Kant’s  concept  of  transcendental  idealism.  One  of  the  most  fundamental 
relationships for Kant is one that concerns consciousness and reality, being and thought, subject or object. 
Before Kant, philosophy had worked on the assumption that there were objects in the world about whose 
existence we could be sure of, that is to say, we could assert the existence of objects outside of ourselves, 
objects were, to put it simply, just there. However, Kant argued that objects could not exist outside of our 
relation to them, that, in fact, the object existed for our consciousness, and that we could not be sure of the 
existence or reality or the world, outside of our own consciousness. This implied also, that we could not 
understand the nature of the concept of being, without understanding the nature of consciousness, and 
that indeed, being and consciousness were one and the same thing. Kant asserted that we could not know 
'things in themselves' but could only know them through our consciousness of them, that our experience 
of objects or of reality was mediated by our consciousness.  
13 Adorno reflects that, ‘The confidence that from immediacy, from the solid and downright primary, an 
unbroken entirety will spring – this confidence is an idealistic chimera.’ (ND: 40)  
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Taking up the left-over philosophical aporia present in a post-Hegelian and post-
Kantian world, one of Adorno’s central concerns was how to rescue philosophy from its 
own conceptualization, given that, for Adorno, rationality and philosophy had failed 
when it allowed the horror of Auschwitz to occur. In the now famous maxim, Adorno 
begins Negative Dialectics by claiming that, ‘Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, 
lives on because the moment to realize it was missed.’ (ND: 3) Rationality had become 
irrational, and the only way to salvage the discourse of philosophy would be to turn 
philosophy’s critical reflection back on itself. What this amounts to for Adorno, is the 
critique  of  metaphysical  a  prioris,  of  first  principles  or  essences.  Adorno’s  task, 
therefore, was to radically reinterpret subjectivity and the philosophy of the concept 
from within the confines of their own structures. This immanent critique gives rise to 
his philosophy of the non-identical. ‘The name of dialectics says no more, to begin with, 
than that objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder[…]’ (ND: 5). 
Identity thinking subsumes objects under concepts, but it doing so, it must necessarily 
forget some aspect of that object that the concept cannot account for. Concepts cannot 
ever completely grasp an object in its totality, but can render some partial aspect of it 
visible  to  language.  For  Adorno,  this  subjective  dominating  impulse  represents  a 
fundamental  injustice  to  the  object  at  hand,  because  some  aspect  of  it  will  be 
disregarded in the name of understanding. Yet we are faced with a problem because all 
thinking,  therefore,  is  compliant  with  identifying  thought,  ‘[…]  the  appearance  of 
identity is inherent in thought itself, in its pure form. To think is to identify.’ (ND: 5) 
The totalizing effect of identity thinking makes, for Adorno, a false whole which must 
therefore be shown to be false by the subject, ‘Aware that the conceptual totality is mere 
appearance, I have no way but to break immanently, in its own measure, through the 
appearance of total identity.’ (ND: 5) The non-identical, therefore, is the name given to 
the process which honours the particularity of experiences, events, people and objects. 
The non-identical gives form to the obscured aspects of an object. Woolf fits into this 
dialectical movement by virtue of the ways in which her work will be shown to honour 
this philosophy of the nonidentical by doing justice to those aspects of experience that 
identity thinking overlooks.  
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Expertise and Enigmaticalness 
 
The significance of a potential salvaging of Woolf’s musical marginalia and the 
mutuality  of  Adorno  and  Woolf’s  work  come  together  in  one  of  Adorno’s  under-
developed theses in the ‘Draft Introduction’ of Aesthetic Theory in which he writes: 
 
Aesthetics  was  productive  only  so  long  as  it  undiminishedly  respected  the 
distance from  the empirical and  with  windowless  thoughts  penetrated  into  the 
contents  of  its  other;  or  when,  with  a  closeness  bordering  on  embodiment,  it 
judged the work from within, as sometimes occurs in the scattered remarks of 
individual artists, which are important not as the expression of a personality that is 
hardly authoritative with regard to the work, but because often, without recurring 
to the subject, they document something of the experiential force of the work. 
These reports are often constrained by naiveté that society insists on finding in art. 
Artists  either  stubbornly  resist  aesthetics  with  artisanal  rancour,  or  the 
antidilettantes devise dilettantic theories that make do. (AT: 425) 
 
 
In other words, Woolf’s ‘scattered remarks’ about music are important not because 
they confirm or deny any aspect of Woolf’s character, but because they make comment 
upon the experiential. Again, the mutuality of Woolf and Adorno is evident from this 
quote because Woolf’s remarks require aesthetic theory if they are to be considered 
more than intuitions, and Adorno’s theory needs Woolf’s writing if it is to successfully 
conceptualise aesthetic experience without sacrificing the phenomenological.   
If, for argument’s sake we were to consider Woolf the musical dilettante in respect to 
a technical musical fluency and Adorno the connoisseur, then again, it seems possible to 
call into question Woolf’s contribution to a musical discourse. But it is precisely her 
status  as  dilettante  that  is  important  to  salvage,  because,  as  Adorno  notes,  Woolf’s 
dilettantism actually allows her to preserve what he terms art’s enigmaticalness, which 
in turn, produces an interpretation which recognizes the limits of pursuing complete 
comprehension of the art work. The preservation of art’s enigmaticalness represents the 
task of aesthetics for Adorno because it is the incomprehensibility of art that is to be 
comprehended, not necessarily the work in itself. Woolf’s relative  lack of expertise 
around music therefore brings us closer to the concept of enigmaticalness: 
 
Its enigmaticalness may in an elementary fashion confirm the so-called unmusical, 
who does not understand the ‘language of music,’ hears nothing but nonsense, and 
wonders what all the noise is about; the difference between what this person hears 
and what the initiated hear defines art’s enigmaticalness. (AT: 160)  
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  Woolf does not properly constitute what Adorno here calls ‘unmusical’; after 
all, she was famously a great admirer of music, and an enthusiastic listener of music. 
She knew very well what ‘all the noise [was] about’; she simply did not have a 
technical musical literacy. But we can see Woolf appearing more vividly in Adorno 
as he develops the concept of enigmaticalness: 
 
Whoever refuses to re-enact the work under the discipline it imposes falls under 
the empty gaze cast by a painting or a poem, the same empty gaze that, in a sense, 
the art-alien encounter in music; and it is precisely the empty questioning gaze 
that the experience and interpretation of artworks must assimilate if they are not to 
go astray; failing to perceive the abyss is no protection from it. (AT: 160) 
 
The first word that resonates with Woolf’s writing in Adorno’s quote is ‘re-enact,’ 
because, as I will show, some of Woolf’s writing can be thought of as having ‘musical’ 
qualities  itself,  with  rhythmic  and  melodic  features  being  thrown  forwards.  So  that 
while she may not be commenting explicitly on the work itself, she is, to an extent, re-
enacting a sonic memory through writing. Take her recollection of the sound of waves 
on the beach at St Ives from ‘Sketch of the Past’: ‘It is of hearing the waves breaking, 
one, two, one, two, and sending a splash of water over the beach; and then breaking, one, 
two, one, two, behind a yellow blind.’ (MoB: 78)  The breaking waves are rhythmised, 
and  she  discovers  a  metre  in  their  pattern.  This  metric  pattern  is  mimetically 
reconfigured in the repetition of ‘one, two, one, two,’ and the alliteration and assonance 
(‘sending’/  ‘splash’  and  ‘behind’/  ‘blind’)  apparent  in  the  phrase  mean  that  this 
particular memory is far from a distant recollection, rather the images and sounds of the 
past are given renewed status as lively sonic experiences.  And yet, this phrase, poetic as 
it is, seems also to engather a void into itself. There is nothing else going on other than a 
listening to the waves breaking, and the ‘yellow blind’ throws the picture off balance by 
reverting drastically to the visual, producing a synaesthetic clash between the visual and 
the aural. The ‘yellow blind’ invokes the visual, but the blind itself is an obscuring 
object and it creates a boundary between the inside and the outside. Furthermore, the 
phrase as a whole captures the non-locatability of the seascape. The phrase poeticises an 
empty listening. The ‘empty gaze’ can be salvaged precisely because it can be seen to 
perform  an  important  function  in  Adorno  and  Woolf’s  reflection  on  the  aesthetic. 
Arguably, aesthetic reflection needs the empty gaze because without it, artworks would 
be subsumed by theory, or identical to their interpretation. Aesthetic reflection, if we are 
to follow Adorno’s logic, can tolerate a degree of alienation in the face of aesthetic  
 
29 
 
phenomena  and  critical  discourse,  can,  therefore,  capitalise  on  the  sense  of  the 
wonderment,  confusion  and  misapprehension  that  is  present  in  such  ‘art-alien’ 
encounters.  And  in  Woolf’s  case,  this  misapprehension  often  stimulates  the 
autobiographical narrative of the dialectic of revelation and concealment in works of art. 
We can  see  this  at  work  in  the following  note in Woolf’s diary  from  Saturday,  13
 
February 1915: 
 
We wrote and after luncheon L. went to the Library and I went to a concert at the 
Queen’s Hall. I ran into Oliver Strachey, standing very like a Strachey in the Hall, 
because he dislikes sitting inside waiting for the music. I got by luck a very good 
place, for the Hall was nearly full – and it was a divine concert. But one of the 
things I decided as I listened (its difficult not to think of other things) was that all 
descriptions  of  music  are  worthless,  and  rather  unpleasant;  they  are  apt  to  be 
hysterical, and to say things that people will be ashamed of having said afterwards. 
They played Haydn, Mozart no. 8, Brandenburg Concerto, and the Unfinished. I 
daresay the playing wasn’t very good, but the stream of melody was divine. It 
struck me what an odd thing it was – this little box of pure beauty set down in the 
middle of London streets, and people – all looking so ordinary, crowding to hear, 
as  if they weren’t ordinary after  all, or had  an ambition for something better. 
Opposite me was Bernard Shaw (D1: 33). 
 
 
 
Woolf’s account of her struggle to make sense of musical experience betrays a sense 
of alienation. The theoretical difficulty here is to discover the connection between, on 
the  one  hand,  her  distracted  listening,  and  on  the  other  her  subsequent  assertion 
regarding  the  worthlessness  and  unpleasantness  of  musical  description.  Everything 
hinges on her use of the word ‘divine’. Her admission that she is unable to remain 
concentrated on the musical performance, and yet, her  pronouncement that it was a 
‘divine concert’ actually reinforces and exemplifies Adorno’s insistence that aesthetic 
reflection must assimilate the empty gaze. In context, Woolf’s informal and colloquial 
use of the adjective divine conveys to us the “excellence” of the music – but the remark 
also hints at a metaphysical dimension that is reinforced by her situating of the concert 
space, and which is then punctured and then illuminated by this divine music. This is 
then furthered developed as she imagines the concert hall itself as ‘a little box of pure 
beauty.’  The  metaphysical  and  quasi-religious  rhetoric  is  further  developed  by  the 
notion of purity, and makes the disjunction between the beauty of the music and the 
shameful descriptions of the music all the more acute. In a sense, the word ‘divine’ is 
the only word Woolf has that would sustain the structure of the aesthetic experience and 
protect her from the shame of description. This kind of construction is not the outcome  
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of  a  listening,  as  such,  but  through  her  deep  assimilation  of  the  basic  relationship 
between  individuals  and  musical  utterances,  she  produces  a  kind  of  ‘abyss’,  in  the 
Adornoian  sense.  This  abyss  appears  because  the  divine  metaphor  is  both  full  and 
empty.  By  not  concentrating  on the  music  being  played,  by  turning  away  from the 
artwork, and by allowing herself to be led by a line of questioning, Woolf actually 
produces an insight about the experience of listening, and assimilates experience and 
interpretation. Thus, she can be seen to be preserving art’s enigmaticalness. Furthermore, 
Woolf’s observations about the limitations of language in conveying what music can 
express chime with Adorno’s argument, ‘that artworks say something and in the same 
breath  conceal  it.’  (AT:  160)   Rather  than framing  her  thoughts as an  aside  to  her 
aesthetic experience, as Woolf does by placing them in parentheses, I would like to 
reposition them as being of central importance to reflection upon aesthetic experience. 
Her partial attention to the musical performance illustrates perfectly Adorno’s juncture 
‘that one understands something of art, not that one understands art.’ (AT: 161) 
The metaphorical description as ‘a little box of pure beauty’ is not the invocation 
of any philosophical discourse about beauty per se; rather it is an enchanting of the 
physical space, and gestures towards a pre-rational aspect to her experience. 
14 Woolf’s 
‘box of pure beauty’ is both a description of the concert hall and the invocation of the 
promise of magic, where unreal and ‘divine’ things occur. Her idea that the concert hall 
could  be  other,  and  perhaps  more  than  it  actually  is  can  also  be  incorporated  into 
Adorno’s logic. According to  him, stabilising a view of the  object that allows it to 
become more than it is whilst retaining its sense of unreality is ‘the idea of art’ (AT: 
104). A concert hall cannot really be a box of pure beauty, but we can imagine the 
concert hall as if it were a  box of beauty and this is  how  she ‘gains control of its 
semblance…as well as [negating] it as unreal.’ (AT: 104) 
Adorno’s theory affords a degree of legibility to certain aspects of experience that 
might  be  lost.  Thus,  for  him,  art  works  preserve,  but  crucially  resist  resolving,  the 
antagonistic nature of experience. In Woolf this is constituted as the articulation of the 
struggle to determinedly account for the ways in which music affects her. In a letter to 
Vanessa Bell from 1909, she writes, ‘We heard Parsifal yesterday; it was much better 
done, and I felt within a space of tears. I expect it is the most remarkable of the operas; 
it slides from music to words almost imperceptibly. However, I have been niggling at 
the effect all the morning, without much success’ (D1: 406). The ‘niggling’ experience 
                                                
14 The theme of enchantment dominates much of Aesthetic Theory, Adorno says at one point, ‘Artworks 
speak like elves in fairytales.’ (AT: 160)  
 
31 
 
Woolf articulates is another example of the preservation of the incomprehensible and 
the  non-identical  in  art.  Woolf’s  inability  to  articulate  precisely  what  it  is  about  a 
musical experience that she finds so moving, can be likened to an aspect of Adorno’s 
aesthetic  theory  that  advances  the  state  of  astonishment  as  being  indicative  of  the 
moment when language falls short of comprehending experience.   
 
Aesthetic feeling is not the feeling that is aroused: It is astonishment vis-à-vis 
what is beheld rather than vis-à-vis what it is about; it is a being overwhelmed by 
what is aconceptual and yet determinate, not the subjective affect released, that in 
the case of aesthetic experience may be called feeling. (AT: 217) 
 
 
That  Woolf  was  ‘within  a  space  of  tears’  suggests  that  she  was  indeed 
overwhelmed not necessarily with the actual performance of Parsifal but with the effect 
the production had on her. This sense of distance between the actual performance and 
the experience of the performance is further reinforced in her diary entry which remains 
speculative in the extreme; she ‘expects’ that the opera is remarkable and she cannot 
perceive with certainty the relationship between the words and the music. Thus, what 
can be salvaged from Woolf’s observations on music is this sense of uncertainty.  
 
Essayism 
 
The essay is a form and practice of writing and reflection that has a long and 
established history. Yet, the essay is also marginal; it is not regarded as a secure context 
for  the  establishment  of  disputable  knowledge  claims.  But  neither can  the  essay  be 
dismissed as being without cognitive import. And while it might enjoy a certain stylistic 
freedom, or be marked by a personal literary fingerprint, the essay cannot be understood 
as being simply, or unconditionally, a literary or aesthetic object per se. It is this double 
character of the essay, the fact that the essay thrives in the interstices of the literary and 
the critical (i.e., has a cogent, world-revealing content) that here requires theoretical 
examination and development.  
Therefore, the generic limitations of the essay will be used here to explore an 
inter-disciplinary tension within the writing of music criticism. The essay’s status as 
that which presents both aesthetic and cognitive information lends the articulation of 
musical aesthetic experience a potential form; the essay writes knowledge, but also tests 
the boundaries of the dissemination and presentation of this knowledge by writing a  
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subjectivity. To what extent, therefore, does our perception of the potential objectivity 
of criticism change when we allow the subject to speak? Essayism marks the point at 
which  the  distinction  between  art  and  philosophy  and  literature  and  the  self  are 
entangled, overlap, and ultimately become indistinct.
15  
We know that the form of the essay played a crucial role in the development of 
Woolf criticism,  but, as  Leila  Brosnan  points  out  in  her  study  on  Virginia  Woolf’s 
Essays and Journalism, work that has been done on Woolf the essayist has tended to 
focus on the content of the essays themselves rather than the relationship between the 
essay and its implications for genre theory
16. Brosnan’s work is similar to the work 
done here on Woolf which continues to develop ways of critically appraising Woolf’s 
non-fiction without falling prey to the dangers of looking at her marginalia with the 
intention of creating a unified system. As Brosnan points out, it would be all too easy to 
insist  that  snatches  of  Woolf  might  illuminate  particular  theoretical  positions,  but 
without due care to the specific qualities of such an illumination, one can do justice 
neither to the text nor the theory itself (Brosnan, 1997: 9). It seems important therefore 
to develop a reading of Woolf’s essays that engages with a critical theory of subjectivity 
that is constituted through a philosophy of the non-identical in order that such a reading 
remain,  in  some  senses,  metacritical  so  as  to  avoid  the  concretization  of  any  one 
particular  reading.  This  would,  in  turn,  provide  a  reading  of  Woolf  that  remained 
faithful to Adorno’s skepticism regarding the infallibility of a metaphysical discourse. 
All  reflection  therefore  is  contingent  upon  a  recognition  of  the  instability  of 
philosophical a prioris. 
The disruption of the supremacy of metaphysics and of grand narratives concerning 
the development of a modernist aesthetics allows the critical status of the essay to come 
into focus. In terms of the historical context during which Woolf was writing, she was 
very much still connected to the legacy of the English essayistic tradition which gave 
                                                
15 Scholarly  research  into  the  genre  of  'essayism'  might  have  once  been  thought  of  as  belonging 
exclusively to the domains of literary theory, or English, but, as this dissertation will show, it is becoming 
increasingly incumbent upon us to consider the form of music-critical writing.  
16 Anyone familiar with Woolf studies will know that research on Woolf’s essays is a growing industry. 
For  general  reading  see:  Joeres  Boetcher,  Ruth-Ellen  and  Elizabeth  Mittman,  The  Politics  of  the  Essay; 
Feminist Perspectives  (Bloomington  and  Indianapolis:  Indiana  University  Press,  1993),    Rachel  Bowlby, 
Feminist Destinations and Further Essays on Virginia Woolf (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), 
Julia Briggs Virginia Woolf: An Inner Life (Orlando: Harvest, 2006), Alexander Butrym Essays on the Essay: 
Redefining the  Genre  (Athens  and  London:  The  University  of  Georgia  Press,  1989),  Jane  Goldman  The 
Feminist Aesthetics of Virginia Woolf: Modernism, Post-Impressionism and the Politics of the Visual (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), Hermione Lee Virginia Woolf (London: Vintage, 1997), The Cambridge 
Companion to Virginia Woolf, ed. Susan Sellers, 2nd edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000; 
2010)  
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rise to writers like William Hazlitt, Charles Lamb, Francis Bacon and Samuel Coleridge 
Taylor.  At  the  same  time,  and  separately,  various  schools  of  European  intellectual 
thought were developing and expanding critical and theoretical work on genre theory 
and, in particular, the essay. This work remains, to this day, indebted to T.W. Adorno 
and  György  Lukács,  whose  attempts  to  analyse  and  reconstruct  the  essay  as  a 
predominantly  critical  text,  through  and  against  various  strains  of  late-Romantic 
philosophical thought, propelled the status of the essay from pleasure-oriented, semi-
autobiographical prose, to a potentially revolutionary tool in the domains of art and 
criticism. Not since Adorno and Lukács’s expositional writing on the critical potential 
of the form of the essay has a theorization of the form been so compelling. I submit that 
it  seems  intellectually  irresponsible  to  ignore  the  consequences  their  work  has  for 
musical-critical writing. It is my intention, therefore, to draw out the parallels between 
Woolf’s  essayistic  development  and  the  concurrent  developments  in  European 
essayism.  In the essay ‘Montaigne’ from Series One of The Common Reader Woolf 
writes: 
 
Let  us  simmer  over  our  incalculable  cauldron,  our  enthralling  confusion,  our 
hotch-potch of impulses, our perpetual miracle – for the soul throws up wonders 
every second. Movement and death are the essence of our being; rigidity is death; 
conformity  is  death;  let  us  say  what  comes  into  our  heads,  repeat  ourselves, 
contradict ourselves, fling out the wildest nonsense, and follow the most fantastic 
fancies without caring what the world does or thinks or says. For nothing matters 
except life; and, of course, order. (CR1: 63) 
 
Woolf  recognized  not  just  the  seemingly  limitless  possibilities  concerning  the 
content of the essay, but also the critical capacity of the essay. She takes great care to 
specify that whilst the form of the essay is extensive in what it permits the author to 
include in its writing, one should also be mindful of ‘order’, as if to remind the reader 
that even chaos requires some direction. However, this invocation of ‘order’ reads a 
little  ambiguously  because  it  is  tacked  on  to  the  end  of  an  otherwise  effusive  and 
evocative  passage.  The  notion  of  ‘order’  is  also  rather  intriguing,  for the  last thing 
anyone expects to read at the end of such an energetic train of thought is that we must 
stop and curtail our ‘fantastic fancies’ in the name of order. Moreover, if we read her 
summoning  of  order  as  being  anticipated  by  the  earlier  references  to  ‘rigidity’  and 
‘conformity’ we might again be surprised to note that these two terms are considered to 
bring about ‘death’, which only makes her claim to ‘order’ all the more unexpected.  
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Woolf  was  certainly  keen  that  writers  and  readers  alike  be  mindful  of  certain 
principles of linguistic coherency and  sense,  but, and  to read a little more into this 
notion  of  order,  perhaps  one  might  speculate  that  she  was  making  glances  in  the 
direction of the form of the essay, because a further (albeit perhaps unintended) nod in 
the direction of the theoretical conditions of the essay comes when Woolf suggests that 
we must ‘say what comes into our heads, repeat ourselves, contradict ourselves’ (CR1: 
63). Perhaps what this paragraph convinces us of is that Woolf was, even at this stage, 
considering both the form and the content of essayistic writing. She was aware of the 
relationship  between  form and content  as  existing  as a  necessary  dialectic. Woolf’s 
tendency to mention, but not necessarily develop, broader aesthetic and philosophical 
ideas in relation to reading and writing has been noted by Ann Banfield, who identifies 
such concerns in Woolf’s fiction, ‘Yet the subject of…the external world, the nature of 
perception  –  does  enter  Woolf’s  novels  couched  in  explicit  philosophical  language’ 
(Banfield, 2000: 4). It is possible, also, to hear this ‘explicit philosophical’ language in 
Woolf’s non-fiction and in the essays in particular, for her invocation of ‘essences’ and 
‘being’,  two  terms  that  also  occupy  a  space  in  a  philosophical  discourse,  seem  to 
suggest a familiarity with questions related, but not limited to, artistic form, aesthetic 
experience and subjectivity. In fact, as Banfield argues, Woolf’s proximity to certain 
philosophical discourses was a direct result of her involvement with the Bloomsbury 
Group.  The  link  between  Bloomsbury  and  essayism  comes  about  through  a 
consideration of the essayist as being like a philosopher and in ‘The Modern Essay’ also 
taken from Series One of The Common Reader, Woolf identifies certain characteristics 
that the essayist and the philosopher have in common. Woolf recognizes that it is the 
pursuit of truth, and the burden of this task, that links the philosopher and the essayist. 
This,  in  turn,  allows  parallels  between  Woolf’s  work  and  the  work  being  done  on 
European  essayism  to  be  seen  more  vividly.  So,  how  was  philosophy  at  that  time 
articulating itself, and what were the influences that Woolf was coming under?  
In terms of British intellectual history, she was writing during a time that coincided 
broadly with, ‘work on knowledge’ (Banfield, 2000: 4) that was being done by Bertrand 
Russell Principles of Mathematics (1937) and Our Knowledge of the External World as 
a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy (1926), G.E. Moore Principia Ethica (1903) 
and Alfred North Whitehead Science and the Modern World (1926). One of the reasons 
why Bloomsbury came into contact with these various philosophical developments was 
because burgeoning interest in theories of knowledge had largely been borne out of 
philosophies  of  science,  but  the  problem  of  knowledge  necessarily  invoked  other  
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disciplines, namely art, because of what Russell names ‘“the gulf between the world of 
physics and the word of sense’” (Banfield, 2000: 5). Russell, Moore and Whitehead 
were concerned with how to reconcile two seemingly opposite theories of how we come 
to have knowledge of the external world. On the one hand was the world of scientific 
empirical  data,  and  the  other  was  the  world  of  sense  perception  and  sensation. 
Philosophy had to find a way of making knowledge objective, without dismissing the 
importance of subjective sensation (Banfield, 2000: 6). Adorno puts it this way, ‘In 
sharp contrast to the usual ideal of science, the objectivity of dialectical cognition needs 
not less subjectivity, but more. Philosophical experience withers otherwise.’ (ND: 40) 
However, there was also another text that made an impact on British philosophy and 
Woolf  at  this  time  and  this  was  the  appearance  of  Wittgenstein’s  Tractatus 
Philosophicus (1921): 
 
The years 1911-1913 are also those in which the young Wittgenstein entered the 
English  philosophical  scene,  those  of  the  intense  exchange  between  him  and 
Russell. The profound crisis created for Russell by Wittgenstein’s criticism led to 
Russell’s  abandonment  of  the  Theory  of  Knowledge  text.  Wittgenstein  as  a 
philosophical influence sets […] a kind of terminus ad quem to the period of the 
theory of knowledge. (Banfield, 2000: 7) 
 
And  in  amongst  these  monumental  yet  subtle  shifts  in  British  philosophy,  Woolf, 
though by her own admission limited in philosophical capacities, was falling in and out 
of conversations at the heart of which may well have been many of these issues: 
 
This does not prevent the Tractatus from playing a role in our reconstruction of 
Bloomsbury’s intellectual world. It came out of the period of Russell’s theory of 
knowledge,  and  its  conceptions,  language  and  dominant  metaphors  find  their 
counterparts in Woolf, not because she came under its influence, but because she 
shared its ways of thinking. (Banfield, 2000: 9) 
 
One of the most explicit examples of Woolf’s externalization of this philosophical 
background appears during her contemplation of what it means to be an essayist in her 
essay on Montaigne. She implies that a truly ‘great’ essayist is one who has the ability 
to traverse our artistic, moral, and ethical modes of being. This immediately challenges 
the notion that the essayist merely knows how to write in the tradition of belles lettres. 
Instead,  Woolf  describes  the  essayist  as  a  sage  or  a  mentor,  as  someone  who  is  
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renowned for profound wisdom, a philosopher. 
17 The essayist has the task of making 
sense of the ‘unpredictable’ soul and the world around him. The essayist is entrusted to 
order the chaos of the mind. 
Liberated from the structures and influences of social custom and without the help of 
guiding institutions, Woolf concedes that for the essayist it is, ‘far more difficult to live 
well the private life than the public.’ She does, however, identify figures from the past 
that have done so; 
 
It is an art that each must learn separately, though there are, perhaps, two or three 
men, like Homer, Alexander the Great, and Epaminondas among the ancients, and 
Etienne de La Boétie among the moderns, whose example may help us. (CR: 64) 
    
In fact, this ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’ spread itself is interesting here, for on the one 
hand Woolf rejects historical narrative at the outset and writes an ahistorical account of 
the  essay,  yet  on  the  other  hand,  she  can’t  seem  to  resist  the  vivid  references  to 
historical figures. The fact that she betrays ahistoricity in favour of the deeply historicist 
approach suggests that she somehow knew what enormous impact her invocation of 
history would have on her argument. She also gives us an insight into some of the 
contradictions  that  must  necessarily  abide  in  the  essay.  And,  it  is,  of  course,  the 
responsibility of the essayist to negotiate these contradictions. And thus, Woolf allows 
us to consider what an enormous task, indeed, burden, the essayist has ahead of him.  
She describes the essayist as a man of extreme learning, but that, in addition to his 
knowledge of world, he must also be a sage, a reflective individual whom we might all 
be  able  to  rely  on,  someone  whom  we  could  trust  to  make  sense  of  the  world. 
Importantly, Woolf develops, and essentially elevates the status of the essayist from 
simply someone with gifted abilities in writing, to a philosopher who is able to critically 
evaluate  the  world  and  his  position  in  it.  But  Woolf  doesn’t  entirely  neglect  the 
importance of the literary skill of the essayist and the enjoyment he might offer the 
reader,  and  she  remains  committed  to  the  pleasurable  aspect  of  essay  reading  and 
writing. She writes in ‘The Modern Essay’: 
 
Of all forms of literature, however, the essay is the one which least calls for the 
use of long words. The principle which controls it is simply that it should give 
                                                
17 Note that in Woolf’s diary from June 1918 she writes, ‘We discussed the moral eminence of Moore, 
comparable to that of Christ or Socrates, so R. and L. held.’ Oliver Bell, Anne ed., The Diary of Virginia 
Woolf Volume One 1915-1919 (Harcourt Brace and Company: Florida, 1977) p. 155. Ray Strachey (honorary 
Parliamentary Secretary of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies 1916-21) and Leonard Woolf.  
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pleasure; the desire which impels us when we take it from the shelf is simply to 
receive pleasure. Everything in an essay must be subdued to that end. It should lay 
us under a spell with its first word, and we should only wake, refreshed, with its 
last.  In  the  interval  we  may  pass  through  the  most  various  experiences  of 
amusement, surprise, interest, indignation; we may soar to the heights of fantasy 
with Lamb or plunge to the depths of wisdom with Bacon, but we must never be 
roused. The essay must lap us about and draw its curtain across the world. (CR: 
211) 
 
As will be shown, it is in fact the contradictory nature of the essay as form, as 
developed by Adorno that will guide the rereading of Woolf’s essays. And, contra the 
perception that Woolf  succeeds in articulating insights into the precise nature of an 
essayistic  subjectivity,  I  will  show  that  in  fact  her  writing  actually  presents  the 
impossibility of conceiving of such a subjectivity in its entirety. This attempt to write a 
strong subject position is undermined by continuous self-reflection that casts doubt on 
the  status  of  the  writerly  self.  However,  it  is  precisely  this  attempt  to  inscribe 
subjectivity  that  reveals  the  essay  as  a  form  of  writing  that  rejects  the  potential 
sundering of subject and object.  Its form  is also  its content because  the  essay is in 
essence, an attempt, and can therefore only ever piece together a picture of wholeness. 
Perhaps the most common understanding we have of the term is to essay, to try, to make 
an attempt,  from  the  French  essayer.  The  writer  essays,  the attempt  is  an action,  a 
gesture, the writing of the essay is an activity, the writer makes the essay, as one might 
make a picture, a sentence, a telephone call. But the essay is also a noun, it is a thing 
among  other  things,  it  is  a  text,  an  inscription,  a  piece  of  prose,  a  comment  upon 
something or other, it is an insight into the interiority of the author, a signature, perhaps. 
As a verb, the meaning of the essay is indisputable; it is an attempt. There is little 
ambiguity to be found in this understanding of the activity itself. But, as a noun, as a 
thing, one single, over-arching definition of the essay cannot be found. The essay is not 
one, singular writing, but many kinds of writing.  
Claire de Obaldia in The Essayistic Spirit makes the following introductory remarks 
about the essay; 
 
The essay is an essentially ambulatory and fragmentary prose form. Its direction 
and  pace,  the  tracks  it  chooses  to  follow,  can  be  changed  at  will;  hence  it’s 
fragmentary  or  'paratactic'  structure.  Rather  than  progressing  in  a  linear  and 
planned  fashion,  the  essay  develops  around  a  number  of  topics  which  offer 
themselves along the way. And this sauntering from one topic to the next together 
with the way in which each topic is informally 'tried out' suggests a tentativeness, 
a looseness, in short a randomness which seems to elude the unifying conception  
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–  syntactic,  semantic,  and  pragmatic  –  of  a  recognizable  generic  identity.  (de 
Obaldia, 1995: 2) 
 
The  essay  opposes  continuous  prose  by  virtue  of  its  multiple  'directions'  and 
'number of topics', in other words, the essay seems to be characterised by the lack of a 
centrifugal or overarching thesis that is logically developed and argued throughout the 
course of the work. This lack of coherent argument is the cause of what de Obaldia 
refers to as a 'tentativeness' or 'randomness' of form, but, crucially, de Obaldia identifies 
the consequence of this 'randomness' as impacting upon the identity of the essay. In 
other words, she makes a connection between the varying number of topics contained 
within  the  essay  and  the  resulting  impact  this  has  on  the  structural  organisational 
success of the essay, which, she argues, contributes to the essay's identity.  
According to de Obaldia, the identity of the essayistic text is based upon its rejection 
of a unifying conception. This unifying conception is dependent on the syntactic (the 
rules of grammar and logic), semantic (signification of or meaning between words) and 
pragmatic  (the  use  of  linguistic  signs  in  relation  to  actual  situations  or  human 
behaviour)  properties  of  the  text.
18 The  emotive,  figurative  or  expressive  modes  of 
meaning  are  extinguished  and  ultimately  dismissed  from  the  cognitively  rational 
construction of meaning, and thus the identity of the text becomes based on its structural 
and empirical ability to make sense, in a syntactic and cognitive manner. This particular 
sense of meaning, de Obaldia argues, is lacking from the form of the ‘essay’, and as 
such, we are left with a view that the essay constitutes a ‘random’ form of writing. 
Essays are considered, in the most general sense, to be trials, attempts, or forays into 
subjects that may or may not be related. Characteristically, the essay is a form of writing 
that does not have a specific direction; it does not articulate a purpose, a thesis or a 
formal  argument  which  it  either  proves  or  disproves  throughout  the  course  of  the 
writing before arriving at a firm conclusion. Rather, what is articulated in the essay is 
often only loosely related to what it might claim to be about and the ostensible subject 
matter sometimes differs from what is actually written. The essay can be thought of as a 
piece of writing that is reflective; the essay muses, it records thoughts and events in 
their instantaneousness, in the ‘here and now’, as opposed to concentrating on a specific 
area of enquiry. Montaigne says as much in the opening of his essay ‘On Repentance’: 
 
                                                
18 We might presume that de Obaldia’s reference to the three elements of the ‘sign’ have been taken from 
the  American  logical  positivist  Charles  Morris’s  theory  of  language.  See  Morris,  C.,  Logical Positivism, 
Pragmatism and Scientific Empiricism (Paris: Hermann et cie, 1937).  
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Others shape the man; I portray him, and offer to the view one in particular, who 
is ill-shaped enough, and whom, could I refashion him, I should certainly make 
very different from what he is. But there is no chance of that. Now the lines of my 
portrait are never at fault, although they change and vary. The world is but a 
perpetual see-saw. Everything goes incessantly up and down – the earth, the rocks 
of Caucasus, the pyramids of Egypt – both with the universal motion and with 
their own. Constancy itself is nothing but a sluggish movement. I cannot fix my 
subject. He is always restless, and reels with a natural intoxication. I catch him 
here, as he is at the moment when I turn my attention to him. I do not portray his 
being; I portray his passage; not a passage from one age to another or, as the 
common people say, from seven years to seven years, but from day to day, from 
minute to minute. I must suit my story to the hour, for soon I may change, not 
only  by  chance  but  also  by  intention.  It  is  a  record  of  various  and  variable 
occurrences, an account of thoughts that are unsettled, and as chance will have it, 
at  times  contradictory,  either  because  I  am  then  another  self,  or  because  I 
approach my subject under different circumstances and with other considerations. 
(Montaigne, 2003:235)  
 
Montaigne’s self-deprecating tone is clear enough as he establishes that much of 
the content of his work is a record of himself and his fluctuating moods, and we are 
given  to  understand  that  he  will  present  a  series  of  little  vignettes  about  his  own 
experiences without recourse to any clear argument, or to any clear conclusion. What is 
at stake, though, in reading Montaigne’s essays is the extent to which an irreverent 
rhetoric masks a more serious intention. The particularity of his self-address also reveals 
aspects of universal human qualities. And though he is quick to point out that his essays 
generally concern only himself, there is a distinct sense in which his writing alludes to 
the universal or common man. His self-reflections invite us to see not only him, but also 
ourselves and other people too. Moreover, Montaigne repeatedly makes reference to his 
commitment to a ‘truth’: ‘But truth is so great a thing that we ought not to despise any 
medium that will conduct us to it.’(2003:344) ‘The active pursuit of truth is our proper 
business.’(2003:292)  
Woolf’s  review  of  the  genre  of  the  essay  in  ‘The  Modern  Essay’  leads  to  the 
appearance  of  certain  key  principles  that  give  some  order  to  the  apparent  chaos  of 
essayistic writing. Interestingly, Woolf’s own particular piece of writing on the essay 
also happens to be a perfect example of the form. First impressions might lead to the 
reader to consider that Woolf's essay is rather whimsical, or light-hearted. The style in 
this essay is rather chatty and informal, 'the essay can be long or short, serious or trifling, 
about God and Spinoza or about turtles and Cheapside’ (CR1: 211) and the language is 
straightforward, but vivid and picturesque:  
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Yet it is true that the essayist is the most sensitive of all writers to public opinion. 
The drawing room is the place where a great deal of reading is done nowadays, 
and the essays of Mr Beerbohm lie, with an exquisite appreciation of all that the 
position exacts, upon the drawing room table. There is no gin about; no strong 
tobacco, no puns, drunkenness, or insanity. (CR1: 218) 
 
 
In  place  of  logical  argument,  essayism  favours  multiple,  dissociated  themes; 
instead  of structured conclusions, the essay is inconclusive; the essay can be loose, 
malleable and fleet-footed, whereas what we might consider ‘academic’ prose can be 
rigorous, stiff and exacting. Such adjectives to a certain extent parody both disciplines, 
and in  no  way  do  I  wish  to  suggest  simplistically  that  we  must  attach  crude  value 
judgements about the two disciplines, rather, the point is a little more circumspect. The 
essayistic spirit remains faithful to an aspect of musical experience that academic prose 
must do away with in order to fulfil a particular institutional expectation. This aspect of 
musical experience which essayism complements is tied up with music’s temporality 
and what we might term ‘ineffability’
19. Woolf’s musical marginalia gives a voice to the 
ordinary  experience  of  music  and  in  doing  so  challenges  the  status  and  limits  of 
authoritative criticism in academia. Graham Good remarks in his book The Observing 
Self: Rediscovering the Essay: 
 
There is a strong case for increasing the role of the essay in academia, both as an 
object to study and as a form of writing for that study. This does not imply a 
return to an elitist, belletristic cult of sensibility as a form of personal superiority – 
this  “gentlemanly  amateur”  image  of  the  essayist  belongs  mainly  to  the 
Edwardian period and is by no means typical of that anyway. Anyone who can 
look  attentively,  think  freely,  and  write  clearly  can  be  an  essayist;  no  other 
qualifications are needed. Potentially, as Addison and Steele showed, the essay is 
one of the most popular forms of expression, the most available to writers and 
readers. It is a direct individual-to-individual communication. As such it is likely 
                                                
19 Vladimir  Jankélévitch  (1903-85)  remains  a  relatively  unknown  philosopher  of  music  and  his  French 
philosophical  colleagues  have  much  more  readily  been  admitted  into  the  lives  of  English-speaking 
thinkers  –  Derrida,  Foucault,  Merleau-Ponty,  and  Levinas.  His  work  The  Ineffable  in  Music  is  only 
beginning to be acknowledged as an important moment for the progression of music aesthetics having 
only recently been translated in 2003 by Carolyn Abbate. He writes, ‘the mask, the inexpressive face that 
music  assumes voluntarily  these  days,  conceals  a  purpose:  to  express  infinitely  that  which  cannot  be 
explained. Music, said Debussy, is made for that which cannot be expressed. I will be more precise: the 
mystery transmitted to us by music is not death’s sterilising inexplicability but the fertile inexplicability of 
life, freedom, or love. In brief, the musical mystery is not “what cannot be spoken of”, the untellable, but 
the ineffable.’ Music’s overwhelming abundancy is his interpretation of its ineffability, a state he contrasts 
with untellability, ‘Death, the black night, is untellable because it is impenetrable shadow and despairing 
nonbeing, and because a wall that cannot be breached bars us from its mystery: unable to be spoken of, 
then, because there is absolutely nothing to say, rendering us mute, overwhelming reason, transfixing 
human discourse on the point of its Medusa stare.’ (Jankélévitch, 2003: 71-72). 
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to  offer  divergent  views  rather  than  express  a  consensus.  It  is  not  free  from 
ideology, because no individual consciousness is free from it, though the essay 
encourages a critical attitude. A positive description might call the essay an anti-
ideological  expression  of  the  free  individual  reporting  and  reflecting  on  his 
experience in defiance or disregard of authority; a negative account might see it as 
embodying  bourgeois  ideology,  the  world  view  based  on  the  isolated  self, 
separated  from  community,  and  forced  to  construct  its  own  precarious 
significance in an alien world. But regardless of whether the essay is seen as a 
happy form or a sad one (like the epic and novel respectively in Lukács’s theory 
of the novel), it provides an opening to individual experience of the past. Theory 
and system are powerful and necessary organisers of human knowledge, and they 
usually  hold  pride  of  place  in  academic  institutions;  but  the  lived  individual 
experience which eludes system, and which the essay expresses and symbolizes, 
has an important place as well. (Good, 1998: 182-3) 
 
This study is broadly in agreement with Good’s support of the essay as a form of 
writing that makes a place for individual experience. But it is not simply that we must 
be  in  favour  of  the  essay  because  it  allows  particular,  personal  experiences  to  be 
articulated, but rather, and this is where this dissertation picks up a less well developed 
area of Good’s study, the essay rivals the authority of academic discourse because, as 
Adorno and Lukács noted, it is the critical form par excellence. The essay remains a site 
of individual struggle because it refuses to submit to organized social, cultural, political 
or intellectual systems of any kind.   
The form of the essay also has a role to play in the relation between Woolf’s work 
and the broader project of European Modernism, because, as Elena Gualtieri in Virginia 
Woolf’s Essays: Sketching the Past suggests: 
 
As Woolf turns to examine the status of her own work within the development of 
literary  history,  the  essay  is  offered  as  a  possible  source  of  disturbance  of  a 
historical paradigm which would see the ‘old post-Dostoevsky argument' (D2 248) 
about character in fiction superseded by a better representation of character in a 
sort of progressive move towards the best possible literature. This is a remarkably 
un-English conception of the genre which associated it not so much with leisurely 
pursuits and the exercise of style for style’s sake, but rather with a different way 
of  thinking  about  history  and  modernity.  In  this  sense,  the  essay  becomes  an 
interruption to progress and, at the same time, signals the emergence of a type of 
literary history that questions the identification of modernity with the culmination 
of progress. (Gualtieri, 2000: 4) 
 
In other words, it becomes possible to think of the essay as not simply a genre of 
writing that is defined by its relation to other literary genres, but as a form of writing 
that could be defined by its unique ability to traverse the aesthetically pleasing and the 
critically astute. By this, I suggest that the essay is of special interest because, although  
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it is often considered a 'marginal genre' in comparison to the novel, play or poem, it also, 
historically, has some obligation to the concept of truth. The full extent of the critical 
potential  of  the  essay  is  seen  here  in  Gualtieri's  assertion  that  the  essay  plays  a 
fundamental role in disrupting a (literary) paradigm of history that equates modernism 
with progress.  
  One of the reasons why this conception of the essay provides such fertile material for 
the Continental commentary on the essay is because Lukács and Adorno considered the 
essay one of the biggest mysteries of modernity. As a kind of writing that is able to distil 
historically specific events and experiences, the essay could also transcend temporal 
limitations  and  be  thought  of  as  purely  objective.  Gualtieri  summarises  Lukács’s 
position thus: 
 
Lukács insisted that the essence of the essay lies precisely in its ability to bring 
together modes of being and of thinking that are commonly thought of as being in 
opposition  to each  other.  He  admits  that  the aesthetic and  the  epistemological 
domain relate to two different forms of consciousness (the things itself and the 
concept), produces two different types of expression (the image and meaning), 
and two different ontologies (that of giving form, or creation, and that of inquiry, 
or intersubjective relationship). Yet he claims that as a modern genre still in its 
prehistory the essay present features from both sides of the distinction. It asks the 
fundamental ontological questions, ‘what is life, what is man, what is destiny?’, 
but provides them not with ‘the answers of science or, at purer heights, those of 
philosophy’ but with a form, a ‘symbol.’ (Gualtieri, 2000: 4-5) 
 
These ideas are extremely pertinent to Virginia Woolf’s musical marginalia because 
even though it seems ostensibly difficult to see that they could have anything objective 
to say  whatsoever about musical life,  there are powerful  intellectual arguments  that 
suggest otherwise.  Outside of her musical writings, Woolf herself was reflecting on the 
ways in which the experiences of life could be contained within a written form. She 
writes in her diary on Sunday, 20 April 1919: 
 
Moreover there looms ahead of me the shadow of some kind of form which a 
diary might attain to. I might in the course of time learn what it is that one can 
make of this loose, drifting material of life; finding another use for it than the use 
I put it to, so much more consciously and scrupulously, in fiction. What sort of 
diary should I like mine to be? Something loose knit, and yet not slovenly, so 
elastic that it will embrace any thing, solemn, slight or beautiful that comes into 
my mind. I should like it to resemble some deep old desk, or capacious hold-all, in 
which one flings a mass of odds and ends without looking them through. I should 
like to come back, after a year or two, and find that the collection had sorted itself, 
and refined itself and coalesced, as such deposits so mysteriously do, into a mould,  
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transparent  enough  to  reflect  the  light  of  our  life,  and  yet  steady,  tranquil 
composed with the aloofness of a work of art. (D1: 266)  
 
In response to Woolf’s question about the kind of diary she should like hers to be, 
it would seem appropriate to suggest that she has almost already articulated the answer 
herself.  In  fact,  her  question  seems  like  a  bit  of  a  red  herring  as  she  describes  so 
beautifully the essayistic nature of the diary. The diary, as a form of essayism, is able to 
make use of the ‘loose, drifting material of life’, it is ‘loose knit, and yet not slovenly’, 
and, as Woolf intimates, those unconnected, haphazard ‘odds and ends’ all fuse together 
in the sort of unstructured structure that embodies the essay. Moreover, Woolf’s critical 
insight goes a stage further when she recognizes the potential for individual experience 
to obtain the status of a work of art and, like Lukács, she identifies that this happens 
when lived experience manifests itself as form.  
These indistinguishable boundaries  between form and content are what  make the 
essay such a good example of its resistance to systematization. The essay is shaped by 
experience itself, but the essay also produces experience, in that it creates it through 
writing. This means, therefore that the essay cannot make ‘any appeal to the notion of 
an unmediated, transparent experience’. (Gualtieri, 2000: 6) As Good recognizes: 
 
The truth of the essay is a limited truth, limited by the concrete experience, itself 
limited, which gave rise to it. The essay is a provisional reflection of an ephemeral 
experience of an event or object. If one event followed another, we would have a 
narrative; if one object followed another we would have a descriptive catalogue; if 
one thought followed another we would have a logical argument…Thought in the 
essay tends to be presented as experienced, not as afterthought; as it responds to 
objects and events on the spot, not as it is later arranged and systematized. This is 
the essential uniqueness of essayistic discourse: neither the order of thoughts nor 
the order of things predominates. (Good, 1998: 7-8) 
 
In  other  words,  even  though  the  essay  to  some  degree  produces  experience 
because it does not transform experience into a system of knowledge it retains a degree 
of fidelity to the ‘fundamental formlessness of personal experience.’ (Gualtieri, 2000: 6) 
It is possible to glimpse this sense of ‘fundamental formlessness’ in the Woolf’s diary 
entry from Wednesday, 23 October 1918: 
 
I went up to the concert and heard the ghosts of lovely things, since the substance 
somehow escaped me; partly owing to my mood, partly to the usual vulgarity of 
Wood. Even so the ghosts of two Bach pieces (one for a duet of violins) were 
exquisitely lovely. Edith Sichel, whose entire soul is now open to me through her  
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letters, makes me determine to write descriptions neither of pictures nor of music. 
(D1: 206) 
 
The  diary  notes  that  the  concerts  were  part  of  Sir  Henry  Wood’s  Promenade 
Concerts and the pieces played were Bach’s Suite No. 2 for  Flute and Strings, and 
Concerto no. 3 for Two Violins and Orchestra. Woolf also heard works by Beethoven, 
Mozart, Glück and Dvořák. Woolf’s vivid references to ‘ghosts’ and ‘souls’ implies that 
she  can  only  account  for  traces  of  her  musical  experience;  there  are  semblances, 
impressions of the pieces by Bach, but they lack ‘substance’ and ‘somehow escaped’ 
her. Woolf dismisses her findings by reasoning that it is either her own mood or the 
‘vulgarity’ of the composer that causes her to hear only the outlines of the pieces, but, to 
my mind, this is an unnecessary gesture, for there is something about Woolf’s musical 
ghosts that rings true. I would suggest that they appear because of the temporality of 
listening and also because one can only ever get impressions of a piece upon hearing it 
perhaps for the first time, in a concert hall. Without the luxury of close listening or 
score reading, various complexities and nuances in the music will be intimated, but 
ultimately lost in a concert performance to all but those with an intimate knowledge of 
the work. Woolf is simply articulating this experience. Her utterance is special, though, 
because  she  brings  into  focus  so  sharply  the  strange  experience  of  first  listening. 
Woolf’s vivid image of the ghost is enough to convey the precise nature of what is 
rather  ‘difficult  to  put  into  words.’  Moreover,  it  is  not  just  that  Woolf  pinpoints  a 
musical phenomenon with seemingly no effort; she goes on to make a rather pointed 
remark about the difference between music and writing. In reference to Edith Sichel’s
20 
letters, she remarks that it is possible to gain access to Sichel’s ‘entire soul’ –this is 
quite an opposite experience from the elusive musical ghosts. But the difference might 
not be all that great, because even though letters give us ‘entire souls’ and music only 
shadows, one could argue that the soul also occupies a similar imprecise, ambiguous 
space in our consciousness. The soul  too is  immaterial. On  reading Sichel’s letters, 
though, Woolf determines that she will not write descriptions of either music or painting. 
But, as shall be demonstrated below, this is something she cannot commit to. 
Importantly,  though,  what  Woolf  is  doing  in  this  diary  entry  is  privileging  an 
aspect of musical experience that has little to do with the actual music, as such, but is 
rather  concerned  with  how  she  is  experiencing  the  music  as  it  is  happening,  and 
allowing that experience to stand autonomously. She does not go back, retrace her steps 
                                                
20 Edith Sichel (1862-1914) was an English author and wrote, amongst other things, a volume on the Essays 
of Montaigne. Edith Sichel, Michel de Montaigne (London: Constable, 1911).  
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and try to fill in the gaps by describing precisely the musical textures, the way it was 
performed, the narrative of the movements, etc. She does not reconstruct the concert, 
resigning  it  to  a  moment  in  the  past.  Instead,  she  retains  the  ‘present-ness’  and 
immediacy  of  the  musical  experience  by  just  saying  what  it  was  like  and  without 
attempting to shape its ‘fundamental formlessness.’  
In 1919, Woolf writes in a similar vein in another diary entry about a tea-party she 
had attended: 
 
The company was decorous and fur bearing as usual; and the music like the voice 
of spirits in another world enticing the hopelessly damned. Sir Henry (Newbolt) 
wrote a patriotic song to the tune of it. But how nice they are too! (D1: 245) 
 
Again, the mention of the musical ‘spirits’ ‘enticing the hopelessly damned’, puts 
music firmly into another realm, far away from material reality. Music is the thing that 
lures us into a damned world, music is a weakness, a vice, and Woolf can’t help but 
notice its mythical qualities. Yet, in a breath these subterranean references are dismissed 
and music is able to be spoken about in rather banal terms; it is ‘nice’ and it has tunes. 
This quote is a good example of the ways in which music can provoke complex literary 
evocations  as  well  as  inconsequential  observations  that  say  nothing  beyond  simple 
description.  
Woolf’s musical utterances embody the essayistic spirit. The essayist rehearses a 
response  to a  work  of art  by  representing  something  of  the  truth  of  the  object and 
something of its likeness. In other words, the essayist gives a critique of the work of art, 
but she also re-presents the work in the way George Steiner might recognize when he 
suggested that the best response to a work of art is another work of art.
21 Claire de 
Obaldia points out that one of the dangers of calling something essayistic is to imply 
that it has more to do with literature and less with actual reality. However, she points 
out, in accord with Lukács, that to say something about the essay’s literary status is to 
have said very little about it at all.  She goes on to use Virginia Woolf as an example of 
a writer who took the generic complexities of the essay more seriously than most, and 
as someone who was concerned with the aesthetic comportment of the essay, not just 
with its pleasure-giving aspects. De Obaldia also draws on the work of Graham Good in 
The Observing Self, suggesting that he successfully draws out the importance of the 
‘active, creative role which likens the essayist to the artist’ (de Obaldia, 1995: 9). 
                                                
21 See George Steiner, Real Presences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).  
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One of the implications of suggesting that there might be similarities between the 
essayist and the artist is that the essayist is continually driven to create the work anew in 
his or her criticism of it. Woolf does the work of this recreating, as we see in the above 
quote, when she reproduces the inconsistent, quality of music. Music, by its very nature, 
is inconsistent – phrases can be related, like sentences can be, melodies can develop like 
an argument or point can, but the precise nature of the connection is often not visible. In 
the same way that if Woolf is talking about music one moment and what those who are 
listening  to  the  music  are  wearing  the  next,  is  the  connection  between  those  two 
thoughts any less valid than if she had only mentioned the actual music itself? I would 
suggest that, like music, Woolf recreates a way of being that music also inhabits. And 
this way of being is to do with a sense of coherence or bindedness. Woolf puts two 
different  experiences  side  by  side  and  encourages  us  to  see  them  as  united  and  as 
connected and this is an aesthetic gesture. This is also the archetypal ‘modernist’ stance 
– traditional methods and views are subordinated to ones that say two opposing forces 
can  be connected.  Coherence,  in  Woolf’s  musical  writing comes  about because  she 
forces us to see music as co-existent with all our other experiences, musical and non-
musical  experiences  are  joined  up.  De  Obaldia  points  out  the  impact  that  this 
artist/essayist configuration had on ‘modern’ criticism: 
 
In fact, criticism for Lukács, as for most German theorists, is not just one aspect 
of the essay but the essence itself for the genre, and the work of art is its most 
natural object. In  Lukács’s piece, the question of the essay’s belonging  to the 
realm of literature on the basis of a shared attitude towards life is therefore raised 
in terms of the essential nature of criticism as a work of art, that is, of the essay’s 
acquisition of the creative independence or autonomy endemic to the work of art 
which it discusses. (de Obaldia, 1995: 10) 
 
Woolf’s  musical  marginalia  are  creatively  autonomous,  and  because  they  are 
essayistic, they are therefore critical.  
György Lukács begins his 1910 essay by asking whether or not there is any kind 
of unifying principle in the form of the essay that would it allow it to be considered a 
literary genre in its own right. In truth, however, what Lukács really asks is not whether 
such a unifying principle exists, but whether this unity is even possible, ‘to what extent 
has the really great writings which belong to this category been given literary form, and 
to what extent is this form of theirs an independent one?' (Lukács, 1974: 1) Lukács’s 
concern with the precise characteristics of the essay and its relation to other literary 
forms develops into a more pressing question still; ‘To what extent do they (the great  
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writings) endow the work with the force necessary for a conceptual re-ordering of life, 
and yet distinguish it from the icy, final perfection of philosophy?' (1974:1). Lukács 
recognises that the essay has the potential to be both a form of critique, and a form of 
expression.  The  essay  has  the  potential  to  ‘re-order’  life,  and  yet,  it  must  remain 
essentially human in characteristic, that is to say, it must avoid the ‘icy perfection’ of 
systematic philosophy. Speaking more broadly about the practice of criticism, Lukács 
suggests that criticism ought to be considered, ‘at the very best, an art.’ (1974: 2), and 
for him, this means valuing, above all, the form of criticism, i.e. the essay. For the 
remainder  of  the  essay  he  attempts  to  understand  the  essay’s  'intended  form  of 
expression' and 'the ways and means whereby this expression is accomplished.' (1974: 
2). Granting the essay aesthetic autonomy results in Lukács at the same time granting 
criticism the status of art, because for him, the essay is synonymous with criticism, 'The 
critique, the essay-call it provisionally what you will-as a work of art, a genre?' he asks. 
(1974:1)   
But perhaps the most important aspect of Lukács’s essay comes in his conclusion 
in which he asserts, ‘The essay is a judgement, but the essential, the value-determining 
thing about it is not the  verdict (as is the case with the system)  but the process  of 
judging.’ (1974: 18). Indeed, if we consider the essay essentially as a judgement, then 
this  chapter’s  reflection  on  the  philosophical  and  methodological  complexities  of 
criticism become even more pertinent. And, in addition to this, as Lukács notes, the 
thing of value in the essay is not any conclusion it presents, rather, it is the very process 
of the act of judging that the essay lays bare.  
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Chapter 2 
The Case for a Woolfian Renewal of Music Criticism 
 
The following chapter will attempt to familiarise the reader with a brief history of the 
domain of music criticism in Britain since the 18
th century in order to highlight some of 
the problems of music criticism and to put forward a case for the renewal of criticism. 
The presumption that there is simply a genre or a category of writing we might label 
‘music criticism’ is at once both premature and, I would argue, misguided; only the 
briefest survey of the recent historical analysis of the word ‘criticism’ is enough to 
convince the reader of the diverse, not to say ambiguous, senses of such a term.  
    According to the Oxford English Dictionary, one of the earliest examples of the 
use of the word ‘criticism’ can be found in the work of the Elizabethan playwright 
Thomas  Dekker,  dating  from  1607,  in  which  his  reference  to  the  word  ‘criticism’ 
implies that one’s actions could be ‘criticised’, that is to say, one’s actions could be 
judged. To judge is to evaluate based on a set of pre-established conditions, or criteria. 
To be able to judge something, then, is, in part, an act of comparison; I compare one set 
of behaviours with another, one performance with another, one piece of music with 
another.   
Woolf  recognized  that  judgement  was  at  the  heart  of  criticism,  but  for  her, 
judgements by contemporary critics seemed always to be stuck in the past, judging the 
works of today by the standards of yesterday. In ‘How it Strikes a Contemporary’ (1923) 
she writes: 
 
The only advice they can offer is to respect one’s own instincts, to follow them 
fearlessly and, rather than submit them to the control of any critic or reviewer 
alive, to check them by reading and reading again the masterpieces of the past.’ 
(CR1: 232).  
 
However, her immense sense of obligation to the past was tempered by her sense 
of responsibility to the future. From ‘Poetry, Fiction and the Future’ (1927), ‘Is it not 
the critic’s duty to tell us, or to guess at least, where we are going?’ (SE: 74). 
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Judgement 
 
But  what  are  the  other  cognitive,  conceptual,  indeed,  moral  and  ethical 
components  of  judgement  making?  One  compares,  certainly,  but  one  must  also 
discriminate, distinguish, reject, accept, define, evaluate, interpret and describe. All of 
these actions are constitutive of the practice of criticism. It is in the Critique of Pure 
Reason  that  Kant  articulates  his  famous  'Copernican  turn'  in  which  he  sets  about 
criticising  the  assumption  that  our  understanding  follows  the  existence  of  objects. 
Rather than being able to deduce 'a priori' knowledge (given that one of the aims of 
philosophy was to ascertain the nature of 'objective truth') through the effects of objects 
upon  our  senses,  Kant  claims  that  it  is,  in  fact,  the  other  way  around,  that  objects 
become knowable through the subjective faculties of judgement. And it is in this sense 
that the Kantian object is 'that concerning which a subject can make a true judgement, 
not something which is true independently of its appearing to the subject' (Bowie, 1997: 
32).  
Settling for a moment on the concept of judgement and remaining within a Kantian 
discourse, we are drawn back to the aesthetic and its seemingly inextricable connection 
to reason. In the Critique of Judgment, Kant suggests: 
 
Judgement in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under 
the  universal.  If  the  universal  (the  rule,  principle,  or  law),  is  given,  then  the 
judgement which subsumes the particular under it is determinant...If, however, 
only  the  particular  is  given  and the  universal  has  to  be found for  it, then  the 
judgement is simply reflective. (Kant, 1952: 18) 
 
Judgement, then, is thinking about an object within the context of the concept we 
have  of  that  object.  If  we  listen  to  a  particular  piece  of  music,  some  of  our 
understanding of that piece is tied up with notions of 'music', 'art', 'beauty' and so on. In 
addition to this, Kant suggests that if the universal is already given, i.e., if we have 
notions of what 'beauty' is, if we already have the concept and our task is to fit the 
particular object into various concepts, then our judgement is determinant. However, if 
we have no concept, if we only have the object, the piece, or the text, and we must find 
the universal, the category, or the description, then our judgement is reflective. Kant 
makes the distinction between understanding (that which supplies us with concepts) and 
reason (that which is able to make inferences from concepts), and locates judgement as 
that which mediates between the two – understanding and reason, because the subject is  
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free  to  make  differing  subsumptions  of  particulars.  In  the  case  of  the  determinate 
judgement, we can understand this to mean that the concept is sufficient to determine 
the particular, that is, the particular contains nothing that would exceed the explanation 
given by the concept. However, it is the status of reflective judgements that pertains to 
this discussion of criticism. 
Thus, if we destabilise the criteria with which we judge, or indeed, if we begin to 
question the very condition of our judgements, then, in a sense, we have to interrogate 
how these 'pre-established' conditions have come to be. For, to reflect upon the very 
existence and the very tradition of certain 'critical' vocabularies is one of the purposes of 
this work. Furthermore, if we take Dekker's use of the word, to criticize a person’s 
actions is to make a comment upon how that person has conducted themselves in the 
world.  It  suggests  that  judgements  can  be  made  regarding  disposition,  choices  and 
behaviour, which, in turn, implies that the word ‘criticism’ carries with it certain moral 
connotations.  
For the moment, though, let us consider the word ‘criticism’ within the domain of 
music for, though it would be unwise to suggest that the artistic and the ethical are 
easily separated, such concerns are not central to this dissertation at the present moment. 
For  the  time  being  then,  let  us  initially  understand  the  word  ‘criticism’  as  having 
something to do with the act of judgement-making in order to establish how the term 
has been adopted into the discourses of art and literature.  
The development of the term ‘criticism’ continues with Matthew Arnold in 1875 
who states that that: ‘I am bound by my own definition of criticism: a disinterested 
endeavour  to learn  and propagate the best  that is known and thought in  the  world’ 
(Arnold,  1875:  45).  Arnold’s  quote  is  interesting  not  least  because  it  inadvertently 
draws to our attention a number of issues that continue to be extremely pertinent to a 
contemporary consideration of the term ‘criticism.’ The first implication in Arnold’s 
quote  is  that  it  is  possible  that  one  could  assert  one’s  own  definition  of  the  term 
criticism without recourse to a unified or general understanding of the term. In other 
words, Arnold is bound by his definitions only. The notion, then, of understanding the 
term ‘criticism’ objectively becomes problematic if one is only ever bound to one’s own 
definition of the term.  
Nevertheless and despite these subjectivist tendencies, Arnold goes on to suggest 
that the act of criticism involves ‘propagating’ ‘disinterestedly’ ‘the best that is known’. 
Again, a plethora of problems arise when we begin to question the potential scope and 
limitations  of  Arnold’s  definition.  By  what  or  whose  standards,  and  under  what  
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conditions  would  it  be  possible  to  judge  knowledge?  Arnold’s  implication  is  that 
criticism could be involved in the reproduction of ‘the best that is thought and known in 
the  world’  suggests  that  it  would  be  possible  to  have  not  just  a  universally  agreed 
understanding of what criticism is, but also to have a general understanding about that 
which is thought ‘best’ in the world.  Arnold’s quote is useful, if only as an instance of 
how the term ‘criticism’ rapidly becomes embroiled in the charges of relativism and 
subjectivism, and is a good example of how difficult it is for even the most practised 
‘critic’ to become tangled up in the methodological and epistemological complexities of 
the word ‘criticism’. Without a definitive definition, and, lacking too, a general sense of 
its own usage (is criticism, for example, an act of fault-finding, is it necessarily derisive? 
22 Or  does  criticism  pertain  mostly  to  the  evaluation  and  assessment  of  art  and 
literature?), it becomes clear that a contemporary consideration of a music criticism 
carries with it not just the burden of the clarification of the term criticism, but a further 
complication - the object of the criticism, in this case the music itself. 
 
Brief History of Music Criticism 
 
In the following section I will rely on the Grove Dictionary of Music’s article entitled 
‘Criticism’  to assist  in orientating  us around  some  general  issues  involved  with  the 
analysis of the term ‘criticism’. Although the article is fairly limited in its development 
of some of the more pertinent issues – issues that include, but are not limited to, notions 
of  the  ‘aesthetic’  and  ‘aesthetic  experience’;  the  philosophical  legacy  of  certain 
Enlightenment  and  Romantic  concepts  that  continue  to  influence  the  way  we  think 
about art; the problems associated with a ‘critical language’; musical hermeneutics and, 
more recently, the reassertion of ‘criticism’ through the work of what has come to be 
known  as  ‘New  Musicology’
23 –  the  article  is  useful  inasmuch  as  it  invites  us  to 
                                                
22 The idea that 'criticism' is a destructive force is one that is deeply rooted in our sense of the word - the 
following  quote  is  from  Friedrich  Schlegel's  Philosophical Fragments  and  highlights  the  double-bind  of 
criticism – on the one hand we acknowledge a sense of derision inherent in the word criticism, yet at the 
same time we recognise the potentially banality of a discourse that is devoid of criticism; 'If some mystical 
art lovers who think of every criticism as a dissection and every dissection as a destruction of pleasure 
were to think logically, then “wow” would be the best criticism of the greatest work of art. To be sure, 
there are critiques which say nothing more, but only take much longer to say it.' Freidrich Schlegel, trans. 
by Peter Firchow, Philosophical Fragments (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991) p. 7. 
23 I refer here to the work of prominent ‘New Musicologists’ – Rose Rosengard Subotnik, Susan McClary, 
Lawrence Kramer, Richard Leppert, Kofi Agawu, Richard Taruskin etc. For criticism of ‘New Musicology’ 
see Pieter van der Toorn – Music, Politics and the Academy (1996) and Charles Rosen ‘The New Musicology’ 
in Critical Entertainments: Music Old and New (2000:255-272).  
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consider some of the key arguments that have occupied the domain of music criticism in 
the recent past. The Grove article begins: 
 
Although many references to music criticism imply the narrow definition, it is 
important to understand criticism broadly in order to see the continuity among 
various activities of musical interpretation and evaluation…European traditions of 
music criticism centring on concert music and opera typically treat music as an art, 
as  do critical traditions worldwide that derive from  European models. In such 
discourse,  music  is  one  of  several  art  forms  along  with  literature,  visual  art, 
architecture, theatre and dance; this assumption reflects a conceptual formation 
that  is  historically  and  geographically  specific.  Often,  in  music  criticism,  the 
central goal is to evaluate and describe music as art, or as an object of aesthetic 
experience.
24 
 
The article draws our attention to two main points: firstly, that music is considered 
an art, and as such, is conditioned by certain historically and geographically specific 
concepts and secondly, that, already, the function of music criticism has often been 'to 
evaluate and describe music as art or as an object of aesthetic experience.’ What I am 
chiefly concerned with here is the precise nature of the ‘evaluations’ and ‘descriptions’ 
of such endeavours. The article also briefly acknowledges the problem of defining the 
term  'music  criticism'  and  we  might  understand  the  ‘narrow  definition’  of  music 
criticism  that  the  article  refers  to  as,  initially,  the  writing  of  music  criticism  in  a 
journalistic context. Before continuing any further, I think it is important to mention that 
by referring to the term 'music criticism' this dissertation is not implying only the kind 
of music criticism that appears in a journalistic context. The fact that newspapers carry 
daily reviews of music concerts is symptomatic of the changes that the term ‘criticism’ 
has been subjected to and as the Grove article points out, more than a few discrepancies 
arise when we consider what might be expected of the professional critic: 
The  music  critic…becomes  a  representative  of  experienced  or  cultivated 
musicians, and can act as an educator in relation to a larger, diverse audience. A 
tension arises between these two approaches, one grounding critical authority in 
the absence of individualisation, the other grounding critical authority in special 
knowledge and training that distinguish the critic from many other people.
25 
 
The particular nature of the problem articulated here, i.e., that there is an inherent 
contradiction facing the modern critic; on the one hand he must speak for the people, 
and therefore be of similar disposition to the people, and on the other hand, he must be a 
                                                
24 Fred Everett Maus, et al. "Criticism." Grove Music Online. Oxford Music Online. 19 Jan. 2010 
<http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/40589pg1>. 
25 Ibid.  
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specialist, an individual voice of expertise within his field is one of the many problems 
that arise as a result of a contemporary understanding of criticism. In his article ‘The 
Authority of Music Criticism’ prominent musicologist and composer Edward Cone
26 
makes a useful distinction between the kinds of people who will normally be involved 
in the practice we call music criticism. These are the ‘reviewer’, the ‘teacher’ and the 
‘critic proper.’ He refers to the reviewer thus: 
 
The reviewer writes primarily for the consumer. His reader wants to know what to 
buy: what concerts and operas to attend, what records to listen to, and what to 
think  about  what  he  hears.  The  reviewer’s  ears,  then,  must  be  fundamentally 
similar  to  those  of  the lay  audience  –  although,  one  hopes,  sharper  and  more 
focused.  His  essays  must  describe  as  accurately  as  possible  how  the  music 
sounded – how it went, if it was new; how it was performed, it is was old. If he is 
successful his reader will say, “Yes, that is what I heard,” or, “So that it what I 
would have heard if I had been there.” But the reviewer cannot stop with mere 
description. He must make a judgement, for what his reader is most anxious to 
know is, Is it worth hearing, worth attending, worth talking about, worth buying? 
Will I like it? (Or, Should I like it?) The reviewer’s authority, then stems from his 
reader’s  conviction  that  the  reviewer’s  taste  is  trustworthy  –  which  most 
frequently means, consonant with the reader’s own. Broader and better informed, 
to be sure, but basically similar (Cone, 1981: 2)  
 
As Cone explains, when it becomes the responsibility of an individual to account 
for a musical or aesthetic experience, it is generally accepted that some level of musical 
knowledge  is  a  requirement  of  such  a  role.  The  precise  nature  of  this  knowledge, 
however, is less clear, and to a large extent, in the case of the newspaper reviewer, the 
knowledge  he  possesses  is  thought  to  be  of  a  similar  level  to  his  readership.  This 
acceptance of a kind of critical laymen is a recent development, however, and we can 
see  how  sharply  this  differs  from  an  eighteenth  century  understanding  of  criticism. 
Critica Musica (1722-5), one of the oldest periodicals of the German critical tradition, 
defined criticism as:  
 
The precise examination and evaluation of…opinions and arguments in old and 
new literature about music…for the elimination of all primitive [grob] errors and 
to promote greater growth in the science of pure harmony.
27 
 
 
                                                
26 Edward Cone, ‘The Authority of Music Criticism’, Journal of the American Musicological Society, 34 (1981), 
1-18. 
27 Critica Musica is thought to be the first music journal ever published. Founded by Johann Mattheson, it 
is in the Leipzig City Music Library. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/143356/Critica-Musica  
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What is striking about this quote is the mention of the word 'literature'. To what 
extent, if any, do we expect today’s newspaper critic to have a thorough knowledge of 
the arguments found in old and new ‘literature’ about music? Here we can understand 
the term 'literature', I think, in the widest possible sense for the time being. That is to 
say we can understand the term 'literature' to mean simply a written document whose 
subject, in this particular instance, is music. Cone goes on to suggest that the reviewer 
differs from the teacher because the teacher is concerned with the dissemination of 
practical advice to the student. The teacher is a professional, he teaches musicians and 
the teacher’s authority resides in, ‘the precision of his technical knowledge, the breadth 
of his musical experience, and the ability to apply both knowledge and experience to 
the solution of the student’s problems.’ (Cone, 1981: 3)      
One of the fundamental difficulties in fixing a definitive meaning of the concept 
of criticism stems from the historically inconsistent relationship we have to it.  In the 
eighteenth  century,  it  was  accepted,  encouraged  even,  that  the  discourse  of  music 
criticism took place inside the domain of texts about music. In other words, the objects 
under  scrutiny  were  the  texts  themselves,  and  not  necessarily  the  musical  score. 
Moreover, contained within the evocation of the term 'literature' is the implication that 
this commits the 'precise examination and evaluation' of musical texts to a kind of 
language  that  concerns  itself  with  'opinions  and  arguments'.    In  other  words,  the 
practice of music criticism was obligated to notions of rhetoric, of argument, and of 
reasoned and precise judgements. Admittedly, one could argue that this definition of 
music criticism suffers from the kind of rhetorical idealism that characterises much of 
the German Romantic period. Indeed, it remains unclear what 'greater growth in the 
science  of  pure  harmony'  might  imply,  even  if  it  is  simply  being  faithful  to  a 
historicised idea of musical tonality. Even though the precise date of this quote might 
be considered a little premature to be thought of as strictly belonging to the period we 
know as Romanticism, the use of the word 'harmony', I would suggest, has connotations 
of a ‘unified subjectivity’, or ‘contented spirituality’ i.e., a state of being in which one is 
‘in  harmony’  with  oneself,  the  pursuit  of  which  often  occupied  German  Romantic 
thought.  
In terms of the state of British music criticism in the eighteenth century, as Herbert 
M. Schueller explains, the debates of the period centered on ideas that were related to 
imitation and expression, and, he argues, the story of British music criticism in the 
eighteenth century remains largely untold. As has been previously mentioned, it was 
thought in Britain too, that those who participated in the critical writing of music were  
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familiar  also  with  a  literary  tradition,  and  thus  were  subject  to  a  ‘variety  of 
influences.’
28  Among these influences were two dominant ideas relating to music and 
its  effects.  The  first  is  concerned  with  music’s  capacity  to  imitate  ‘nature’  (in  the 
broadest sense of the term, thus including human nature) and secondly, is the idea that 
music’s function was to represent a given state of emotion or affectation: 
 
In musical composition there followed a demand that any single piece must have a 
single style or mood, such as gaiety, liveliness, or sombreness. A “sonata” had 
one mood, not, like the classical sonata, contrasting moods. Music was a language 
which  could  express  passions,  affections,  and-later-sentiments.  The  composer, 
except when he was writing for instruments, had to make his music correspond 
with  words.  His  aim  was  literary,  rather  than  musical;  his  duty  was  affective 
representation of words in music (Schueller, 1948: 547). 
 
 
Music’s capacity to ‘express’ emotion and capture mood was one of the reasons 
that  opera  flourished  so  successfully  in  both  British  and  European  musical  life. 
Schueller gives the following précis of early British music criticism: 
 
Though British music criticism has little to say before 1750, criticism of the opera 
in the work of Addison (in the Spectator, 1711-12) and of John Dennis (1706) had 
certain  affinities  with  Continental  music  criticism.  The  influences  of  British 
thought  about  music  were  Italian,  German  and  French.  From  France  came  St 
Evremond (Sur les opéras, 1705), Boileau, Charles Perrault (Critique de l’opéra, 
1674), and others; later came Dubos (1719), Andres (1741), Batteux (1746), and 
others. From Germany came the Critica Musica (1722-25) of Johann Mattheson 
and the works of F.W. Marpurg (1718-95). From Italy came chiefly musicians and 
the “Italian style”, but also many technical treatises which, like those coming from 
France,  carried  rationalistic  presuppositions.  And  in  all  of  the  Continental 
influences  on  British  music  criticism  there  was  material  for  the  philosophical 
question of imitation and expression in the art of music (Schueller, 1948: 548). 
 
 
All  of  these  influences  as  well  as  the  close  intersection  of  philosophical  and 
musical  ideas  meant  that  the  British  eighteenth  century  music  critic,  was  neither  a 
philosopher nor a musician but rather a little of both; ‘The eighteenth century British 
music critic was also an amateur philosopher, but as a literary man he was a dilettante in 
matters musical. Never a musician, he was interested in academic problems.’ (Schueller, 
1948: 548) Reflections on the qualities and the characteristics of the critic lead us to 
                                                
28 Herbert M. Schueller, ‘“Imitation” and “Expression” in British Music Criticism in the 18th Century’, The 
Musical Quarterly, 34 (1948), 544-566 (p. 546).  
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Woolf’s famous incarnation, the common reader, who will be discussed in greater detail 
in  Chapter  3.  What  happens  next  in  British  music  criticism  though,  according  to 
Schueller,  is  that,  as  a  consequence  of  the  music  critic’s  philosophical  and  literary 
investment, musical composition in Britain enters a state of radical paralysis, whereby, 
by 1750 it had rejected the musical developments in Opera in Europe, and was left 
trying to find solutions to the now historical problems of the Baroque era; ‘Tacitly, they 
admitted that the British composer no longer had the energy to match the efforts of men 
like Purcell…they indicated that the difficulty was not with Handel’s destruction of 
British  musical  efforts,  but  with  the  stagnation  of  the  British  musical  imagination’ 
(Schueller,  1948:  549).  Schueller  argues  that  this  ‘stagnation’  is  a  result  of  the 
fundamentally ‘conservative’ nature of art criticism. But I would query this assertion 
and  instead  would  suggest  that  this  fundamental  split  between  theory  and  practice, 
whereby practice is left stranded by the pace of theoretical developments, means that a 
fissure begins to emerge between the contemporaneity of musical discourse and the 
practice of musical composition. This fissure or antagonism between theory and practice 
is  something  that  returns  again  and  again  throughout  history,  and  has  an  enormous 
impact on the concept of criticism. Criticism has a duty to respond to the art work of its 
era, but if the language and the ideas accorded to that discourse of criticism rely on a 
historical  set  of  problems,  then  criticism  can  only  ever  be  an  antiquated  form  of 
appraisal. The critic is expected to make meaning from the activity he observes, yet, this 
meaning  is  somehow  burdened  with  priorities  from  the  past.  What  happens  in  late 
eighteenth century Britain, then, is that music becomes stuck on the idea that it is purely 
imitative, but, crucially, imitation of a limited kind, whereby music can only imitate 
sounds  and  motions.  This  was  in  opposition  to  literature  and  painting  which  could 
recreate things, trees, faces, etc. (Schueller, 1948: 549). We can see how this problem of 
theory ‘overtaking’ practice gathers pace in eighteenth and nineteenth century British 
music criticism, by looking at the development of the language of music criticism, for 
one of the most fundamental questions we must ask of music criticism is how it arrives 
at or decides upon the vocabulary it utilises. The Grove article continues: 
 
Descriptive and interpretative language in criticism ranges from technical analysis, 
to attributions of affect or expression, to the many diverse possibilities of figurative 
language...Critical language used in interpretation of music can itself become a topic 
for interpretation; the interpretative issues include, on one hand, the relation of the 
critical language to the music and to listeners' experiences, and on the other hand, the  
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relation of the language to other discourses of arts criticism, literature, philosophy 
and so on.
29 
 
It becomes clear, then, the  issue of language in  music  criticism is one that is 
fundamental here. Precisely how music is written about requires one to consider not just 
the  interpretative  problems  that  accompany  such  a  consideration,  but  also,  I  would 
argue, asks one to consider the very style of language – that is, one must understand 
language at its structural level. As the Grove article correctly surmises, the language of 
music  criticism  can  itself  be  the  object  of  interpretation.  The  article  continues  by 
speculating about the role of experience in music criticism: 
 
Critical judgements of music originate in experiences. They depend on experience 
of the object of criticism…Enlightenment thinkers, not surprisingly, emphasised 
the  origin  of  artistic  or  aesthetic  judgements  in  the  experiences  of  distinct 
individuals  and  then  found  puzzles  in  the  relationship  between  individual 
subjectivity and the normative character of the judgement.
30 
 
 
Critical  judgements,  then,  according  to  the  article  are  based  on  a  set  of  a 
posteriori  conditions,  that  is,  conditions  that  yield  a  type  of  knowledge  that  is 
dependent upon our experience of the music. But although this tells us that critical 
judgements of music are based on the experiential, it fails to tell us anything about the 
nature of ‘experience’, nor of how we arrive at these critical judgements. Schueller 
suggests that in the eighteenth century judgements about music were (and to a large 
extent  still are)  reliant upon  an,  ‘improper  metaphor, upon  a  pun, and  [music]  was 
described by expressions like “high” notes and “low” ones’ (Schueller, 1948: 551) This 
utilisation of ‘improper metaphors’ is the result of a fundamentally naïve interpretation 
of our experience of the world, in which, ‘the word heaven should be set to “high” 
tones…and hell in a “low” position.’ (Schueller, 1948: 551) In itself, this seems at one 
level, a perfectly reasonable thing to do, yet on the other hand, the fact that this idea 
survives both the Renaissance and the Baroque period carries with it the suspicion that 
such practices do not seem to respond to the entirety of a musical experience. It is not 
until the appearance of the work of John Brown (1763), Schueller explains, that we 
begin to see a more nuanced interpretation of the idea of imitation, in which imitation 
                                                
29 Fred  Everett  Maus,  et  al.  "Criticism."  Grove  Music  Online.  Oxford  Music  Online.  19  Jan.  2010 
<http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/40589pg1>. 
30  Fred  Everett  Maus,  et  al.  "Criticism."  Grove  Music  Online.  Oxford  Music  Online.  19  Jan.  2010 
<http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/40589pg1>. 
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should  come  to  be  understood  as  imitation  of  our  most  essential  affectations  or 
emotions.  In other words, imitation should no longer be dependent on the particularity 
of individual words, ‘To imitate the hills and the valleys was to distort the imitation, 
which should deal with the essence of words’ (Schueller, 1948: 553). These changes in 
the  concept  of  imitation  give  way,  eventually,  to  theories  of  expression  in  British 
musical thought and it became common to believe that music could express emotion 
and meaning: 
 
According  to  Baroque  theories  and  according  to  certain  eighteenth  century 
theories  that  followed  them,  music  could  imitate  or  express  the  passions,  the 
affections, or the sentiments. (Schueller, 1948: 553) 
 
 
Importantly, however, these emotions were not just the individual emotions of a 
particular man, rather they were the emotion of all men, and of all people. And this 
belief accounts for  the movement towards the generalisation  and universalisation  of 
experience  prevalent  in Romantic thought. Moreover, what is so interesting about a 
retrospective  account  of  British  music  criticism  is  that  we  can  see  already  how 
problematic the practice of criticism becomes when there is discord between theory and 
practice. Schueller correctly points out that the entire practice of musical composition 
came to be adversely affected by stagnant intellectual thought, and similarly, theory in 
turn becomes paralysed by the lack of a practice upon which to comment.  
The relationship between theory and practice is picked up by Patricia Herzog in her 
article ‘Music Criticism and Musical Meaning
’31, in which she suggests that the focus of 
the argument centres largely on aesthetic value: 
 
The aim of music criticism is the articulation of aesthetic value. And the music 
critic serves this aim not simply by telling us what, in an impersonal, objective 
sense, music means, but by telling us why music is meaningful. (Herzog, 1995: 
299) 
 
 
Herzog is also rather forthright about the kind of position the music critic finds 
himself in: 
 
                                                
31 Patricia Herzog, ‘Music Criticism and Musical Meaning’, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 53 
(1995), 299-312.  
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Theory and analysis alone fail to provide an interpretive vocabulary rich enough 
to do the critic’s job. They do not generate the categories that tell us why music 
matters. And from a critical standpoint, why music matters is essential to what 
music means. Musical meaning as the critic sees it will not necessarily line up 
with musical meaning in the eyes of the art historian, theorist or analyst. (Herzog, 
1995: 299) 
 
 
She also criticises music theory of the last 150 years, which, she suggests: 
 
H[as] not provided[ed] an adequate basis for music criticism. Music criticism is 
underdetermined by what autonomy theorists have traditionally regarded as the 
“facts” of musical meaning. Accordingly, the scope of musical meaning must be 
enlarged to accommodate the demands of music criticism. By grounding musical 
meaning in music criticism (I aim to) restore credibility and vitality to the time-
honored  practice  of  music  criticism  as  the articulation  of  human  interests  and 
values. (Herzog, 1995: 300) 
 
 
Herzog sets up a dialogue between the ‘autonomous’ theorists, Eduard Hanslick 
and  Peter  Kivy,  and  the  ‘heteronymous’  theorists,  musicologists  Edward  Cone  and 
Joseph Kerman. Though not in great support of the distinction between the autonomous 
and heteronymous, the former implying a discourse of formalist music aesthetics and 
the  latter  implying  that  the  musically  beautiful  might  not  be  exclusively  musical, 
Herzog concedes that it is difficult to escape from these terms. In On the Musically 
Beautiful
32,  Eduard Hanslick denies  that music can move a  listener by virtue of its 
emotional  content,  and  argues  that  what  is  beautiful  or  valued  in  music  must  be 
specifically  musical;  tones,  form,  melody,  harmony,  timbre,  rhythm.  Importantly 
though, Hanslick  qualifies this by stating  that although  music can only be beautiful 
because of its musical form, music is not empty or abstract. Instead, music has what 
Hanslick refers to as “ideal substance.” In other words, what can be discerned in the 
music is beautiful not just formally, but because the ideas that the music relates to, or 
indeed, generates, can be considered “ideal” – that is, they can relate to a notion of the 
truth. In addition to this, Hanslick asserts that music cannot find a form in language, that 
music is untranslatable. Herzog is quick to point out the contradiction: 
 
That  we cannot say anything about the value  of music, save assent to it, is a 
strange statement, to say the least, coming from one of the foremost music critics 
                                                
32 Eduard Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful: A Contribution Towards the Revision of the Aesthetics of Music, 
ed. by and trans. By Geoffrey Payzant (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1986).  
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of the nineteenth century. Someone who truly believes what Hanslick says about 
musical meaning could never have written the way Hanslick did about Beethoven, 
Schubert,  and Brahms, to  name just  a  few  of  the composers  whose  music  he 
greatly admired. (Herzog. 1995: 302) 
 
But how do we negotiate this contradiction today? Indeed, how is music criticism 
conceived  of  in  current  discourse?  The  concern  is  certainly  not  a  new  one  in 
musicological debates, as the Grove article demonstrates: 
 
Controversies over musical meaning, politics and élite culture also became more 
central to the academic study of music. Kerman (1985) argued that musicologists' 
preoccupation  with  ‘analysis’  had  ‘produced  relatively  little  of  intellectual 
interest’ because it completely ignored the question of ‘artistic value’; he urged 
them  to  adopt  the  wider  stance  of  ‘criticism’.  Over  the  next  decade  musical 
scholarship  did  undergo  a  major  change;  however,  the  emphasis  was  not  on 
artistic value but on the sociology of music, its political meanings and its cultural 
contexts. Musicologists followed literary theorists in asking questions about the 
kinds  of ideas music promotes and  why  they  succeed. Some scholars rejected 
aesthetic  distinctions  altogether  and  treated  music  as a coded tract  concerning 
sexuality  and  politics;  scholarly  papers  on  the  iconography  of  the  pop  star 
Madonna became as common as studies of the Classical style. In the 1990s it 
sometimes  seemed  that  criticism  in  the  broadest  sense  had  become  a  goal  of 
musicology,  while  journalistic  criticism  often  retreated  to  the  comfort  of 
‘reviewing’.
33 
 
And on the future of musical criticism: 
 
Despite these changes, though, at the beginning of the 21st century the future of 
traditional music criticism was more uncertain than it had ever been… As the 21st 
century began, it was increasingly clear that the future nature of music criticism 
was increasingly unclear, leaving feelings of dismay along with hope for as yet 
unforeseen possibilities.
34 
 
 
To a large extent, this dissertation seeks to clarify some of the uncertainty around 
the nature of music criticism, and, furthermore, I hope to show that Woolf’s writing 
yields  ‘as  yet  unforeseen  possibilities’  with  regard  to  the  articulation  of  musical 
asethetic experience. 
                                                
33 Fred Everett Maus, et al. "Criticism." Grove Music Online. Oxford Music Online. 19 Jan. 2010 
<http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/40589pg3>. 
34 Ibid.  
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Issues in Contemporary Music Criticism 
 
In terms of more recent scholarship, the search for a more experientially centred 
form of writing is reflected in an essay by Rose Rosengard Subotnik entitled Toward 
the Next Paradigm of Musical Scholarship written in 2004. Subotnik writes: 
 
On one side, I wanted thinking about music to intersect not just occasionally but 
constantly with the most exciting issues available to the mind: defining the good 
in life (moral philosophy and social theory) and in art (criticism and aesthetic 
theory). On the other side, I wanted to find ways of engaging with music that 
permitted me to say something valuable about a piece without invariably needing 
first to achieve mastery over every element of its formal detail. Most of all, I think, 
I  was  desperate  for  a  norm  of  writing  about  music  that  centred  on  good  and 
exciting uses of the English language, uses that banished technical signs to the 
extent possible and referred those remaining not, at least in the first instance, to 
scores or complex diagrams but to ideas in the writing itself. (Subotnik, 2004: 
281)
35  
 
Woolf finds ways of ‘saying something valuable’ about music that contribute to the 
scholarly paradigm Subotnik describes. This might seem a little strange given that she 
predates Subotnik by over half a century, but it is possible to re-interpret Subotnik’s 
appeal for a new paradigm by looking again at the material already provided by history. 
There is no urgent need to throw out old methodologies for the sake of trying to invent a 
new one; rather pre-existing methodologies need to be adapted to make use of non-
musical texts and texts which contain incidental musical references. There is nothing 
‘new’, as such, about Subotnik’s Next Paradigm, and, indeed, it is a little surprising that 
there  is  no  explicit  reference  to  Adorno  or  identity-thinking  in  her  discussion  of 
‘mastery’, but perhaps this is because any explicit naming of identity-thinking, could 
itself be considered an example of such thought. Subotnik is looking for ways out of 
structural listening; however, such a manoeuvre doesn’t necessarily do away with the 
ideology of musical meaning, it simply sounds like an alternative method to analysis.  
Subotnik’s Next Paradigm argues for a new kind of listening that is able to take 
account  for  the  phenomenal  aspect  of  music  but  yet  at  the  same  time  resists  the 
temptation  to  aspire  to  complete  control  over  the  music  through  formal  analysis. 
However, a further problem with Subotnik’s paradigm is that it implies that analysis 
really did or indeed does have the potential to obtain full control over the music. But 
                                                
35 Rose Subotnik, ‘Afterword: Toward the Next Paradigm of Musical Scholarship’ in Beyond Structural 
Listening?:  Postmodern  Modes  of  Hearing,  ed.  by  Andrew  Dell’Antonio  (Berkeley:  University  of 
California Press, 2004), pp. 279-303 (p.281).  
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perhaps the issue is not one of control, but rather of containment. Analysis seems to 
places certain boundaries around music, it implements limits, but this would not imply 
that analysis says everything about a piece of music; rather that analysis says something 
about music. Subotnik again: 
 
When Fred Maus makes his elegant diagnoses of traditional music theory as itself 
a kind of defence mechanism, he stresses not only the potentially overwhelming 
power of music but also the lengths to which analysis typically goes to contain 
that power; in effect he presented the middle and late twentieth-century paradigm 
toward a new alternative based on ‘a tense, complex relation of shared agency and 
responsibility,’ that is, toward a ‘positive model of shared creation.’ (Subotnik, 
2004: 286) 
 
Pursuing the ‘meaning’ or ‘truth’ of a musical text occupies students and scholars alike, 
but  Subotnik  and  the  other essayists  in  the collection  suggest  that  there is  growing 
‘distrust and rejection of mastery as a goal or even as a virtue.’ She continues: 
 
And indeed, one can argue that the turn away, in this volume, from associating 
musical  works  with  mastery  reflects  the  larger  turn  towards  scholarly  self-
reflexiveness and, with it, a growing willingness to acknowledge a whole range of 
limitations  –  creative,  theoretical,  epistemological  –  to  which  composers  and 
critics alike are subject. (Subotnik, 2004: 289) 
 
It picks up a similar thread that is visible in Ruth Solie’s book Music in Other 
Words: Victorian Conversations, in which she writes: 
 
Nearly forty years ago…I learned what has become a central preoccupation of my 
historical thought,  the cardinal  importance of “what goes without saying”: the 
evidence we will never find is just that information that our historical subjects 
considered too obvious to be worth mentioning, its very centrality marked by its 
absence. Far from occasioning the discouragement it might have, this warning 
spurred  my  interest  in  nearly-dead  metaphors,  informal  modelling  systems, 
persistent but unscrutinised cultural tropes – language in general, especially the 
most casual – for glimmerings of what might be in those blank spaces, legible 
traces of the unsaid. (Solie, 2004: 1) 
 
 
As has already been alluded to, Woolf’s writing about music makes a space for the 
inexpert  listener,  and,  by  virtue  of  her  lack  of technical  musical  vocabulary,  she  is 
forced to imagine other ways of writing about music. And this, in accordance with 
Subotnik’s New Paradigm, allows us to use Woolf as an example of a writer who is 
unconcerned with the mastery of a piece of music. Woolf, I argue therefore, contributes  
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to an area of musical scholarship that is concerned with the problems of interpretation 
and experience. Subotnik  argues that  scholars of music  pursue a  unified account  of 
interpretation  and  experience,  that  is,  they  seek  to  find  ways  of  making  how  we 
experience  music  correspond  to  the  ways  in  which  that  experience  comes  to  be 
articulated.  Subotnik  and  others  in  the  volume  agree  that  this  approach  conceals  a 
misunderstanding about the true nature of listening and musical experience, because it 
relies on our ability to make sense of and completely master our musical experiences. 
However, if we renounce the claim to mastery, we do not necessarily give up the claim 
to a  meaningful  and  insightful musical experience,  rather,  we  acknowledge  that  the 
incompleteness  of  listening  still  lends  itself  to  interpretation  and  understanding. 
Subotnik: 
 
As these and other contributors to this volume again and again make clear, the 
difficulties  of  articulating  the  inarticulable  are  construed  within  the  Next 
Paradigm as the condition that underlies all writing about music. (Subotnik, 2004: 
291) 
 
 
The  reason  why  Woolf,  in  particular,  gives  us  special  insights  into  musical 
criticism  is  because  she  is  self-consciously  a  writer,  that  is,  she  is  always  already 
reflecting on the value and status of her work. Therefore, she is able to imagine the 
space between the given of experience, that which one might call reality, and how that 
experience comes to be articulated in another kind of form, in this instance, essays, 
diaries and letters. Thus, Woolf speaks directly to another of Subotnik’s concerns:  
 
What  emerges  from  these  numerous  invocations  of  semiotic  inadequacies, 
difficulties, and gaps is the sense that the Next Paradigm is being shaped, in parts, 
by doubts, and even a pervasive anxiety, about the status and future of writing. On 
one level the question being raised is this: in writing about music, what can one 
say  that  is  valuable  and  true?  The  ongoing  shift,  I  cited  earlier,  from 
foundationalist  principles  to  aesthetic  sensibilities  as  a  standard  for  appraising 
scholarship,  has  decreased  the  possibility  of  answering  this  question  with 
authority; and the erosion of authority raises grounds for doubt, in turn, about the 
general importance of one’s own work. (Subotnik, 2004: 291)  
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The Problem of Mastery 
 
In the introduction to Beyond Structural Listening? Postmodern Modes of Hearing, 
Andrew Dell’Antonio contextualizes the book’s essays by initially suggesting that they 
are all a response to one particular issue, namely, Subotnik’s conception of structural 
listening: 
   
Which  she  sees  as  originating  primarily  with  Schoenberg  and  Adorno,  and 
becoming  the  prevalent  aesthetic  paradigm  in  Germanic  and  Anglo-American 
musical scholarship. In her usage the term designates an approach to listening that 
considers musical works as autonomous structures defined ‘wholly through some 
implicit and intelligible principle of unity. Structural listeners who believe in the 
autonomous  art  work  believe  also  in  the  ‘possibility  of  reasoned  musical 
discourse,’ and thus seek to find ‘objectively determinable’ ‘interconnectedness of 
structure…This leads them to ‘end by locating musical value wholly within some 
formal  sort  of  parameter,  to  which  it  is  the  listener’s  business  to  attend.’ 
(Dell’Antonio, 2004: 1) 
 
 
One essay in particular in the collection that deals explicitly with some of the 
problems  of  experiencing  music  (problems  which  Woolf  also  articulates)  is 
‘Uncertainty, Disorientation, and Loss as Responses to Musical Structure’
36 by Joseph 
Dubiel. Dubiel begins by criticizing what he regards as the limiting nature of the term 
‘structure’  by  pointing  out  that  it  normally  connotes  a  ‘pattern…logical 
consequence…the satisfaction of a requirement…validation.’ (Dubiel, 2004: 174) He 
then, quite rightly, points out that the term also implies that which is not structural; in 
other words, he argues that any attempt to distance oneself from a structural listening 
implies that a lot of what occurs in music could be other then structural. Furthermore, 
these  other aspects are necessarily  divorced  from  the  structure  itself,  ‘…the  idea  is 
suppressed that ornament and colour and expression are, among other things, aspects of 
‘structure…’ (Dubiel, 2004: 174) However, Dubiel is altogether too quick to assume 
that  Subotnik’s conception of structure  supports  a reassertion  of binarisms.  As  she 
points out in the Afterword of the book, Subotnik always intended her idea of structure 
to be thought of as an aspect of style, and in this sense, it would automatically include 
the ornamental, colouristic and expressionistic aspects of structure that Dubiel thinks 
                                                
36 Joseph Dubiel, ‘Uncertainty, Disorientation, and Loss as Responses to Musical Structure’, in Beyond 
Structural Listening? Postmodern Modes of Hearing, ed. by Andrew Dell’Antonio (Berkeley; Los 
Angeles; London: University of California Press, 2004), pp. 173-200.  
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she rejects. Subotnik therefore sees structure and style as being part of a dialectical 
relationship.  However,  if  Dubiel’s  early  mistake  is  his  limited  understanding  of  the 
breadth of Subotnik’s idea of structure, one way he does ingratiate himself to the reader 
is by proposing several theoretical approaches to musical analysis that avoid mastering 
the text in any way. The idea of an analytical or critical mastery of a text is one that is 
singularly important for this chapter, and I will argue that Woolf offers us a way of 
renegotiating the problem later on. By mastering, I mean to pick up on another theme of 
Subotnik’s  critique  of structural  listening that  has previously been mentioned in the 
Introduction to this dissertation: 
 
On no topic discussed in this volume is there greater unanimity: every contributor 
casts doubt, at some level, on the possibility and value of mastery as a concept 
within the framework of studying music…Not surprisingly, rejections of mastery 
are  most  often  aimed  in  this  book  at  specifically  musical  modes  of 
reception…Unity of interpretation with experience is surely the unspoken object 
within any notion of critical or analytical mastery: it is precisely what these, and 
any, scholars give up on when they renounce the claim to mastery. (Subotnik, 
2004: 289-90)  
 
 
There are several ways that Dubiel attempts to address the problem of analytical or 
critical mastery in his essay. In an analysis of Wagner’s Tristan and Isolde, he begins by 
claiming  that  a  moment  of  ‘high  impact’  in  the  music  coincided  with  a  structural 
manoeuvre in the score that he claims to have been unaware of. Accordingly, he goes in 
search of the structural detail only to find that the discovery of compositional technique 
does little to further his desire to account for the ‘psychically jarring’ experience of 
listening.  However,  and  somewhat  disappointingly,  Dubiel  seems  to  get  round  this 
short-fall by simply suggesting that, ‘the admission of difficulty – in both senses of 
admission: owning up to it and letting it into the discussion – is an unusual analytical 
manoeuvre, if not indeed the opposite of the work analysis tries to do.’ (Dubiel, 2004: 
180) Although this is an admirable sentiment, ultimately Dubiel never quite manages to 
apply the same analytical rigour to his experiences as he does to the score. His next 
attempt comes through an analysis of Morton Feldman’s Triadic Memories in which 
Dubiel  can  only  manage  to  articulate  that  his  experience  of  a  particular  rhythmic 
structure is ‘wobbly’ and yet again avoids fully penetrating his experience by remaining 
complicit with an idea of ‘vagueness’: 
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Part of what I find interesting about this account of this music is the degree of 
overkill in the notation relative to what I say I’m getting out of it; or, to put this in 
a more encouraging way, the degree to which what I’m proposing as a hearing 
does not involve recovering every bit of detail that I can see (or think I see) in the 
notation. The perceived outcome of this oddly specific notation, I’m claiming, is a 
particular kind of vagueness about a particular kind of thing. (Dubiel, 2004: 186)  
 
 
Frustratingly,  Dubiel  seems  to  become  increasingly  convinced  that  the 
‘vagueness’ of a piece of music is an objective fact, and he struggles to find a way of 
adequately interpreting his listening.  One such struggle is apparent when he resorts to 
giving  legitimacy  to  the  surely  now  irrelevant  debate  about  a  composer’s  intention 
being a way of working out what a piece ‘means’. Furthermore, he seems to conclude 
his analysis of the Feldman piece by claiming, in a rather banal way, that any working 
out of what one is hearing ‘may take some imagination to figure out’. Furthermore, and 
a little surprisingly, Dubiel ultimately thwarts his own attempts to move away from 
assumptions about musical-technical analysis by reaffirming the potential benefits of 
such activity: 
 
Actually, a good reason to carry on music-analytic investigations is that they may 
help us to recognize sensations that we didn’t realize we were having. The effort 
to  figure  out  what  the  effect  could  possibly  be  of  some  feature  of  the  sonic 
configuration may lead to a raising of consciousness. (Dubiel, 2004: 187) 
 
 
What  is  most  striking  about  Dubiel’s  essay,  and  why  it  is  important  in  this 
particular  context,  is  the  sense  that  he  might  have  wasted  an  opportunity  to  say 
something significant about the original problem of mastery that Subotnik raises in her 
critique  of  structural  listening.  Dubiel  goes  so  far  as  to  make  some  interesting  and 
important theoretical insights into the idea of musical structure, but one gets the sense 
that his attempt at theoretical tenacity gives way to his more accomplished analytical 
skills. This is most evident in his conclusion in which he seems to support what we 
might broadly refer to as a ‘dialogical’ listening, as opposed to a ‘masterful’ one. Quite 
rightly, he notes that analysis can fall victim to notions of obligation to the musical 
work, but, in my view, he consistently fails to reach far enough into the dialectical 
network of his vocabulary. For example, merely replacing the word ‘structure’ with his 
own  term,  ‘systems’,  Dubiel  simply  rejects  the  notion  of  a  singular  master  of  the 
musical work with a theory that would allow for multiple masters, if you like. This kind  
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of conceptual confusion means that Dubiel himself seems unable to escape from the 
binary mode of thinking he warns us about in the introduction to his essay. 
One of the main problems with the idea of mastery, which Dubiel fails to mention, 
is the need, if one is going to deal with such an idea, to adequately account for the place 
of interpretation inside this matrix of structural listening. Analysis is an interpretative 
method which relies on the established lexicon of terminology. Calling into question 
either the interpretative act itself, or, indeed, the language employed in such an activity 
requires us to look back momentarily to the development of a critical language with 
which we have, arguably, sought to master works of art. 
At  the  heart  of  critical  practice  there  is  a  tension  between  experience  and  the 
resulting  articulation  of  that  experience.  To  articulate  the  value  and  meaning  of  an 
experience is what is expected of the critic, yet remaining faithful to an experience may 
come  at  the  expense  of  that  other  criterion  of  criticism;  the  production  and 
dissemination of knowledge. One of the primary functions of criticism, therefore, has 
been to try and negotiate the dialectic of experience and interpretation, and what is 
fundamental to the way we understand the concept of criticism is the way in which the 
notion  of  interpretation  seems  to  survive  the  process  of  mutation  that  criticism 
undergoes  throughout  the  centuries.  The  ability  to  interpret  is  something  that  has 
remained central to our understanding of who a critic is and what he does.  
 
The Renewal of Criticism   
 
I  would  like  now  to  try  and  expand  our  understanding  of  the  development  of 
criticism  by  turning  to  the  work  of  Simon  Jarvis  whose  article  ‘An  Undeleter  for 
Criticism’
37 asserts that there is an obligation to renew our thinking about criticism: 
 
Suppressing the question of art, we suppress the ability to think about how our 
own  making  may  be  anything  but  “production.”  Suppressing  the  question  of 
beauty, we suppress the ability to think how our own experience may be anything 
but “consumption.” Paid thinkers have a particular responsibility to challenge the 
mistransfiguration  of  production  and  consumption  into  the  permanent  and 
universal lineaments of experience. (Jarvis, 2002: 8) 
 
Jarvis begins his essay by noting that the wildly broad discourse of ‘aesthetics’ requires 
us to account for two things; experiences and ideas: 
                                                
37 Simon Jarvis, ‘An Undeleter for Criticism’, Diacritics, 32, (2002), p. 3-18.  
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Is there an experience of beauty, or is it only that we sometimes choose to sort and 
name certain experiences by using a set of terms, originating often in ancient and 
medieval philosophy and by a long process of mutation and manipulation arriving 
under  the  disciplinary  heading  of  “aesthetics”?  [...]  It  does  not  only  ask  for 
information about the history of the formation of the concept of aesthetics; it also 
asks for information about experiences. But information about experiences is hard 
to come by. This is not only, perhaps, for the large reason that “information is 
concerned with alien objects,” rather than with experiences, but also for the more 
local one that “aesthetics” does not often attempt to describe any experiences with 
determined fidelity. (Jarvis, 2002: 3) 
 
Jarvis’s quote not only helps explain why I felt it necessary to try and give a brief 
history of music criticism but it also recognizes the burden felt by those whose job it is 
to try and write about experience, ‘Professional writing demands not that we merely 
report  on  our  own  subjective  experiences,  but  that  we  produce  knowledge.’(Jarvis, 
2002: 3) The obligation to produce knowledge, therefore, is perhaps what leads Jarvis to 
mention the strict ‘philosophical grammar’ that imposes itself upon judgements about 
beauty. He points out that we cannot expect judgements about beauty to automatically 
constitute  knowledge  because  beauty  evades  logical  reasoning  (because  it  concerns 
personal values and not simply facts) – yet at the same time, ‘they are not…merely 
reports  of  a  purely  subjective  experience  either.’  (Jarvis,  2002:  5)  The  problem 
therefore,  for  criticism,  becomes  about  negotiating  this  middle  ground  somehow 
between  subject  and  object.  But  Jarvis  astutely  points  out  that  we  are,  to  a  certain 
extent, misguided to think that an experience of beauty can be faithfully rendered by a 
grammar which seems to obfuscate our conception of both ‘beauty’ and ‘experience’.  
Jarvis  goes  on  to  try  and  articulate  the  process  of  turning  an  experience  into 
knowledge and comes to the conclusion that in order to do so, such a: 
 
Making  has  depended  upon  the  deletion  of  everything  idiosyncratic  about  my 
experience and, with it, upon the deletion of everything that makes that experience 
an  experience  […]  What  has  happened  here?  The  field  of  criticism  has  been 
deleted  […]  that  field  which  lies  between  or  beyond  a  rationalism  which  can 
prove what is beautiful, and a relativism which knows what it likes. (Jarvis, 2002: 
6) 
 
He develops his argument by pointing out that at the heart of criticism lies a tension 
between  the  aesthetic  and  the  cognitive,  a  problem  that  he  explains  by  analyzing 
Kantian aesthetics. He suggests, in reference to Kant’s Third Critique, that aesthetic 
judgement has been based on an initial flaw in the distinction between ‘the good, the  
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true and the beautiful’ (Jarvis, 2002: 8) because it suffers from what he refers to as ‘a 
hierarchical asymmetry.’(Jarvis, 2002: 8) This asymmetry  is produced because Kant 
specifies that “there are two kinds of concepts”, “the concept of nature and the concept 
of freedom.” In the tripartite group of ‘the good, the true and the beautiful’, it is the 
concept of the beautiful that is, if you like, the odd one out. This is because the good 
and the true can be sought from the array of concepts given by the two overarching 
concepts of Nature and Freedom. The beautiful, however, has no concepts that belong to 
itself. Jarvis explains the consequence of this asymmetry: 
 
The way the categorical separation of true, good, and beautiful is specified is both 
what deprives beauty of any concepts of its own and what requires that beauty be 
explained by analogies with the only two sources of concepts available. (Jarvis, 
2002: 8) 
 
 
In other words, aesthetic judgement, according to Kantian metaphysics at least, relies on 
analogies made to the concepts belonging to the categories of the good and the true, and 
not on concepts germane to ‘beauty’. The effect produced is a kind of incongruous 
cross-referencing; whereby neither beauty, nor experience can come to be articulated 
honestly,  because  they  must  always  employ  the  vocabulary  of  foreign  conceptual 
categories. The point that Jarvis is making is that criticism lies in a similar relation to 
equivocality as the concept of beauty does. Although he concedes that ‘characterising 
the  terrain  of  criticism  does  not  require  Kantian  epistemology  and  Kantian 
antimetaphysical metaphysics to sustain it’ (Jarvis, 2002: 9) I maintain that this kind of 
conceptual  enlightening  of  criticism  is  helpful  in  understanding  why  aesthetic 
experience is so hard to articulate, and is exemplary in its commitment to a heightened 
awareness  of  a  specific  aspect  of  the  complex  legacy  of  aesthetic  thought.  Jarvis’s 
attention to detail also prophesises the ending of his essay in which he argues for an 
honoring  of  the  particularity  of  experience.  He  refers  to  the  relationship  between 
phenomenology and philology as being one that the field of criticism might model itself 
on: 
 
There could be worse models for criticism, always remembering that marriage, 
“not a contractual relationship as far as its essential basis is concerned,” is not 
seamless cooperation, but at once supersedes and preserves antagonism in love. 
Such a criticism would by no means imply a retreat from the minute particularity 
of art or of nature. Instead, it would no longer need to insist that access to the 
complexity  of  phenomena  arises  in  proportion  to  the  deletion  of  everything 
singular about my response to them. (Jarvis, 2002: 17)  
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It is not my intention to go into detail about the model that Jarvis ends up with here, 
rather, I want to re-read Jarvis’s argument as being resonant with a problem facing 
music  criticism.  His  desire  to  retain  ‘everything  singular’  about  his  response  to 
phenomena highlights a recent  musicological debate that  is also concerned with the 
faithful  articulation  of  musical  experience.  The  two  writers  in  this  case,  Jarvis  and 
musicologist  Rose  Rosengard  Subotnik,  seem  to  converge  over  a  shared  desire  to 
expand  the  parameters  of  academic  discourse  so  as  to  admit  singular,  personal 
experience as a facet of analysis. I suggest that Woolf’s writing about music could be 
used  a  ‘model’  for  the  kind  of  criticism  that  Jarvis  argues  is  in  danger  of  being 
overlooked. Woolf’s criticism, I will show, preserves the distance between the aesthetic 
and  the  cognitive  by  refusing  to  attempt  to  master  any  of  her  musical  encounters 
through theorization. Her preservation of this distance is, I think, similar to Jarvis’s 
appeal to  preserve  the  equivocal  nature of  criticism; an equivocality  that essentially 
defines criticism.  
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Chapter 3 
‘Innumerable threads’: Writing unreconciled   
subjectivity 
 
This chapter will explore the equivocality that Jarvis recognises splits subjectivity 
in the writing of experience by looking in detail at four essays from Woolf’s oeuvre, 
‘The Common Reader’, ‘Street Haunting: A London Adventure’, ‘Sketch of the Past’ 
and ‘Evening Over Sussex: Reflections in a Motor Car’. My reason for choosing these 
essays in particular is because they attempt to render a fractured subjectivity whole but 
in doing so they merely affirm the impossibility of such a reconciliation. In these essays, 
Woolf’s writing of the self produces what is tantamount to a phenomenological analysis 
of subjectivity as contradictory, transient and therefore illusory; but also in terms of 
presence and absence, subjectivity is considered in the aspect of life and death. And it is 
precisely this complex and exemplary pattern of self-affirmation and self-negation that 
can be salvaged for a poetics of criticism.  
I  will  read the  ‘The  Common  Reader’  somewhat against  the  grain.  This  short 
prefatory essay, which ostensibly acts as an introduction and might be thought to unify 
the remaining essays in the volume through the stabilising hypothesis of the common 
reader, actually presents a confused and confusing picture of what reading amounts to. 
If the essay itself is analysed in terms of its own rhetoric, it is not actually constitutive 
of a viable subject position for the reader from which the essays may be approached, but 
it  is,  rather, a  text  which  subtly  undermines  such a  position.  My  reading  of  ‘Street 
Haunting’ then builds on this sense of instability by arguing that Woolf discreetly and 
persistently invokes a chimeric selfhood. The title itself implies ghostly presences; a self 
that is displaced and disembodied. This partial self infiltrates crowds, bodies, minds, 
people, and  noise  and  sees  life  manifested  through  a  manifold  of  perspectives.  She 
examines  the capacity of the self to transform and delude itself; to evade itself and 
eventually negate itself. ‘Sketch of the Past’ will also be read in the light of a fractured 
subjectivity which relies on recollection and memory as a way of reproducing a partial 
self. In ‘Evening over Sussex’, Woolf attempts to reconcile four separate selves during a 
drive through the English countryside, and I will argue that the essay is in fact the 
narration of the process of the splitting and putting back together of consciousness in 
which it can be seen that the final, reunified subject is merely an illusion.  I will be  
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arguing  that  these  four  essays  have  two  striking  commonalities;  without  explicit 
philosophical terminology or an overt sceptical agenda, she addresses the fallibility of 
the thesis of an a priori subjectivity. Secondly, and in relation to wholeness, all four 
essays are concerned with history and an idea of the past. The past, for Woolf, acted as a 
lens through which one could see all aspects of art’s artificiality. But it was, ultimately, 
the standpoint of the seer that Woolf was interested in exploring and defending. The 
term “history” comes back in her writing as something of a pedal point, it seems an 
instinct to discover the finality of her own position, acts as a cover concept for the 
legitimisation and stabilisation of her ideas, and conveys her concern to make broader 
gestures in the direction of authority. And, moreover, such a person could act as the 
'vital  connection'  between  the  living  and  the  dead.  Let  us  suppose  that  the  'vital 
connection' Woolf writes of is the ‘common reader’. From her point of view, the age of 
the great critic – 'The Dryden, the Johnson, the Coleridge, the Arnold' was long dead, 
and all we could do was look back with envy to the past.  She knew at this early stage 
that history had a true bearing on the present, rejecting the scholarliness of other literary 
histories, instead wanting to capture in her criticism, the immediacy and intimacy of 
conversation.  
The figure of the common reader is essentially fictitious, but it can be read as the 
articulation of a particular subjectivity that honours a discourse of difference. Woolf 
constructs the common reader like she would a character in a novel. She writes in a 
letter to Janet Case on the 23
rd June 1925:  
 
My dear Janet, I am very glad you like the Common Reader. I was rather nervous 
lest you should curse my impertinence for writing about Greek [On Not Knowing 
Greek], when you are quite aware of my complete ignorance. I wonder if you 
think that I said anything to the point about Greek? I am in a state of complete 
bewilderment, as everyone seems to prefer either Mrs Dalloway to the C.R. or the 
other way about, and implore me to write only novels or only criticism, and I want 
to do both. (L3: 191) 
 
 
One  way  of  confronting  the  past  is  through  the  making  of  aesthetic  objects. 
Through the figure of the Common Reader – the reader who Woolf constructs – we now 
have the ability to 'take on' the stories, the judgements, and the actions of the past. She 
fictionalises history as a way of criticising it. Suzanne Nalbantian observes that: 
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Woolf used her discussion of Proust to warn her readers that the purpose of art 
was  not  to  provide  psychological  insight  into  the  author,  for  truth  had  to  be 
measured by the standards of art rather than life. (Nalbantian, 1994: 139) 
 
Instead, she notices that Woolf has, ‘An aesthetic orientation towards the use of 
life material.’ (Nalbantian, 1994: 139) Art has the ability to intervene in the making 
of a history, and for Woolf, writing was a way to of doing this. We might say that 
Woolf is writing literary history, in the true sense of the phrase. That is to say, she is 
not writing the history of literature, per se, rather she makes history literary. And in 
her kind of criticism, the book becomes the critic and the form is used critically. In 
many ways Woolf puts forward a critical notion of history whereby she isolates, 
breaks  up and  dissolves certain  moments  of  history. We  might  then  say  that for 
Woolf history is not that which dictates the material of the work of art, rather history 
itself  becomes  the  material  with  which  we  construct  new  works.  This  is  most 
explicitly articulated in ‘The Common Reader’: 
 
Above all, he is guided by an instinct to create for himself, out of whatever odds 
and ends he can come by, some kind of whole – a portrait of a man, a sketch of an 
age, a theory of the art of writing. (CR1: 1) 
 
We find a correlation in Adorno: 
 
Understanding in the highest sense – a solution of the enigma that at the same 
time  maintains  the  enigma  –  depends  on  a  spiritualisation  of  art  and  artistic 
experience whose primary medium is the imagination. (AT: 162) 
 
For Adorno, subjective mediation of the art work was central to the possibility of 
the  work’s  objectivity.  The  experiencing  subject’s  activity  in  the  face  of  the  work 
contributes to, or composes, a perception of the object, thus understanding, according to 
Adorno, is immanently dialectical, a negotiation between the empirical reality of the 
artistic material and the arbitrary, ungoverned experiences of the viewing subject. We 
find a corollary gesture in ‘The Common Reader’ and ‘Sketch of the Past’, Woolf’s 
attempt to articulate a unique critical subjectivity that negotiates, and indeed, challenges 
the boundaries of received critical practice and scholarship. The common reader ‘creates 
for himself’, is guided by his instinct, and prioritises pleasure in aesthetic experience. 
The common reader has what Adorno might refer to as a ‘creative imagination.’ In fact,  
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these essays in particular address a number of Adornoian concerns; the subject-object 
dialectic relates directly to Woolf’s theorization of the form of the essay and the role of 
the  essayist;  both  writers  emphasise  the  importance  of  imagination  in  aesthetic 
experience, and the part/whole dialectic is given new insights through Woolf’s work, 
which, in line with Adorno’s thinking in Aesthetic Theory testifies, ‘to the unreconciled 
and at the same time envision[s] its reconciliation.’ (AT: 221). 
There is no shortage of research that attests to the attention Woolf gave to the 
practices of reading and writing, and her attempts to articulate the precise nature of her 
own practices fill numerous pages of the diaries and letters. The Common Reader, of 
which there are two series, was first published in 1925 and contains a collection of short 
essays that had already appeared in journalistic form in literary periodicals or political 
pamphlets.  Despite  the  fact  that  these  essays  would  have  been  commissioned,  and 
therefore subject to the vagaries of editorial constraints, Woolf, nevertheless, tries to 
find some connecting thread to harness the heterogeneity of the two volumes. In fact, 
the desire to make some kind of ‘whole’ from the miscellany of the various essays 
preoccupied Woolf greatly, both as essayist and novelist. By 1925 Woolf is forty three 
years of age and has already established herself as a ‘serious’ writer, though was still 
not what we might consider ‘a household name’. However, the general public would 
have been familiar with some of her works already; The Voyage Out (1915), Night and 
Day (1919) and Jacob’s Room (1922). The Common Reader also comes one year after 
Woolf’s literary manifesto ‘Mr. Bennet and Mrs. Brown’ (1924). By this stage in her 
life, Woolf’s aesthetic reflection and interest in genre theory has deepened and gathered 
force.  This  comes  to  light  in  the  eponymously  titled  introduction  to  the  Common 
Reader.  
 
‘The Common Reader’ 
In this briefest of essays, ‘The Common Reader’ could be thought of as a pivotal 
figure  in  Woolf’s  philosophy  of  criticism.  Neither  critic,  nor  scholar,  the  common 
reader  is  ‘worse  educated,  and  nature  has  not  gifted  him  so  generously.’  (CR1:  1) 
Denied the relative epistemological stability of the world of the critic or scholar, the 
common reader is forced to fashion his impressions in whatever make-shift way he can. 
He  must,  ‘run  up  some  rickety  and  ramshackle  fabric  which  shall  give  him  the 
temporary satisfaction of looking sufficiently like the real object to allow of affection,  
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laughter, and argument.’ (CR1: 1). Woolf’s deprecating picture of the common reader 
continues as she describes him as, ‘hasty, inaccurate, and superficial.’ (CR1: 1) But 
beneath this outward disregard for the common reader’s literary skills, Woolf reinstates 
the critical importance of the common reader’s approach at the end of the essay when 
she claims that his observations will, ‘contribute to so mighty a result.’ (CR1: 2) In fact, 
this is just one of many paradoxes in this essay which can be regarded in the light of 
Adorno’s philosophy of the irreconcilability of the art work. ‘The Common Reader’ 
implies commonality and a sense of shared community. These disparate essays find 
their connection, their wholeness in the common reader. The common reader represents 
a subject position which unifies, joins together and makes connections with others. This 
was supposed to be the function of Woolf’s introductory essay. Yet, in fact, the entire 
piece  is  characterised  by  contradiction  and  communicates  not  a  universal,  unified 
understanding  of  subjectivity,  but  something  much  more  sophisticated;  the  essay 
purports to an idea of ‘wholeness’, yet undermines this very wholeness in its execution. 
An example of this first appears in the second paragraph, when Woolf writes, ‘Above 
all he is guided by an instinct to create for himself, out of whatever odds and ends he 
can come by, some kind of whole – a portrait of a man, a sketch of an age, a theory of 
the art of writing.’ (CR1: 1) But Woolf’s ‘whole’ seems to consist only of fragments; a 
portrait is not a man, a sketch is a mere outline, and art cannot be entirely explained by 
theory. What is at stake in ‘The Common Reader’ is the epistemological value of the 
presentation of unreified subjectivity. That is to say, the essay confronts us with the 
reality of our own experience, precisely because the essay is laced with contradiction 
and inconsistency whilst claiming to be otherwise. There can be no knowledge of an 
object without the perspective of the subject’s negotiation of that object. And in this 
sense, we gain knowledge not from the essay itself, but from our confrontation with the 
particularity of the essay’s contradictions. ‘The Common Reader’, whilst purporting to 
an  idea  of  wholeness  actually  presents  us  with  the  very  opposite,  and  it  is  our 
experience of confronting this contradiction that disrupts the reifying discourse of the 
subject/object dialectic.  
‘Subject  and  Object’  from  1969  encapsulates  some  of  Adorno’s  fundamental 
philosophical arguments. Martin Jay’s reading of Adorno’s essay is particularly helpful 
here as it emphasizes the material reality of Adorno’s rationale. Despite the complex 
philosophical language that surrounds the subject/object dialectic, at heart, Adorno’s 
concern remained centred on how we relate to our surrounding environments. But the  
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problem  of  conceiving  of  an  adequate  conception  of  subjectivity  from  which  one’s 
relation to the world could be established becomes more complex still with Adorno’s 
insistence that a collective concept of the subject fails to account for the uniqueness and 
individuality of any particular person. Thus, we arrive at an intellectual crossroads: 
 
If on the other hand we tried to define the two terms so as to avoid this type of 
complication,  we  would  land  in  an  aporia  that  adds  to  the  problematics  of 
defining…for in a way, the concepts of subject and object – or rather, the things 
they intend – have priority before all definition. Defining means that something 
objective, no matter what it may be in itself, is subjectively captured by means of 
a fixed concept. Hence the resistance offered to defining by subject and object. 
(Adorno, 1987: 498) 
 
Woolf’s essay, replete with inconsistencies and contradictions, therefore prevents the 
sundering of the subject by means of a fixed concept, and thus the particularity of the 
common reader remains intact. This understanding of the figure of the common reader 
has  implications  for  the  subject/object  dialectic  because  it  reinforces  the  need  to 
critically  engage  with  objects,  whether  those  objects  are  the  specific  works  Woolf 
mentions in her essays, the essays themselves, or, meta-critically, the act of reflection 
itself. 
The  rhetoric  of  reflection,  and  the  possible  multi-layered  interpretations  these 
reflections give rise to, is clear in both ‘Subject and Object’ and ‘The Common Reader.’ 
Woolf’s essay begins with a reflection on the past and the opening sentence is an echo 
from Dr Johnson’s Life of Gray in which she quotes, ‘…I rejoice to concur with the 
common  reader.’  But  the  essay’s  most  revealing  reflection  comes  here,  ‘He  never 
ceases, as he reads, to run up some rickety and ramshackle fabric which shall give him 
the  temporary  satisfaction  of  looking  sufficiently  like  the  real  object  to  allow  of 
affection, laughter, and argument.’ (CR1: 1). The ‘real object’ here is the critic or the 
scholar,  but  their  status  as  ‘object’  is  interchangeable  with  ‘subject’.  Thus  the 
equivocality of the dialectic is on full display. Furthermore, that the common reader 
would only ever be able to provide a reading that would look sufficiently like that of the 
critic  or  the  scholar  further  entrenches  the  complex  structures  of  impressions  and 
reflections, and the illusory nature of the dialectic. Illusory because any separation of 
subject and object is (as both Adorno and Woolf testify) one of the fundamental errors 
of epistemology. Martin Jay explains:  
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To  move  from  error  to  truth  requires  a  critique  of  concepts  that  pits  their 
ambiguous implications against the social world to which they imperfectly refer; 
the result will not merely be that the concept is inadequate to the world, but also 
that the world as it presently is constituted is inadequate to certain meanings of the 
concept.  The  particular  error  of  contemporary  epistemology…is  the  radical 
separation of subject and object, which has been a fundamental assumption of 
Western thought at least since Descartes. (Jay, 1984: 61) 
 
This illusory subject/object aporia is captured vividly by Woolf’s essay as she 
sustains a paradoxical rhetoric throughout. But, as Adorno notes, this aporia is both 
illusory and real at the same time, and this is precisely why it is meaningful. He writes: 
The separation of subject and object is both real and illusory. True, because in the 
cognitive  realm  it  serves  to  express  the  real  separation,  the  dichotomy  of  the 
human condition, a coercive development. False, because the resulting separation 
must not be hypostasized, not magically transformed into an invariant. (Adorno, 
1987: 498-9) 
 
This rather confusing use of true and false refers to Adorno’s ongoing dialogue with 
Hegelian dialectics and gives rise to the proclamation in Minima Moralia  that, ‘the 
whole is the false.’ (MM: 50) Truth, as Adorno means to  imply here,  refers to the 
current  state  of  the  human  condition  and  the  contradictory  nature  of  experience.  It 
refers, essentially, to the truth of human suffering as it continually tries to come to terms 
with  the  world  around  it  and  the  objects  in  it  with  the  dominating  impulse  of 
instrumental  reason  which  ultimately  falsifies  the  subject  and  its  experience.  ‘The 
Common  Reader’  ostensibly  attempts  to  suppress  heterogeneity  for  the  sake  of 
unification, but, as  I have shown, ultimately resists doing so.  We  can see how this 
speaks  directly  to  Adorno’s  philosophy  of  identity  and  non-identity,  because  the 
resulting  effect  of  Woolf’s  writing  is  the  salvaging  and  protection  of  a  non-reified 
subjectivity.  That  is  to  say,  Woolf’s  work  testifies  to  the  redemptive  power  of  the 
remembrance  and  restoration  of  difference  and  particularity  to  the  subject/object 
dialectic. 
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‘Street Haunting: A London Adventure’ 
‘Street Haunting: A London Adventure’ first appeared in the Yale Review in October 
1927 and is a vivid insight into the colourful and varied life that wanders through the 
streets of London. But it is also evidence of Woolf’s inscription of a nomadic self, the 
wanderer,  who  identifies  herself  both  as  observer  of  other  people,  and  in  disguise, 
momentarily and haphazardly wearing the identities of others. In fact, the whole essay is 
built around an illusory self and the metaphor of the seeing eye/I that roams through the 
crowds, disembodied from any one self. The very first sentence of the essay gives us 
some clue of what is to come, ‘No one perhaps has ever felt passionately towards a lead 
pencil.’ (CE4: 155) What we realize, of course, is that ‘no one’ indicates the negation of 
the self that is developed in the rest of the essay. In a similar way to ‘The Common 
Reader’, ‘Street Haunting’ is also concerned with wholeness and the unification of the 
self, but this self is constituted negatively and remains continually dislocated and alien 
to  itself.  The  opening  paragraph  sets  up  the  metaphor  of  disguise  and  deception 
immediately  by  referring  to  the  buying  of  a  lead  pencil  as  a  pretext  for  wandering 
around London, and as darkness falls we learn that, ‘We are no longer quite ourselves.’ 
(CE4:  155)  Instead,  having,  ‘shed  the  self  our  friends  know  us  by’  we  become, 
‘anonymous trampers.’ Taking up this anonymous identity, the pervasive rhetoric of 
seeing begins to develop as Woolf describes the act of spying on an arguing couple. But 
instead  of  pursuing insight,  the  seeing  eye  merely  glides over the surface  of  things 
always  at  a  distance  from  the  entirety  of  the  vision  it  chases.  The  eye  reflects  the 
pearlescent  colors  around  it  as  ‘a  central  oyster  of  perceptiveness,’  but  it  does  not 
penetrate the surface of things, ‘The eye is not a miner, not a diver, not a seeker after 
buried treasure. It floats us smoothly down a stream, resting, pausing, the brain sleeps as 
it  looks’  (CE4:  156)  The  sleepy  encountering  of  the  world  in  which  skimming  the 
surface will suffice, advances the metaphor of sight paradoxically. Sight is not used to 
penetrate or overcome the strangeness of the world, rather the image of the disembodied 
eye only serves to affirm its unfamiliarity. The eye without a body can only ever access 
experience partially: 
 
Here vaguely one can trace symmetrical straight avenues of doors and windows; 
here under the lamps are floating islands of pale light through which pass quickly 
bright men and women, who, for all their poverty and shabbiness, wear a certain 
look of unreality[…] (CE4: 156) 
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Vague tracings of life reinforce the illegibility of experience in which appearances 
are unreal and illusory. This sense of the unreal is advanced by Woolf’s writing of a 
subjectivity that cannot become real because it is trapped by a series of events that 
simply reinforce the peculiarly deceptive nature of experience. The infinite deferral of a 
unified subjectivity by virtue of the disembodied eye/I relies on viewing events and 
people superficially for fear of, ‘catching at some root or branch.’ (CE4: 157) This root 
or  branch  symbolizes  understanding  and  making  sense  of  the  empirical  world  –  a 
trajectory that the essay undermines by sustaining the image of the fractured self. For 
Adorno, this refusal to shape experience in concrete terms for the sake of understanding 
allows the differential nature of things to remain distinct. (Adorno, 1987: 499). 
Throughout the essay, Woolf’s flâneurial self encounters numerous characters, all 
of whom represent the fragility of the self and the power of transformation. Her first 
encounter with a dwarf precipitates a questioning of identity, ‘“What, then, is it like to 
be a dwarf?”’ The dwarf draws the seeing eye towards her, ‘Look at that! Look at that!’ 
as she herself plays out a negotiation of her own identity. The dwarf episode resonates 
with the main themes of the essay as we read about her trying on various different types 
of  shoe and  regarding  herself  in  the  mirror. The  dwarf’s  impressions  of  herself are 
radically transformed as she becomes convinced that the shoes diminish the inferiority 
of her stature, ‘Look at my feet, look at my feet, she seemed to be saying, as she took a 
step this way and then a step that way. The shop girl good-humouredly must have said 
something flattering, for suddenly her face lit up in an ecstasy.’ (CE4: 158) However, as 
quickly as the dwarf leaves the shop and returns to the streets, the power of the mirror 
and the flattery of the shop-girl has faded as she is absorbed back into the formless mass 
of the people on the street, ‘the humped, the twisted, the deformed.’(CE4: 158). Almost 
as if by way of punishment for her fleeting moment of happiness in the shop, the dwarf 
immediately encounters two blind men, to remind her that though deformed, she could 
at least ‘see herself’, even though the sight she saw in the mirror in the shop lasted only 
as  long  as  she  was  looking.  The  representation  of  experience  in  ‘Street  Haunting’ 
continues by stringing together various unrelated events and imaginings; bearded Jews, 
donkeys, cats, the homeless and the deformed as well as the fantasy furnishings of a 
fictional party: 
 
Wearing pearls, wearing silk, one steps out onto a balcony which overlooks the 
gardens of sleeping Mayfair. There are a few lights in the bedrooms of great peers  
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returned from Court, of silk-stockinged footmen, of dowagers who have pressed 
the hands of statesmen. (CE4: 160) 
 
The pearls represent the quitting of one persona for the adoption of another, but 
they also represent the limits of the unreal; wearing pearls on the balcony is held up as 
the experience so different to buying a pencil that it punctures the momentary reverie 
and is the catalyst for a reflection on the heterogeneity of the consciousness: 
 
But what could be more absurd? It is, in fact, on the stroke of six; it is a winter’s 
evening; we are walking to the Strand to buy a pencil. How, then, are we also on a 
balcony, wearing pearls in June? What could be more absurd? Yet it is nature’s 
folly, not ours. When she set about her chief masterpiece, the making of man, she 
should have thought of one thing only. Instead turning her head, looking over her 
shoulder, into each one of us she let creep instincts and desires which are utterly at 
variance with his main being, so that we are streaked, variegated, all of a mixture; 
the colours have run. Is the true self this which stands on the pavement in January, 
or that which bends over the balcony in June? Am I here, or am I there? Or is the 
true self neither this nor that, neither here nor there, but something so varied and 
wandering that it is only when we give the rein to its wishes and let it take its way 
unimpeded  that  we  are  indeed  ourselves?  Circumstances  compel  unity;  for 
convenience’ sake a man must be a whole. (CE4: 160-1) 
 
This moment of intense reflection takes us out of the bustling activity of the streets 
and  into  the  quietude  of  pause  and  thought.  The  aspiration  for  a  ‘true  self’  is 
contradicted and complicated by the rhetoric of the essay which presents a multitude of 
selves,  none  of  which  remain  constant,  ‘But  just  as  we  are  turning  to  obey  the 
command, another self disputes the tyranny to insist.’ (CE4: 164).  The commanding 
self is the one that reminds us of the task to buy a pencil; the pencil is that which 
inscribes,  stabilises  and  memorializes,  but  in  this  essay,  the  pencil,  like  the  self,  is 
exposed as a ruse and an illusion. The pencil, in fact, writes the deterioration of the self. 
 
‘Sketch of the Past’ and ‘Evening Over Sussex: Reflections in a Motor 
Car’ 
The power of remembrance as well as ‘illusory and real’ subjectivity in Woolf’s 
writing is perhaps best exemplified in her 1939 essay ‘Sketch of the Past’. Woolf’s most 
explicitly  autobiographical  essay  is  laden  with  potential  points  of  connection  with 
Adorno’s philosophy of non-identity. By describing the process of writing the self as a  
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practice that allows only the temporary stabilization of the ‘I’, Woolf foregrounds an 
unreconciled subjectivity. She begins the essay by asking, ‘Who was I then?’ (MoB: 79) 
and  claiming,  ‘I  do  not  know  how  far  I  differ from  other  people.’  (MoB:  79) and, 
indeed,  one  could  read  the  whole  essay  as  an  ode  to  negative  dialectics,  with  its 
emphasis on self-reflexivity, non-domination and ‘open’ and ‘experimental’ thought. 
Woolf’s  question  about  how  far  she  differed  from  other  people,  not  how  she  was 
similar, concurs with Adorno’s philosophy of difference. In trying to recall her past, 
Woolf can only remember impressions, sketches and outlines, scraps of sounds, flashes 
of colour and smells. But both her writing and her memories testify to the resistance of 
the self to its unification; the self can only write the past in the present, but this self is 
incomplete, partially remembered and temporal. Writing cannot fix things, concepts, or 
ideas, but it can trace the attempt, the trial, and the struggle of articulation. Woolf has 
similar thoughts in the essay: 
 
I am hardly aware of myself, but only of the sensation. I am only the container of 
the feeling of ecstasy, of the feeling of rapture. Perhaps this is characteristic of all 
childhood  memories;  perhaps  it  accounts  for  their  strength.  Later  we  add  to 
feelings much that makes them more complex; and therefore less strong; or if not 
less strong, less isolated, less complete. (MoB: 81) 
 
Woolf’s constitution of subjectivity comes about largely through moments of what 
she  calls  ‘non-being’,  that  is,  moments  of  life that  are  in  some  way  ‘insignificant’, 
mundane  or  easily  forgotten;  meals,  daily  chores,  snippets  of  meaningless 
conversations. These moments of non-being are a way of describing the subject ‘at rest’; 
unburdened, unmoved, singularly unaffected by any encounter or experience with the 
world.  They  are  in  opposition  to  Woolf’s  ‘violent  shock’,  the  name  she  gives  to  a 
moment  of  consciousness  which  reveals  the  brutality  of  existence  and  exposes 
subjectivity as the continual failure of the articulation of experience. Woolf describes a 
fight with her brother Thoby as being an instance when she recognized the burden of the 
moral  obligation  not  to  hurt  others,  an  obligation  that  she  had  no  power  over,  that 
rendered her helpless. She then recalls regarding a flower bed outside the house at St 
Ives  and realizing  the symbiosis of  nature, claiming to  utter, ‘“That is the  whole”’. 
(MoB: 84) And finally she describes trying to come to terms with the discovery that 
someone she had met once had committed suicide: 
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It seemed to me that the apple tree was connected with the horror of Mr Valpy’s 
suicide. I could not pass it. I stood there looking at the grey green creases of the 
bark – it was a moonlight night – in a trance of horror. I seemed to be dragged 
down,  hopelessly,  into  some  pit  of  absolute  despair  from  which  I  could  not 
escape. My body seemed paralysed. (MoB: 84) 
 
Woolf’s way of coping with these experiences is to try and write about them, to 
render them sensible and to explain them. Again, writing seems to have the power to 
inscribe experience: 
As  one  gets  older  one  has  a  greater  power  through  reason  to  provide  an 
explanation; and that this explanation blunts the hammer force of the blow…And 
so I go on to suppose that the shock-receiving capacity is what makes me a writer. 
I hazard the explanation that a shock is at once in my case followed by the desire 
to explain it. (MoB: 85) 
 
The admission of a desire to explain reveals the impulse to conquer experience 
through language; a desire which Adorno categorises as a dominating one, and yet, the 
essay as a whole remains faithful to the non-identical and to a subjectivity that cannot 
be fixed. But it is Woolf’s need for comprehension that is most revealing about the 
falseness  of  totality  and  its  very  real  allure.  The  desire  to  ‘make  whole’  one’s 
experiences comes from the desire to overcome experience by fixing it with concepts. In 
the posthumously published ‘Evening over Sussex: Reflections in a Motor Car’, Woolf 
describes  the  moment when  she  realizes  that  experience  can  seem  in  excess  of  the 
capabilities of language as ‘a pin prick’: 
 
But, I thought, there is always some sediment of irritation when the moment is as 
beautiful  as  it  is  now.  The  psychologists  must  explain;  one  looks  up,  one  is 
overcome by beauty extravagantly greater than one could expect – there are now 
pink clouds over Battle; the fields are mottled, marbled – one’s perceptions blow 
out rapidly like air balls expanded by some rush of air, and then, when all seems 
blown to its fullest and tautest, with beauty and beauty and beauty, a pin pricks; it 
collapses. But what is the pin? So far as I could tell, the pin had something to do 
with one’s impotency. I cannot hold this – I cannot express this – I am overcome 
by it – I am mastered. Somewhere in that region one’s discontent lay; and it was 
allied with the idea that one’s nature demands mastery over all that it receives. 
(CE2: 290) 
 
The great irony of this passage is that as Woolf attempts to describe her impotency 
in the face of experience, she only serves to confirm her mastery of language and form –  
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the experience of writing takes her beyond the limits of her perception of language and 
thus  the  artistry  she  describes as  lacking,  is,  in fact,  replete  with  the abundancy  of 
imagination. But her treatment of subjectivity does not rest there, as this essay contains 
no less than four incarnations of the experiencing and writerly self. The first, described 
above, believes himself unable to render the beauty of nature through language, the 
second rejects this idea and is content to be overwhelmed by the profuseness of the 
world… ‘believe me when I tell you that it is best to sit and soak; to be passive; to 
accept; and do not bother because nature has given you six little pocket knives with 
which  to  cut  up  the  body  of  a  whale.’  (CE2:  291).  The  third  self  is  a  melancholy 
incarnation who notices that the imposition of the inevitability of death weighs heavy on 
the possibility of enjoying the present, ‘Gone, gone; over, over; past and done with, past 
and done with. I feel life left behind even as the road is left behind. We have been over 
that stretch, and are already forgotten’ (CE4: 291). As if in protest to the frailty of life, 
the repetitious text tries to cement a presence that is continually dying. And the fourth 
self, perhaps the most conscious self, suddenly snaps from a moment of reverie in a 
gesture  of  survival  and  thinks  of  the  future,  of  a  place  where  the  continuation  of 
subjectivity, in the collective sense, can be assured, ‘ ‘You, erratic and impulsive self 
that you are, feel that the light over the downs there emerging, dangles from the future. 
Let us try to understand this. Let us reason it out. I feel suddenly attached not to the past 
but to the future.’’ (CE2: 291)   
What  transpires  in  the  remainder  of  the  essay  is  the  inscription  of  an  interior 
monologue in which the various selves are collected up and made to be whole, ‘ ‘Now,’ 
I  said,  ‘comes  the  season  of  making  up  our  accounts.  Now  we  have  got  to  collect 
ourselves; we have got to be one self…’’ (CE2: 292). But the fact remains; Woolf is 
quoting herself and thus her attempts to unify subjectivity are always once removed 
from  the  subject  in  question.  Moreover,  the  unified  self  is  made  up,  fictionalized 
through the conscious bringing together of disparate parts. Writing cannot unify the self, 
it merely serves to reinforce that the fractured psyche Woolf tries to piece back together 
through writing cannot be anything other than the inscription of the unreconciled and 
unrreconcilable self. 
‘Sketch  of  the  Past’  too,  can  be  read  as  an  inscription  of  the  impossibility  of 
reconciling subjectivity through writing: 
It is only by putting it into words that I make it whole; this wholeness means that 
it has lost its power to hurt me; it gives me, perhaps because by doing so I take 
away the pain, a great delight to put the severed parts together. (MoB: 85)  
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In fact, writing only serves to confirm that this ‘putting together’ of the ‘severed 
parts’ will only produce the appearance of unity; the parts are already severed, any 
unification of them is simply falsely inscribed by process of writing. The only thing that 
redeems writing at this point would be the self-reflexivity of its form, where this false 
inscription is given a voice. This voice comes through Woolf’s self-referential quotes in 
‘Evening over Sussex’ and here too:  
 
From this I reach what I might call a philosophy; at any rate it is a constant idea of 
mine; that behind the cotton wool is hidden a pattern; that we – I mean all human 
beings – are connected with this; that the whole world is a work of art; that we are 
parts of the work of art. Hamlet or a Beethoven quartet is the truth about this vast 
mass that we call the world. But there is no Shakespeare, there is no Beethoven; 
certainly and emphatically there is no God; we are the words; we are the music; 
we are the thing itself. (MoB: 85) 
 
The truth about art is that it has no truth, or, that its truth can be found in the 
telling of the untruth. As Woolf writes and rewrites ‘A Sketch’ so too does she write 
and rewrite herself, never fixed, always incomplete, the embodiment of the unreconciled 
art work. 
 
‘Tympan’ and extract from The Waves 
There is a further way in which the philosophy of non-identity comes to light in 
Woolf’s work that can be seen from the following analysis of a passage from her 1931 
work  The  Waves.  Before  looking  at  the  specific  passages,  I  turn  briefly  to  Jacques 
Derrida's 1972 essay ‘Tympan’ from Margins of Philosophy in which he develops the 
notion that to philosophise is to tympanise – a word taken from the French tympaniser 
which  literally  means  to  criticise,  or  to  ridicule  publicly.
38 To  tympanise,  then,  for 
Derrida, is to philosophise with a hammer, to philosophise is to batter, and to strike, it is 
a violent, aggressive and assertive gesture whose aim to is not just to wound that which 
is  outside  of  philosophy,  that  which  is anti-philosophical,  but  whose  aim  is  also  to 
master.  The  act  of  criticism  then,  taking  the  Derridian  line,  is  akin  to  a  kind  of 
mastering. Interpretation gives way to the desire for mastery. Derrida’s reiteration of 
Adorno’s  identity  thinking  in  which  humankind  is  driven  to  dominate  through 
                                                
38 See Derrida, J. 1982. ‘Tympan’ in Margins of Philosophy (Hertfordshire: University of Chicago)  
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instrumental reason, serves us well here because of the direct link he creates between 
philosophy and criticism. The role of the critic, to some extent, is to analyse, to define, 
to interpret and to comprehend; the critic must overcome the work of art or aesthetic 
experience, because he must bring it within the confines of a particular vocabulary or 
form. He must clarify what the object is, he must label it, and make judgements about it. 
In ‘Tympan’, Derrida questions philosophy's ability to withstand its own tendency for 
mastery, that is to say, he wonders if philosophy can survive its own interrogations, for 
if  philosophy  asks  a  question,  he argues,  it must  surely  question  its  very  means  of 
questioning. Derrida’s notion of mastery, on other words, is derived from an overtly 
Adornian  philosophical  perspective,  in  the  sense  that  mastery  implies  domination 
through  philosophy's  conceptualisation  of  the  world,  and  thus  the  particularity  of 
objects, experiences, and events gets subsumed under general categories and definitions.  
And even though the act of naming and defining an object seems to solidify and 
concretise its existence in a gesture that could appear to be affirmative, Derrida argues 
that this gesture also affects another kind of state, for, to contain the object within the 
limitations of the chosen concept means just that, the object is now labelled, it has been 
determined, it has been conceptually conquered. And in this act of interpretation some 
aspect  of  the  object  is  lost,  something  is  left  out.  What  has  been  forgotten  is  the 
particularity of the object, the thing that makes it different from that other thing.  
In The Waves, Rhoda describes the experience of being in a concert hall: 
 
Here is a hall where one pays money and goes in, where one hears music among 
somnolent people who have come here after lunch on a hot afternoon. We have 
eaten beef and pudding enough to live for a week without tasting food. Therefore 
we  cluster  like  maggots  on  the  back  of  something  that  will  carry  us  on  […] 
swaying and opening programmes, with a few words of greetings to friends, we 
settle down, like walruses stranded on rocks […] we lie gorged with food, torpid 
in the heat. Then, swollen, but contained in slippery satin, the seagreen woman 
comes to our rescue. She sucks in her lips, assumes an air of intensity, inflates 
herself precisely at the right moment as if she saw an apple and her voice was the 
arrow in to the note, “Ah!” (W:109) 
 
 
Woolf's depiction of the singer is highly evocative, describing her as a sea-green 
slippery satin covered being that inhales and inflates and hurls herself into the note of 
music. And the audience too is painted in no less a vivid light; we are asked to imagine 
them plump with food, stagnant from eating, immobilised and waiting for the music to 
begin. But the change in the narrative voice at the beginning of the quote illustrates  
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again the idea of a non-reified subjectivity. The ambiguity and anonymity of the 'one' 
who  'pays  money  and  goes  in'  is  transformed  immediately  into  the  definitive  and 
inclusive 'we'. But who is implicated in this transformation? Is it the reader? Are we 
now part of the 'we' or is the ‘we’ simply referring to the remaining five characters in 
the novel? 
The subject/object dialectic is once again in play, and so too is the idea of mastery 
or domination. There is no longer any confusion about whom the audience consists of, 
we now know, the audience is 'we' not 'one'. The reader is no longer in control of the 
audience's identity. The narrator is now our master and controls our interpretation of the 
text.  The  passage  continues  with  the  repetition  of  'us' and  'our',  there  is a sense  of 
belonging, the narrator is taking responsibility for a group of people, she is claiming the 
opinions of not just the 'one' but the many. And suddenly, the singular voice of the one 
is  lost.  The  individual  is  now  part  of  the  group.  The change  in  the  narrative  voice 
excludes the particularity of the individual voice. Of course, perhaps ironically we note 
that the passage is about the individual voice, it is about the individual singer, but even 
with this in mind, Woolf subverts the supremacy of the single voice. As she describes 
the female singer singing she predominantly describes the somatic aspects of musical 
production: ‘She sucks in her lips, assumes an air of intensity, inflates herself’. What 
becomes of the rest of the performance we wonder? What about what the woman is 
singing? The only actual word given to the singer is ‘Ah!’ which, even though it is 
repeated four times in the following paragraph, is surely a censorship of some kind.  
A further example of Woolf’s playfulness around the idea of the mastery of text can 
be shown with the help of French philosopher Maurice Blanchot’s theory of language. 
Blanchot retains an essentially Hegelian/Adornoian philosophical model of the concept, 
but he is concerned with orientating the problem of the mastery of conceptualisation 
towards  the  discourse  of  literature.  However,  this  is  where  the  similarities  to  the 
Hegelian/Adornoian model of conceptual mastery ends, and Blanchot’s theory takes a 
subtle turn. Blanchot attempts to sidestep the problem of conceptualisation by making a 
distinction  between  ‘dialogue’  and  ‘comprehension’.  The  etymology  of  the  word 
comprehension  suggests  that  it  is  always  already  a  violent  practice  (the  Latin 
prehendere  means  to  grasp,  to  grab  or  to  seize)  because  to  comprehend  something 
means to abolish the distance between myself and the thing. If I comprehend a text, or a 
piece of music, I familiarise myself with it, it is not a stranger, not foreign, it is no 
longer at a distance to me. My understanding is also an overcoming or an overpowering 
of the thing. Dialogue, on the other hand preserves the distance between myself and the  
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other, a dialogue is a response to, not an annihilation of the distance that separates us. In 
conversation, I address you directly, I single you out, and in doing so, I acknowledge 
your  difference  from  everybody  else,  I  do  not  disregard  it.  Conversation  honours 
particularity, dialogue honours particularity, one regards the other in their irreducible 
difference.  Dialogue,  therefore,  is  not  masterful.  Woolf’s  passage,  we  might  argue, 
resists comprehension. Her description of the orchestra confirms this: 
 
There is a square; there is an oblong. The players take the square and place it upon 
the oblong. They place it very accurately; they make a perfect dwelling-place. 
Very little is left outside. The structure is now visible; what is inchoate is here 
stated; we are not so various or so mean; we have made oblongs and stood them 
upon squares. This is our triumph; this is our consolation. (W: 110)  
 
Woolf preserves the distance between us and the text because she ensures that at some 
level it resists comprehension. And much as we might guess precisely what the 'oblongs' 
and 'squares' she writes about refer to, we actually don't ever know because she omits a 
level of detail that allows the reader to imagine what they might be. Woolf's words 
make sense, in the syntactical, grammatical way we expect them to, but it is almost as if 
all she ever really does here is sketch the outline of events, people, and experiences, she 
gives us shapes, lines, and pictures, but never much detail, and she  leaves us to fill in 
the specific details. We do not actually need to know what the oblongs and squares refer 
to, it hardly seems to matter, because as she presents us with what we might call the 
silhouettes of experience, she preserves the distance between the thing and us, and in 
doing so, she cannot do violence to the particularity of experience. The parsimony of 
her description does not over-determine the object or the experience. Perhaps now we 
might imagine that the 'Ah!' of the original female is not censorship at all, but rather 
frugality. Because Woolf resists the temptation to articulate the specific nuances and 
characteristics of the singer's every word, she actually allows the scene to be filled with 
imaginative  potential.  I would  suggest  that  it is  precisely  the  parsimony  of  Woolf's 
literary style that makes the possibility of reading her work in the light of Adorno’s 
philosophy of the non-identical so powerful. This is because Woolf’s mastery of form 
means that her writing refuses to submit to the hierarchies of subject or object; only by 
sustaining  the  contradictions  and  paradoxes  that  are  constituent  of  experience,  does 
writing  simultaneously  resist  the  impulse  to  resolve  the  immanent  tension  in  the 
subject/object dialectic. Woolf’s writing about experience could be read as the failure of 
the stabilization of a critical subjectivity. This is evidenced by and through the formal  
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presentation of a continual self-critique of conceptual thought which manifests itself as 
the preservation of contradiction.   
 
89 
 
Chapter 4 
Narcotic pleasure: The Essay as Form 
 
As I have tried to show in the previous chapter, Woolf’s work can be read as a 
critique of subjectivity and as a preservation of the particularity of speculative thinking 
and experience in line with Adorno’s philosophy of the non-identical. In this chapter, I 
wish to examine the form of the essay. In the first part I will set out a picture of the 
modern essay through a cross reading of Adorno and Woolf. In the second part, I will 
consider three of Woolf’s essays that are explicitly about music. These essays, because 
they are about music, reveal more aspects of the essayistic task. This examination will 
explore the characteristics that pertain to the essay genre and will develop the close 
relationship between the form of the essay and criticism. The essay form, as normally 
understood, can  be characterised  by  its  looseness  of construction,  its  informal first-
person perspective and by its negative relation to the dissertation and didactic objectives; 
the essay stands at a remove from the discourse of falsifiable assertion. However, when 
the  essay  form  is  rediscovered  in  the  modern  period,  and  when  it  dramatically 
rediscovers  intellectual  respectability  in  the  hands  of  Adorno  and  Lukács,  another 
picture of the essay appeared, whereby  the object  under essayistic scrutiny  is given 
primacy  in  the  determination  of  concepts.  The  essayistic  spirit  could  be  thought  to 
describe the subject in a state of receptiveness to the world, and is not, in actuality, 
merely an expression of the occasional whims and fancies of the author. 
Adorno’s argument, as we will see, suggests that because the essay is marginal and 
unsystematic  it  denudes  the  subject  of  its  capacity  to  dominate  through  obsessive 
conceptual clarity and conclusiveness. The essay instead remains open to pre-rational, 
unprocessed aspects of experience.  Indeed, Adorno considered the essay to be closer to 
a ‘true’, more viable form of philosophical investigation or research (Versuch).
39  
It goes without saying that Woolf is utterly steeped in the English belletrist tradition 
of literary essayism. But in this chapter, I want to ask to what extent she can be read as 
                                                
39  In  Adorno  and  Critical  Theory,  Hauke  Brunkhorst  explains  that  Adorno  conceives  of  the  essay 
hermeneutically, that is to say, he argues that interpretation arises from a consideration of the differences 
between subject and object, and that the only form capable of disclosing anything to interpretation is the 
essay  because  of  its  experimental  trajectory,  which  nevertheless  relies  on  the  pre-existing  actuality  of 
objects and events. In other words, the essay’s fidelity to the particular preserves its relation to empirical 
reality;  a  relationship  which  may  otherwise  be  eradicated  by  systematic  philosophical  investigation. 
Hauke Brunkhorst, Adorno and Critical Theory (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1999), p. 60.  
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being an essayist in Adorno’s sense. Therefore, what I will be looking for, for example, 
are signs that Woolf’s authorial voice is willing to sacrifice itself for the sake of the 
object, and for the tension inherent in the relationship between the loose construction of 
the essay and systematic conclusion. But we might also be looking for moments of 
contradiction between the purported intent of the essay and what actually transpires. 
Furthermore,  there  may  also  be  evidence  that  the  essay  prosecutes  its  task  with 
considerable rigour only  to nonchalantly revoke its  own  conclusions. And finally, a 
highly  telling  symptom  of  the  dialectical  essay  is  its  tendency  to  mimetically 
appropriate its subject matter, which, as Adorno goes on to argue secures the essay’s 
aesthetic autonomy: 
 
The  positivist  tendency  to  set  up  every  possible  examinable  object  in  rigid 
opposition to the knowing subject remains – in this as in every other instance – 
caught up with the rigid separation of form and content: for it is scarcely possible 
to speak of the aesthetic unaesthetically, stripped of any similarity with its object, 
without  becoming  narrow-minded  and  a  priori  losing  touch  with  the  aesthetic 
object. (NL1: 5) 
 
As essayist and novelist, it might be that Woolf is highly susceptible to the aesthetic 
possibilities of the essay in ways that go further than Adorno thought possible. But what 
his  theory  makes  possible  is  the  grasping  of  these  moments,  not  as  inflections  of 
Woolf’s  already  very  sophisticated  stylistic awareness,  but  as  moments  of  objective 
lucidity. 
It is perhaps advisable at this juncture to make some remarks about how I intend to 
approach the following analysis. I will resist treating Woolf’s essays as mere exemplars 
of Adorno’s theory, but instead what I hope to show are moments of mutual elucidation 
between the two authors, and will cross-reference and compare parts of Adorno’s ‘The 
Essay as Form’ and Woolf’s ‘The Modern Essay.’ It would not be controversial to say 
that Adorno is the more sophisticated theorist here, and in a sense, his investment in 
theory  allows  us  to  see  Woolf’s  writing  in  a  new  aspect.  But  even  though  he  was 
accomplished  as  a  writer  of  literary  essays,  something  of  the  residue  of  dogged 
theorising lingers in Adorno’s tone, and he remains guarded by dialectical discipline. 
Woolf, on the other hand, is continually contradictory, but these contradictions are not 
supervised by any theoretical principles. In a way, her contradictions appear to arise 
naturally, and are therefore, less artificial and more beguiling.  
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Woolf’s ‘The Modern Essay’ and Adorno’s ‘The Essay as Form’ 
 
We can see this immediately as we compare two passages from their essays. ‘The 
Modern Essay’ first published in 1922, can be read in light of Adorno’s assertion at the 
end of his seminal work ‘The Essay as Form’ (1958) that the essay remains a site of 
struggle against ‘the orthodoxy of thought’ (NL1: 23). To quote the final passage in full, 
Adorno argues: 
 
Even the highest manifestation of the intellect that express happiness are always at 
the same time caught in the guilt of thwarting happiness as long as they remain 
mere intellect. Therefore the law of the innermost form of the essay is heresy. By 
transgressing the orthodoxy of thought, something becomes visible in the object 
which it is orthodoxy’s secret purpose to keep invisible. (NL1: 23) 
 
Given  Adorno’s  comments,  a  reading  of  Woolf’s  essay  can  be  deepened  by 
examining  her  assertion  that  the  essay’s  guiding  principle  should  be  pleasure,  ‘The 
principle  which  controls  it  is  simply  that  it  should  give  pleasure;  the  desire  which 
impels us when we take it from the shelf is simply to receive pleasure.’ (CR1: 211) In 
fact, I argue, the pleasure of the essay and reading the essay are undermined by a family 
of  metaphors  which  foreground  writing  and  writers  as  having  a  somatic  density; 
writings can wound, writers can be wounded and reading is always acting on the body. 
Any pleasures that are available in reading an essay are vulnerable to the reality of 
economic  existence;  an  existence  that  leaves  its  mark  on  the  body.  Counter  to  the 
essay’s  presentation  of  a  self-examination  of  form  via  Victorian  essayism,  runs  an 
imaginative rendering of the body in a state of narcosis. Strewn throughout the essay are 
imbedded invocations of and references to disease, intoxication and the body in death. 
And yet, Woolf maintains that pleasure must guide the reading of an essay – thus, I 
argue, at the heart of Woolf’s essay is the refusal to conform to an orthodox idea of 
pleasure. I will read Woolf’s exposition of pleasure with its contradiction in line with 
Adorno’s interpretation of the process of understanding which he argues is necessarily 
transformed by the form of the essay. Woolf’s essay, therefore, not only complicates the 
notion of readerly pleasure, but transforms our understanding of pleasure as such. 
The first glimpse of Woolf’s somatic counter-text comes in the second paragraph in 
which Woolf reflects on the purpose of the essay: 
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It  should  lay  us  under  a  spell  with  its  first  word,  and  we  should  only  wake, 
refreshed  with  its  last.  In  the  interval  we  may  pass  through  the  most  various 
experiences  of  amusement,  surprise,  interest,  indignation;  we  may  soar  to  the 
heights of fantasy with Lamb or plunge to the depths of wisdom with Bacon, but 
we must never be roused. The essay must lap us about and draw its curtain across 
the world. (CR1: 211) 
 
The reading of an essay seems almost like swallowing a drug with immediate 
effect; the first word signifies the body being consumed by the poison and what  is 
written  next  could  easily  be  the  description  of  a  drug-induced  state  of  semi-
consciousness and not a description of reading. Reading an essay is reputedly supposed 
to induce a hysterical scrolling through of emotions and extremes of ‘high’ and ‘low’ 
mental states where the body is stupefied, anesthetised and transfixed.
40 The instruction 
that the reader ‘must never be roused’ gives way to a more detailed reflection on the 
state of the reader whose palate has been dulled by ‘habit and lethargy’. The essayist has 
to  have  a  certain  technical  skill  in  order  to  procure  in  the  reader  a  powerful  and 
contradictory effect. The essayist learns his art nefariously whereby he obtains the tools 
to ‘sting us wide awake and fix us in a trance[…]’ (CR1: 212).  This ‘art’ which is 
precisely  a  pre-Enlightenment  idea  of  art  as  being  akin  to  the  art  of  the  conjurer,  
suggests that there is a sleight of hand due to the essayist. Woolf writes, ‘His learning 
may be as profound as Mark Pattison’s, but in an essay it must be so fused by the magic 
of writing that not a fact juts out, not a dogma tears the surface of texture.’ (CR1: 212) 
Both Woolf and Adorno agree on the non-dogmatic intention of the essay, for example, 
Adorno notes that, ‘the essay recoils from the violence in […] dogma’ (NL1: 10). And 
both writers agree on the violent nature of dogma. But in Woolf’s case, her concerns are 
motivated by practical considerations – the problem of how to write, and in doing so, 
she confirms her commitment to trying to understand the role of the essayist. This is in 
contrast to Adorno, who is more concerned with the essay as form. 
This pattern is repeated often; Adorno presents ideas in the abstract and Woolf 
materialises them. She goes on to reject ‘the voice of a man stumbling drowsily among 
loose words, clutching aimlessly at vague ideas’ (CR1: 212). The rambling voice is 
considered  unfitting  for  the  essay,  and  the  drunken,  intoxicated  figure  is  shunned. 
Sobriety comes, though, in the next paragraph, ‘The essay must be pure – pure like 
water or pure like wine, but pure from dullness, deadness, and deposits of extraneous 
                                                
40 Comparisons  can  be  made  here  to  Derrida’s  concept  of  Pharmakon,  where  he  discusses  the  over-
signification of the Greek work Pharmakon, meaning medicine, remedy and poision. (Plato’s Pharmacy, 
1972; 1981)  
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matter.’  (CR1:  213)  Woolf’s  rhetoric  has  clearly  become  very  polarised,  with  one 
extreme replacing another: absolute intoxication is countered with abstention. Again, 
she reinforces the idea of a stabilised, complete view of the essay. And again, she opts 
for sobriety: 
 
But  doubtless  our  abstention  saves  as  much  gush,  much  rhetoric,  much  high-
stepping and cloud-prancing, and for the sake of the prevailing sobriety and hard-
headedness we should be willing to barter the splendour of Sir Thomas Browne 
and the vigour of Swift. (CR1: 214) 
 
And yet, as much as she is trying to convince the reader that sobriety really is the 
dominant characteristic of the modern essay, Woolf nevertheless indulges the opposite 
and embellishes what she seeks to suppress, ‘much gush, much rhetoric, much high-
stepping  and  cloud-prancing.’  Her  extravagant  vocabulary  seems  to  ironically 
undermine  the  privileging  of  purity.  In  this  sense,  then,  her  effort  to  get  beyond 
dialectical tension is illusory, and she allows the repressed element to return too swiftly. 
Arguably, in doing this, she conforms to one of Adorno’s criteria of essayistic writing. 
Instead she, ‘mirrors what is loved and hated instead of presenting the intellect, on the 
model  of  a  boundless  work  ethic,  as  creation  ex  nihilo’  (NL1:  4)  However,  Woolf 
cannot entirely secure her diagnoses of the essayistic style. Woolf recoils once more and 
warns against the dangers of polishing the essay, ‘until every atom of its surface shines.’ 
To do this would be to asphyxiate the vitality of the manifold of ideas which the essay 
accommodates: 
 
Yet,  if  the  essay  admits  more  properly  than  biography  or  fiction  of  sudden 
boldness and metaphor, and can be polished till every atom of its surface shines, 
there are dangers in that too. We are soon in sight of ornament. Soon the current, 
which  is  the  life-blood  of  literature,  runs  slow;  and  instead  of  sparkling  and 
flashing or moving with a quieter impulse which has a deeper excitement, words 
coagulate together in frozen sprays which, like the grapes on a Christmas-tree, 
glitter for a single night, but are dusty and garish the day after. (CR1: 214) 
 
The  ‘current’  Woolf  mentions,  but  does  not  fully  elucidate,  is  in  contrast  to 
‘ornament.’ The ornament is ancillary, it is not the actual thing itself. The ornament is 
superficial and shallow. Woolf finds herself pitting the inorganic against the organic: 
the current is resolutely not ornamental; it is the essential vital element that defines 
literature. The vividness of this passage is so striking because it represents the moment 
at which it is possible to forget that we are reading a tutorial on the essay. Woolf’s  
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visual  imagination  punctures  the  appearance  of  unity  and  we  are  presented  with  a 
hitherto unseen aspect of the essay. Her imagination is so vivid that she produces a 
moment of excess, one might say, ornamental excess. The idea of ornamentation is not 
enough,  Woolf  has  to  decorate  it.  The  comparison  of  the  writerly  ornament  to  a 
Christmas tree is so unexpected and so sudden, that we are torn from the seriousness of 
the point in question and propelled into a fantasy. This fantasy, however, also draws on 
the metaphor of decay and depicts the ornament as perishable. Its destiny therefore, is 
the absolute opposite of the ornamental, since it will wither and detract from the thing it 
decorates.  
Woolf’s  delimitation  of  the  essay  in  terms  of  its  principal  characteristics  – 
pleasure, sobriety, pureness and current actually constitutes identity thinking. But in the 
above quote, Woolf is no longer trying to say under which category the essay must fall, 
she is no longer making comparisons between literature and essay writing, and in this 
not doing, she stops representing what the essay is via abstract concepts and we find 
ourselves reading an essay. There is a sense in which her own identifications actually 
threaten to alienate her craft, and it is as if she cannot help but let the non-identical 
fissure the text. In Adorno’s terms, this movement is a kind of force that, ‘shatters the 
appearance of identity.’ (ND: 149)  
Later in ‘The Modern Essay’, selfhood is once more a concern. In asking, ‘But what 
did Mr Beerbohm give to the essay and what did he take from it?[…]’ (CR1: 216) 
Woolf opens out an equivocal structure in which to develop an interpretation of the 
authorial self which, naively, can be assumed to stand behind the essay and must be 
adapted to the vagaries of public opinion. The construction of the essayistic subjectivity 
in ‘The Modern Essay’ is no less contradictory than it was shown to be in previous 
essays  that  were  examined  in  Chapter  Two.  Woolf  sounds  naively  realistic  by 
presuming that the essayist has a self to give, ‘What Mr Beerbohm gave was, of course, 
himself.’ (CR1: 216)  This giving of the self Woolf considers the most ‘dangerous and 
delicate tool’ of essayistic practice. The essay’s relationship to authorial personality, I 
argue, represents a startling account of the dialectic of subject and object. Woolf writes 
of  Beerbohm,  ‘He  has  brought  personality  into  literature,  not  unconsciously  and 
impurely, but so consciously and purely that we  do not  know  whether  there is any 
relation  between  Max  the  essayist  and  Mr  Beerbohm  the  man.’  (CR1:  217)  The 
conscious and pure inclusion of ‘personality’ into the essay stops the essay being devoid 
of an author. Moreover, there appears to be no difference between ‘Max the essayist and 
Mr Beerbohm the man.’ Beerbohm was not trying to reproduce himself in the essay, he  
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did not pose as the essayist, rather the scale of his experience was proportionate to that 
of the reader. Interestingly, again Woolf admits that writing seems to allow you to make 
use of yourself, ‘For it is only by knowing how to write that you can make use in 
literature of your self.’ (CR1:217) But that permission is only granted to those who 
‘know how to write.’ (CR1: 217)  
But also, again, this momentary stabilisation of subjectivity is undermined by her 
placing  into  doubt  the  possibility  of  ever  gaining  possession  of  the  self  by  writing 
because writing requires you to, ‘Never to be yourself, and yet always – that is the 
problem.’ (CR1: 217) This idea, cut off in the middle of thought, is further evidence of 
Woolf’s arrival at a theory of an equivocal self-possession, and she places this at the 
heart of writing. Furthermore, this particular sentence, taken as a maxim, comes across 
as a piece of secure knowledge, yet at the same time it is perfectly self-contradictory, 
and therefore, arguably, useless as knowledge. This fragment though, has a particular 
kind  of  force,  it  makes  a  truth  claim  that  breaks  through  the  tone  of  previous  and 
subsequent  musings,  it  is  earnest.  Therefore,  it  is  both  a  fragment  and  it  has  a 
fragmenting  effect.  The  capital  N  of  never  defies  the  rules  of  grammar.  Adorno 
understands the critical potential of the fragment and actually makes it a prima facie 
condition of thoughtful engagement with an object in the following way, ‘[…] the essay 
may not act as though it had deduced its object[…] it thinks in fragments just as reality 
is fragmentary, and finds its unity in and through the breaks and not by glossing them 
over. (NL1: 16).  
The idea of never being yourself, yet always being yourself is a problem which is 
given by literature to the writer, and Woolf can therefore create a hierarchy amongst 
writers according to this criterion of struggle. All these thoughts come together a few 
lines later, via another pathological metaphor, in which Woolf criticises those essayists 
whom she regards as having failed to understand the dialectic of the self in writing and 
left  selfhood  unmediated,  ‘We  are  nauseated  by  the  sight  of  trivial  personalities 
decomposing  in  the  eternity  of  print.’  (CR1:  217).  Thus  writing  seems  capable  of 
bearing witness to the death of the self. And ironically, it is only in death that the future 
of the self is secured because it lives forever in print. And, for Woolf, the only way of 
reading  the essay is in a state of  pure soberness, ‘There is  no gin about; no  strong 
tobacco; no  puns,  drunkenness or  insanity.  Ladies and  gentlemen talk  together, and 
some things, of course, are not said.’ (CR1: 218) Her reference to things which are left 
unsaid  paradoxically  also  brings  the  very  possibility  of  them  to  mind;  in  our 
remembering of the unsaid we honour the particularity of discourse, we remember those  
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aspects of discourse which remain unarticulated. Her saying of things unsaid ironically 
allows Woolf to  occupy  the  very subjectivity  she is writing because  she too  leaves 
things  unsaid  when  it  comes  to making  any  broader  philosophical claims about the 
nature of the essay. Perhaps the closest we come to an explicit theorisation is towards 
the end of the essay in which she states,  
 
This is the penalty which the habitual essayist must now be prepared to face. He 
must masquerade. He cannot afford the time either to be himself or to be other 
people.  He  must  skim  the  surface  of  thought  and  dilute  the  strength  of  his 
personality. He must give us a worn weekly halfpenny instead of a solid sovereign 
once a year.’ (CR1: 219)  
 
Woolf  herself  is  ‘masquerading’  because  in  advising  the  inevitable  dilution  of 
strength of personality through over-production she actually confirms her intellectual 
strength by virtue of this particular insight. Furthermore, her argument that the essayist 
‘must skim the surface of thought’ is only plausible at first sight. In fact, as we have 
seen, her essays actually produce an array of statements which could be considered 
profound. In writing the self as dissolved and partial, and in suggesting that essayistic 
thought is merely superficial, Woolf actually concretises the fact that the essayist might 
have  something  intellectually  salient  to  say  which  reinstates  the  self  as  whole  and 
consistent  and  capable  of  wielding  objective  knowledge.  It  would  be  a  mistake, 
therefore,  to  suppose  that  the  diminution  of  the  self  amounted  to  a  pious  self-
relinquishment.  Instead,  the  movement  here  is  one  of  self-modification,  it  is  a 
questioning of the limits and powers of the self, by the self. For Adorno, this adaptation 
of  the  self makes knowledge much more conditional  on individual experience. And 
beyond that this individual experience is mediated by the experiences of humanity as  
whole: 
 
The relationship to experience – and the essay invests experience with as much 
substance as traditional theory does mere categories – is the relationship to all of 
history. Merely individual experience, which consciousness takes as its point of 
departure, since it is what is closest to it, is itself mediated by the overarching 
experience of historical humankind. The notion that the latter is mediated and 
one’s  own  experience  unmediated  is  mere  self-deception  on  the  part  of  an 
individualistic society and ideology. (NL1: 10) 
 
 
Woolf too understands the necessity to read the essay in an essential relation to the 
past. In criticising a clutch of contemporary essayists she diagnoses a common failing:  
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They  share  the  contemporary  dilemma  –  that  lack  of  an  obstinate  conviction 
which lifts ephemeral sounds through the misty sphere of anybody’s language to 
the land  where  there  is  a  perpetual  marriage, a  perpetual  union.  Vague  as  all 
definitions are, a good essay must have this permanent quality about it[…]’ (CR1: 
222)  
 
This ‘permanent quality’ relates to individual ‘obstinate convictions’ which Woolf 
argues secures the permanence of the essay as that which avoids the transitory and the 
‘ephemeral sounds’ of empty words. Contradiction, though, remains at the heart of the 
essay. Contradiction plays itself out in Woolf writing by virtue of the presentation of 
claims  and  counterclaims,  and  by  the  accumulation  of  rhetoric  and  style  in  which 
subject positions are written and rewritten.  
For Adorno, contradiction manifests itself through a critical pressure exerted through 
the opposing forces of the dialectic. Again, contradiction is at the heart of a reading of 
Adorno’s essay, and prior to this effusive support of the essayist, his initial thoughts 
about the essay and the essayist are rather unflattering: he suggests that the essayist 
over-interprets, the essay makes meanings out of things that are devoid of meaning in 
the  first  place,  and  the  essayist  himself  ‘squanders  his  intelligence  in  impotent 
speculation.’ (NL1: 4) Of course, as is typical of Adorno, at this stage in the exposition 
he  is  posing  one  side  of  a  dialectic  which  he  will  eventually  confront  with  its 
contradiction.  But  in  staging  this  dialectical  argument  his  own  position  remains 
ambiguous and, for all that, much stronger. 
Importantly, both Adorno and Woolf occupy the role of essayist and critic of the 
essay. But, crucially, where they differ from each other is in their use of language as 
fulfilling two different priorities. Woolf uses language to create other worlds, imaginary 
spaces and vivid images; Adorno, on the other hand, uses it to enhance the essay’s 
critical potential. His total commitment to dialectics penetrates his language and style. 
Language is not used in a painterly manner as we have seen in Woolf, who draws in 
language both real and imagined worlds. Adorno, in contrast, uses a language that is 
penetrated  by  dialectical  thought  to  build  up  pressure  on  the  opposing  sides  of 
contradictions. For example, in ‘The Essay as Form’ Adorno sets up, in opposition to 
one another, two opposing discourses; one of intellectual freedom and one that polices 
intellectual  freedom.  When  discussing  the  world  of  intellectual  freedom,  Adorno 
invokes  the  innocence  of  childhood,  employs  metaphors  concerned  with  light,  and 
brings extreme emotional states to the forefront, ‘the essay reflects a childlike freedom  
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that  catches  fire…The  essay  mirrors  what  is  loved  and  hated…luck  and  play  are 
essential to  the  essay’. (NL1: 4)  However, when we enter the  world of the policed 
intellect,  he  employs  words  such  as  ‘terrorised’  and  ‘prohibition’  coupled  with 
metaphors of officialdom: ‘slapped with the charge of intellectualising’, ‘tracking down 
the individual…’ (NL1: 4) Commenting on the essayist’s apparently inferior ability to 
make reasoned interpretations, he suggests: 
 
Letting  oneself  be  terrorised  by  the  prohibition  against  saying  more  than  was 
meant  right  then  and  there  means  complying  with  the  false  conceptions  that 
people harbour concerning themselves. Interpretation then becomes nothing but 
removing an outer shell to find what the author wanted to say, or possibly the 
individual psychological impulses to which the phenomenon points. (NL1: 4) 
 
Intellectual freedom then hinges upon understanding that it would be a mistake to 
believe that the ultimate meaning of a text relates solely to the author’s intention. To do 
this would do an injustice to the concept of interpretation. But whilst ‘The Modern 
Essay’  is  built around a  problematising  of  the  self and  writing, in  Adorno  it  is the 
concept  of  interpretation  that  generates  the  most  telling  inconsistencies  and 
contradictions. The concept of interpretation signifies a point at which Adorno disrupts 
continuous  discourse,  in  the  same  way  that  Woolf  uses  the  ‘self’  to  interrupt  a 
continuous  line  of  thought.  The  word  interpretation  takes  on  a  special  significance 
because  Adorno  transforms  the  process  of  interpretation  from  a  relatively  simple 
conception  of  something  that  involves  our  perceptual  and  cognitive  faculties,  to 
something that requires more than mere perception or recognition. Interpretation, he 
implies, should be about something more than reading what the author intended to say.  
For Adorno, interpretation, as that which facilitates knowledge acquisition, is not 
what Descartes insisted it was, i.e., an accumulation of ideas that begin with the simple 
and proceed in an orderly fashion to the complex. Rather, the essay begins with the 
complex and will not diminish the complexity which is inherent in the essay’s object 
merely  for  the  sake  of  the  operation  of  reason,  ‘In  opposition  to  the  cliché  of 
“comprehensibility,” the notion of a causal relationship, the essay requires that one’s 
thought about the matter be from the outset as complex as the object itself; it serves as a 
corrective to the stubborn primitiveness that always accompanies the prevailing form of 
reason.’ (NL1: 15) The Cartesian and ‘school-room’ concept of understanding is thrown 
into doubt, and Adorno forces the reader to contemplate the possibility of writing that is 
resistant to our need for clarity and continuity:  
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The demand for continuity in one’s train of thought tends to prejudge the inner 
coherence  of  the  object,  its  own  harmony.  A  presentation  characterised  by 
continuity  would  contradict  an  antagonistic  subject  matter  unless  it  defined 
continuity as discontinuity at the same time. (NL1: 16) 
 
If, as Adorno suggests, the essay falls foul of the Cartesian criteria of clear and 
distinct ideas and logical development, there is a very real temptation to transfer the 
essay to the realm of the aesthetic. Adorno is well aware of this temptation and he does 
not wholly resist it, though any complete aestheticisation of the essay would be just 
another  mistake.  Nevertheless,  certain  figures  emerge  in  Adorno’s  depiction  of  the 
essay which suggest aesthetic tropes. He says that the essay depends upon a moment of 
spontaneous subjective fantasy that is actively discouraged in the moment of disciplined, 
objective  reading.  He  also  entertains  the  notion  that  the  essay  may  have  aesthetic 
autonomy. Furthermore, he acknowledges something that is almost fictive in the essay, 
‘nothing can be interpreted out of a work without at the same time being interpreted into 
it.’ (NL1: 4) However, the opposite claim is also put forward: the essay distances itself 
from art because of its overtly conceptual nature and ‘its claim to a truth devoid of 
aesthetic semblance.’ (NL1: 5) Importantly, Adorno suggests that it is precisely this last 
point that Lukács fails to recognize in his essay on the essay in Soul and Form. 
Now, at this point, Adorno begins to deepen our understanding of the relation 
between art and knowledge, not by attempting to reconcile their differences through 
conceptual  sublation,  rather  by  asserting  the  importance  of  bearing  witness  to  their 
separateness.  What  is  required  is  a  consciousness  that  has  been  faithful  to  and  is 
therefore able to represent the completion of a so-called ‘mediating process’ between 
science  and  art,  between  subject  and  object,  between  self  and  other.  Adorno  cites 
knowledge as one of the most important criterion in any consideration of the essay. 
Knowledge has traditionally been thought of as belonging to the domain of science but 
there  remains  something  unquantifiable  about  knowledge,  something  that  resists 
scientific  categorization,  ‘the  simplest  reflection  of  the  life  of  consciousness  would 
teach us to what a slight extent insights, which are by no means arbitrary hunches, can 
be fully captured within the net of science.’ (NL1: 8) He then uses the work of Marcel 
Proust as the quintessential example of ‘an attempt to express necessary and compelling 
insights  into  human  beings  and  social  relations  that  are  not  readily  accommodated 
within science and scholarship, despite the fact that their claim to objectivity is neither 
diminished  nor  abandoned  to  a  vague  plausibility.’  What  science  is  unable  to  do,  
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therefore, is account for individual experience that is ‘maintained through  hope and 
disillusionment .’ (NL1: 8) 
One of the reasons that experience is so highly valued in the essay, and in turn, 
what makes this valuing important to the critical potential of the essay, is to do with the 
essay’s commitment to the idea of critique. Because the essay can accommodate untruth, 
because it questions the notions of logical structure, argument and presentation, and 
because it neither adheres to the rigid hierarchies of science nor philosophical concepts 
(upon which, after all, science was founded), then the very concepts of truth and history 
themselves take on fundamentally temporal aspects. Thus, the experience of the writer 
becomes the experience of humanity in the broader sense of the word, but only in so far 
as this experience is mediated by history. 
Broadly speaking, then, I have been able to identify many points of correlation 
between Adorno and Woolf’s theory and practice of the essay. I have shown that in 
‘The  Modern  Essay’  Woolf  complicates  the  authorial  voice  and  produces  a  tension 
between the looseness of the form and systematic conclusion. Moreover, I have shown 
the multiple contradictions between what her essay intends and what actually transpires. 
I will now read three of Woolf’s essays that are explicitly about music, ‘Street 
Music’, ‘Impressions at Bayreuth’ and ‘The Opera’ in order to further demonstrate her 
essayistic style and its potential as a means of critique.  
 
‘Street Music’ 
 
‘Street Music’ appeared in the National Review in March 1905, and although it 
was Woolf’s only contribution to the journal, it was widely celebrated by the paper’s 
editor, Leo Maxse. Structurally, the essay is divided into nine separate paragraphs, with 
the opening paragraph tackling the subject of the title, Street Music. However, in the 
second  paragraph  we  are  led  away  from  the  street  musicians  to  more  general 
observations about the nature of music itself, and here, Woolf begins her imaginative 
and semantic departure from the title of the essay. The third paragraph brings us back to 
the subject of the street musician, before we are led away in the fourth paragraph again 
to the world of ‘Christian altars.’ Paragraph five reinforces the religious theme, before a 
rather abrupt change of direction in paragraph six which sees Woolf commenting on the 
contemporary methods of teaching music. This paragraph acts somewhat as a dividing 
section, and the remainder of the essay concentrates on the importance of rhythm as  
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Woolf interprets it. So, in an essay ostensibly about street music, the reader is taken on a 
journey that scrolls through Woolf’s theories of the expressive power of music and on 
the potential importance of rhythm as a structural and aesthetic device. This, I think, 
highlights perfectly the creative capacity of the essay, but it also demonstrates that the 
essay is testament to a vital, real and honest encounter with a subject. The essay has no 
thesis, as such, it announces no specific direction, and it makes no explicit claims to 
knowledge. Perhaps, though, we might also intimate that Woolf recreates and distils in 
pure form in her writing the essence of the title: Street music is often brash and loud, it 
is theatrical and staged, forced upon the ears of those who have not agreed to listen, but 
are  expected  to  pay  money  for  such  an  experience.  Woolf’s  text  is  almost  equally 
unforgiving;  it  is  certainly  theatrical  and  its  movement  between  differing  subjects 
recalls the lumbering gestures of the organ grinder or the amateur band. And because of 
this,  ‘Street  Music’  is  convincing,  it  is  informative  and  intriguing,  it  captures  a 
particular  subjectivity,  a  particular  moment,  and,  most  importantly,  it  transforms  a 
musical experience into a literary one. 
One of the most striking things about this particular essay is the way in which 
Woolf so emphatically ascribes a special kind of power to music, but her invocation of 
music as divine is extreme. It could not be further from scientific knowledge, and yet, 
and  referring  back  to  Adorno,  her  fanciful  constructions  invite  us  to  reconsider  the 
figure of the street musician. Music is thought to reside at the apex of one’s spiritual life, 
and is capable of channelling nothing less than a god. The first glimpse we get of this 
view comes early on in the essay when she writes: 
 
Indeed, I once followed a disreputable old man who, with eyes shut so that he 
might the better perceive the melodies of his soul, literally played himself from 
Kensington to Knightsbridge in a trance of musical ecstasy, from which a coin 
would have been a disagreeable awakening. It is, indeed, impossible not to respect 
any one who has a god like this within them; for music that takes possession of 
the soul so that nakedness and hunger are forgotten must be divine in its nature. It 
is true that the melodies that issued from his labouring violin were in themselves 
laughable,  but  he,  certainly,  was  not.  Whatever  the  accomplishment,  we  must 
always treat with tenderness the efforts of those who strive honestly to express the 
music that is in them; for the gift of conception is certainly superior to the gift of 
expression, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that the men and women who 
scrape for the harmonies that never come while the traffic goes thundering by 
have as great a possession, though fated never to impart it, as the masters whose 
facile eloquence enchants thousands to listen. (E1: 28) 
 
Woolf immediately establishes an image of the musician as a wanderer. The very notion 
of the wanderer brings with it connotations of the holy, in both the pagan and Christian  
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sense, and indeed throughout the essay, Woolf accents the pagan, constructing a picture 
of the street musician as hailing from a different era. Simultaneously, contained within 
the idea of wandering is the sense that a musical theme is mapped onto a journey, and 
there  is  a  musicalisation  of  the  route  between  Kensington  and  Knightsbridge.  The 
streets  of  London  are  mythologised  and  musicalised  in  an  attempt  to  deepen  the 
connections between the crude simplicity of the street musician and the sacred quality 
of  their  presence.  Indeed,  the  tension  between  these  two  seemingly  unconnected 
registers is at the heart of this essay in which the wandering street musician, a vehicle of 
the holy, bursts through the mundane and indifferent London setting.  
The word ‘followed’ in the opening sentence prepares the reader for the development 
of the theme of discipleship, and indeed, Woolf writes herself into this relationship as 
we gain insights into not only her capacity to be swayed and influenced, but also into 
her desire to understand and capitalise on the power of the divine. But there is another 
side to the argument, because the introduction of the notion of the coin and payment for 
art introduces the fundamental schism between the aesthetic and capital. The character 
of the beggar musician offers a double reading; on the one hand they draw on ancient 
powers, and on the other, they fall outside ordinary economic activity. Therefore, almost 
by default, we reencounter the difficulty of remunerating aesthetic activity, which, as 
Woolf notes later, is already deemed useless: 
 
For if the stringing together of words which nevertheless may convey some useful 
information to the mind, or the laying on of colours which may represent some 
tangible object, are employments which can be but tolerated at best, how are we to 
regard the man who spends his time in making tunes? Is not his occupation the 
least respectable – the least useful and necessary – of the three?’ (E1: 29) 
 
 Everything about the ‘melodies of the soul’ invites a pious withdrawal from the 
material world, and yet, the ‘coin’ is a reminder of that world. Deepening still the image 
of the coin, we can read its presence as a metaphor for death; the musician’s eyes are 
shut in a trance and his presence in the world is thus attenuated. Like Charon’s obol, in 
which coins are placed over the eyes or mouth to pay for passage to the afterlife, there is 
something  deathly,  almost  ghoulish  about  the  use  of  the  coin.  In  fact,  there  is  a 
distinctly  uncanny  recapitulation  of  the  myth  of  Orpheus  and  Euridice  in  the 
relationship between Woolf and the street musician. Just as Orpheus is forbidden to  
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look at Euridice as he leads her out of Hades, Woolf follows the street musician who 
cannot, indeed, who will not see her.
41 
Reading on, Woolf does attempt an evaluation of the music, but she is careful to 
attribute the insubstantiality of the music to the ‘labouring’ violin and not the musician 
whose intentions are ‘divine.’  The implication is that art of any quality would leave 
laboriousness  behind.  There  is  something  risible  about  labouring.  Woolf  literally 
summons up a class of people who inhabit London almost entirely unnoticed. These 
minstrels bring with them a brute, emotional simplicity that never materialises in sounds. 
In this sense, the divine music is never heard, but is attributed to these souls who roam 
the streets. 
In addition to this, Woolf’s wanderer, as a kind of holy figure, is also particularly 
‘whole’ in this context. The Germanic origin of ‘holy’ confirms its original sense, as 
that which is whole. Yet again, Woolf has succeeded in writing a specific subject type 
which embodies wholeness and unification set against the fitful, fractured transience of 
the urban mass. Moreover, the logic and grammar of Woolf’s writing seems to make 
music co-operate  with  the  divine  to  momentarily  stabilise and  reinforce  the  idea  of 
wholeness and unity of the self. However, further reflection upon the very constitution 
of  these  wanderers  exposes  this  notion  of  wholeness  as  essentially  false  as  these 
musicians are not, in fact, integrated or self-sustaining. The musical self is inhabited by 
an external force, and the interplay between the inner godly and outer corporeal self is 
fraught. The street musician, as Woolf explains, struggles to realise the divine power of 
music through, ‘scraping’ and ‘laughable melodies.’ She goes on: ‘He is possessed by a 
spirit which the ordinary person cannot understand, but which is clearly very potent, and 
exercises so great a sway over him that when he hears its voice he must always rise and 
follow.’ (E1: 29) The musician is seized by the divine power and music calls people to 
follow. Furthermore, these themes carry on in the following passage: 
 
Many writers have tried to trace these old pagans, and have professed to find them 
in the disguise of animals and in the shelter of far-away woods and mountains; but 
it is not fantastic to suppose that while everyone is searching for them they are 
working their charms in the midst of us, and that those strange heathens who do 
the bidding of no man and are inspired by a voice that is other then human in their 
ears are not really as other people, but are either the very gods themselves or their 
priests or prophets upon earth. Certainly I should be inclined to ascribe some such 
divine origin to musicians at any rate, and it is probably some suspicion of this 
kind that drives us to persecute them as we do. (E1: 29) 
 
                                                
41 See Book X from Ovid’s Metamorphoses (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).  
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Woolf’s descriptions seem to suggest a possible identity of this divine origin- that of 
Dionysus. Once again, images of ecstasy and intoxication support the interpretation that 
Woolf’s pleasure contains aspects of the narcotic: 
 
He [the musician] is the minister of the wildest of all the gods, who has not yet 
learnt to speak with human voice, or to convey to the mind the likeness of human 
things. It is because music incites within us something that is wild and inhuman 
like itself – a spirit that we would willingly stamp out and forget – that we are 
distrustful of musicians and loathe to put ourselves under their power. (E1:29) 
 
The reason why Woolf refers to the musician, as opposed to any other kind of 
artist, as the ‘wildest’ is because of her attitude towards rhythm, a concept upon which 
she lavishes attention in this essay: 
 
We look upon those who have given up their lives to the service of this god as 
Christians  regard  the  fantastic  worshippers  of  some  eastern  idol.  This  arises 
perhaps from an uneasy foreknowledge that when the pagan gods come back the 
god we have never worshipped will have his revenge upon us. It will be the god of 
music who will breathe madness into our brains, crack the walls of our temples, 
and drive us in loathing of our rhythmless lives to dance and circle for ever in 
obedience to his voice. (E1: 29) 
 
The cultish nature of music is reinforced as Woolf invites us to imagine ourselves 
dancing, chanting, as we succumb to the dangers of music, ‘Music is dangerous as we 
know’. (E1: 30) She goes on: 
 
The safest and easiest attribute of music – its tune – is taught, but rhythm, which 
is its soul, is allowed to escape like the winged creature it is…It may be indeed 
that the sense of rhythm is stronger in people whose mind are not elaborately 
trained to other pursuits, as it is true that savages who have none of the arts of 
civilization are very sensitive to rhythm, before they are awake to music proper. 
The beat of rhythm in the mind is akin to the beat of the pulse in the body, and 
thus though many are deaf to  tune hardly any one is so coarsely organized as not 
to hear the rhythm of its own heart in words and music and movement. (E1: 30)  
 
Woolf uses the essay to develop her aesthetic stance towards the importance of 
rhythm which she views as not just a feature of music, but as something that, if properly 
understood, would revolutionise life and writing. This is highlighted by the way the 
terms ‘rhythm’ and ‘music’ have almost become interchangeable by the end of the essay: 
 
Rhythm alone might easily lead to excesses; but when the ear possessed its secret, 
tune and harmony would be united with it, and those actions which by means of  
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rhythm were performed punctually and in time, would now be done with whatever 
of  melody  is  natural  to  each[…]we  all  know  that  the  voices  of  friends  are 
discordant  after  listening  to  beautiful  music  because  they  disturb  the  echo  of 
rhythmic harmony, which for the moment makes of life a united and musical 
whole; and it seems probable considering this that there is a music in the air for 
which we are always straining our ears and which is only partially made audible 
to us by the transcripts which the great musicians are able to preserve. (E1: 31) 
 
 
Rhythmic harmony is linked to ‘a united and musical whole’, but again Woolf 
undermines this sense of wholeness and attests to its partiality by declaring that there 
remains a music which will never be heard, a kind of perfectly preserved music that 
only appears through ‘great musicians.’ Woolf cannot dissociate this idea of wholeness 
and unity from music, and at the same time, she knows that it cannot be achieved, at 
least at a secular level. It seems worth noting that Woolf’s view of music is surprisingly 
idealistic, one might even say, naïve. But music has to occupy this place in her world-
view because it remains a way of relativising existence and secures the possibility that 
there might be an alternative to life on earth.  
In summary, ‘Street Music’ is perhaps Woolf’s clearest depiction of what music 
means to her, and is the most revealing account of the ways in which music seems to 
live at the interstices of a number of different discourses. There is the life-philosophy 
that is born of a rhythm that liberates the soul and harmonises disparate selves; there is 
the writing of a pagan theology in the midst of an urban secular landscape. And finally 
there are the mythological tropes in which music seems to be the pretext for a divine 
encounter. Towards the end of the essay Woolf writes, ‘In forests and solitary places an 
attentive  ear  can  detect  something  very  like  a  vast  pulsation,  and  if  our  ears  were 
educated  we  might  hear  also  the  music  which  accompanies  this.’  (E1:31)  There  is 
something fundamentally unreconcilable about the fact that Woolf is reaching so far 
back into the past (she continually uses the word ‘ancient’) to find the source of the 
music which is so living and present in her environment. The images she paints, like the 
solitary woods, belong to the landscape of Ovid and she is straining her ears to hear a 
lost resonance of echo which is now only a sound, but which once had flesh and bones. 
Like  Euridice,  music  has  died  twice;  in  the  first  instance  music  is  simply  the 
reverberation of the past, a speculative music which ‘something in us is always straining 
to hear’. And secondly, the people that she identifies as being able to bring this music 
into the modern world by virtue of a divine gift are shunned and outlawed as petty 
criminals.  
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‘Impressions at Bayreuth’ 
 
The second of Woolf’s three essays on a musical subject matter is ‘Impressions at 
Bayreuth’ from 1909 which first appeared in The Times newspaper. In this essay we see 
further examples of Woolf’s ability to turn musical impressions into resonant literary 
statements,  as  the  text  continually  sways  between  poetic  renderings  of  an  evening 
performance at Bayreuth and faltering attempts to write music criticism (that are always 
closely attended by reflections on the criticism itself). At the outset of the essay Woolf 
sets out her views on the nature of current music criticism, which she intimates is a 
discourse without an anchor: 
 
The common-place remark that music criticism is in its infancy is best borne out 
by the ambiguous state of musical criticism. It has few traditions behind it, and the 
art itself is so much alive that it fairly suffocates those who try to deal with it. A 
critic of writing is hardly to be taken by surprise, for he can compare almost every 
literary form with some earlier form and can measure the achievement by some 
familiar  standard. But who in music  has tried to do what Strauss is doing,  or 
Debussy? (E1: 288) 
 
 
There are three significant things about this passage. Initially, we learn that the art of 
music is so ‘alive’ that it ‘suffocates’ those who try to write criticism. Secondly, Woolf 
is unable to identify criteria of comparison which might make the critic’s task tractable. 
Thirdly, Woolf  recognises  that every  piece  of music  seems  to  be  like  a fresh  start, 
rendering the making of comparisons with traditional models an impossibility. But this  
represents for Woolf the perfect opportunity to begin anew with music criticism and 
gives, ‘someone the chance of doing now for music what Aristotle did 2000 years ago.’ 
(E1: 288). 
This essay throws up some familiar themes that have already been explored in this 
dissertation. These include the search for a whole and unified account of experience. 
Woolf continually evokes wholeness as a means of measuring experience, and yet, her 
own writing resists, undermines even, this sense of wholeness by refusing to submit to 
systematic  conceptual  conclusion.  This  leads  us  to  the  other  familiar  trope  of 
contradiction. On the one hand, experiential synthesis is the purported goal of writing, 
and yet, essayistic writing in particular undoes the possibility of this synthesis. And in 
addition to  this, the very  means  by which any synthesis could be accomplished are 
denied her by virtue of her status as an amateur, because the amateur lacks ‘sufficient  
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technical knowledge to fasten upon details.’ (E1: 289) And yet, conversely, Woolf has 
not the means with which to capture the whole either, ‘a criticism of the whole resolves 
itself into vague formulas, comparisons, and adjectives.’ (E1: 289).  
The essay, therefore, is somewhat defined by its occupation of the space between two 
ill-defined extremes: the universal and the particular. This position is peculiar to her 
music criticism because, in her literary criticism, she is able to harness normal linguistic 
relations and  associations, and the unquestionable presence  of a  tradition  of literary 
criticism that is so familiar to her, allows her connections, associations and judgements 
to be far more secure.  
In the absence of any specific grounding in either the technical details of music or in 
a generalisable musical tradition, everything therefore depends upon her ability to form 
and convey in language local impressions of her experience, ‘There is only one way 
open thus for a writer […] he may try to give his impressions as an amateur.’ (E1: 288) 
And in this sense, the essay is structured as a rhapsody on her impressions of Parsifal, 
the  surrounding  external  environment  at  Bayreuth,  and  the  nascent  philosophical 
implications of her descriptions. 
There are obvious similarities in this essay’s structure and ‘Street Music’ whereby 
Woolf juxtaposes two distinct modes of writing; one is highly imaginative and visually 
evocative, in which she paints pictures of scenes and people that stand as aesthetically 
autonomous  passages  of  text,  ‘As  the  lights  sink,  they  rustle  into  their  seats,  and 
scarcely stir till the last wave of sound has ceased; when a stick falls, there is a nervous 
shudder, like a ripple in water, through the entire house.’ (E1: 289) The other mode 
conveys  Woolf’s  attempts  to  theorise  musical  interpretation,  ‘Perhaps  music  owes 
something  of  its  astonishing  power  over  us  to  this  lack  of  definite  articulation;  its 
statements  have  all  the  majesty  of  a  generalisation,  and  yet  contain  our  private 
emotions.’ (E1: 291) The localized disjunction of the two styles exemplified by the 
speed with which she jumps between the two modes, often, in this essay, combining 
them  in the same paragraph, prepares the reader  for no systematic conclusion. This 
formal  antagonism  only  reinforces  the  essayistic  avoidance  of  closure.  The 
accumulation of fragmented impressions allows one to make a kind of whole out of the 
essay, but this wholeness asks the reader to perform an integrating and imaginative act.  
We see early on in the essay Woolf’s concern with the bringing together of different 
parts in order to make sense of her musical experience. Writing of Wagner’s Parsifal, 
she notes: 
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The unfamiliarity of the idea hinders one at the outset from bringing the different 
parts together. One feels vaguely for a crisis that never comes, for, accustomed as 
one is to find the explanation of a drama in the love of man and woman, or in 
battle,  one is  bewildered by  a music that  continues with  the utmost calm and 
intensity independent of them. Further, the change from the Temple of the Grail to 
the magic garden, with its swarms of flower-maidens and its red-hot blossoms, is 
too violent a break to be bridged conveniently. (E1: 289) 
 
The fact that music is ‘unfamiliar’ prevents Woolf from ‘bringing the different 
parts  together’  and  she  can  find  no  explanation  or  description  of  music  that 
‘continues  with  the  utmost  calm’  independent  from  the  drama  of  the  operatic 
narrative. But there is not only the incongruity of the story and the music to contend 
with; there is also the difficulty of reconciling the formal structural syntax of the 
music itself, ‘the change from the Temple of the Grail to the magic garden […] is too 
violent  a  break  to  be  bridged  conveniently.’  Woolf’s  observations  reveal  a 
presupposition  that  any  connection  between  the  drama  and  the  music  be  of  a 
particular quality, and that the disruption of this connection leaves one ‘bewildered.’ 
‘Drama’  is  set  against  ‘calmness’  which  in  turn  is  set  against  ‘intensity’  as 
conflicting  states  which  fail  to  be  resolved  by  their  musical  realisation.  Woolf’s 
insights seem to occupy a kind of fractured space as she sunders the music from the 
story  and brings into  question  the  nature,  and the very possibility of  an inherent 
connection between the two. All Woolf can do now is return to her impressions: 
 
Somehow, Wagner has conveyed the desire of the Knights of the Grail in such a 
way that the intense emotion of human beings is combined with the unearthly 
nature of the things they seek. It tears us, as we hear it, as though its wings were 
sharply edged. Again, feelings of this kind that are equally diffused and felt for 
one  object  in  common  create  an  impression  of  largeness  and  […]  of  an 
overwhelming unity. The Grail seems to burn through all superincumbences [sic]; 
the music is intimate in a sense that none other is; one is fired with emotion and 
yet possessed with tranquillity at the same time…The earlier operas have always 
their awkward moments, when the illusion breaks; but Parsifal seems poured out 
in a smooth stream at white heat; its shape is solid and entire. (E1: 290) 
 
These  impressions  display  Woolf’s  evocative  linguistic  sensibilities  at  their  most 
heightened,  but  they  are  also  evidence  of  her  continual  negotiation  between  the 
universal and the particular. The Knights’ desire stands for the ‘intense emotion of 
human beings’. Furthermore, the desire that this emotion gives way to is deemed in 
excess of the physical world, ‘the intense emotion of human beings is combined with 
the unearthly nature of the things they seek.’ What comes next is essentially the  
 
109 
 
setting up of a metaphorical paratext as Woolf’s impressions of the opera become 
themselves impressionistic of the myth of Icarus. She refers to the music as having 
‘wings’, the Grail ‘burns’ through impediments, the listener is ‘fired’ with emotion. 
Moreover, the illusion of Parsifal is never broken (‘the earlier operas have always 
their awkward moments’) but is instead, ‘poured out in a continuous stream at white 
heat.’ This oblique reference to the sun cannot be mistaken.  And in addition to this, 
we get more impressions: 
 
From the hill above the theatre you look over a wide land, smooth and without 
hedges; it is not beautiful, but it is very large and tranquil. One may sit among 
rows of turnips and watch a gigantic old woman, with a blue cotton bonnet on her 
head and a figure like one of Dürer’s, swinging her hoe. (E1: 290) 
 
 
The point about this quote is that Woolf doesn’t just see a woman in a field but she sees 
through her as if the woman carries a representative force that allows her to summon 
cultural  references  and  knowledge.  Her  own  impressions  give  way  to  multiple 
extraneous,  and  often  distantly  related  impressions  that  are  superimposed  upon  any 
given situation or object. This chain of signification means that Woolf can pass through 
Greek  mythology,  Shakespeare  and  Renaissance  painting  as  she  describes  her 
impressions at Bayreuth.  
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‘The Opera’ 
 
Woolf wrote ‘The Opera’ in 1909 and it also appeared in The Times in that year. 
Woolf’s correspondence around this time is littered with references to, and reflections 
on, musical performances and festivals, as well as her growing fascination with opera. 
‘We go almost nightly to the Opera’ she writes in May 1908. What characterises much 
of Woolf’s writing about music during this period is her interest in the relationship 
between music and literature, and her conception of her own writing as ‘musical.’ There 
are suggestions in her diaries and letters that she wanted to mimic in her writing certain 
qualities of  music, a concern  which  itself  was born  out of Woolf’s  perception of a 
fundamental chasm between music and writing that she thought might be overcome. 
Again  and  again,  she  writes  of  the  difficulty  of  putting  into  words  her  musical 
experiences and the impossibility of transcending the starkly different media in which 
she was working and thinking. During a visit to Bayreuth she writes: 
 
We heard Parsifal yesterday; it was much better done, and I felt within a space of 
tears. I expect it is the most remarkable of the operas; it slides from music to 
words almost imperceptibly. However, I have been niggling at the effect all the 
morning, without much success. (L1: 406) 
 
Crucially,  however,  even  though  and  in  spite  of  how  ‘niggling’  Woolf  considered 
writing about music to be, she continued to reflect prodigiously not just on music itself 
and  its  relationship  to  other  art  forms,  but  on  her  own  writing  about  music.  A 
pronounced reciprocity between music and writing emerges in much of Woolf’s musical 
marginalia, with musical experience posing a certain technical challenge to the writer, 
and the obligation to write sending the writer back to music to test uncertain intuitions.  
Woolf’s  relationship  to  music,  and  her  effort  to  articulate  musical  experiences, 
highlights similar concerns that preoccupied Adorno and Lukács’s studies of the essay. 
For these writers, the genre of the essay represented a type of discourse that could be 
both  aesthetic  and  epistemological.  Arguably,  making  judgements  about  music  also 
requires that one employ and negotiate aesthetic and epistemic modes of enquiry. As we 
have  seen,  one  of  the  key  concepts  that  Adorno  relies  on  in  his  essay  is  that  of 
‘understanding’. I wish to suggest that ‘understanding’ could be the concept that allows 
one to pass between the aesthetic and the epistemic. And just as the essay was thought 
to traverse two different modes of being that had hitherto commonly thought to have  
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been in opposition, Woolf’s musical judgements, and her observations concerning the 
difficulty of making those judgements, negotiate this schism.  
The  key  essayistic  strategy  at  work  in  ‘The  Opera’,  a  strategy  that  procures 
understanding, is the positing of a motif concerning the accommodation of differences 
necessitated by the absence of universal satisfaction. The opening lines are as follows: 
 
The Opera season is upon us, and for some weeks the programme from which a 
selection will be made has laid under discussion. No one, of course, is satisfied; but 
then universal satisfaction could only be obtained if we all thought alike. As it is, the 
Grand Opera Syndicate has to consider a variety of tastes, and the ambiguous state of 
mind which their list indicates hints at the varieties of the public taste. (E1: 269) 
 
Woolf is  here  establishing the idea that the institution of the Opera is without a 
centre,  but  that  it  is  a  cover  term  for  a  family  of  competing  and  differing 
preconceptions, technical problems, sites, spaces and discourses. This complex space is 
problematised  via  pairs  of  contrasting  priorities  that,  because  they  concern  cultural 
beliefs and artistic tastes, are epistemic in nature. She identifies factions within opera 
audiences at various levels: between opera lovers and opera loathers; between devotees 
of Wagner and followers of Glück; and between the different species of Wagnerians. 
These  analyses  are  again  epistemic  in  nature  as  they  point  towards  significant 
dimensions of form and aesthetic within the works themselves and count as knowledge 
of  the  terrain.  For  example,  the  difference  between  Glück  and  Wagner  can  be 
established through their treatment of emotion and drama. Glück presents formalised 
emotional situations which lend themselves readily to musical presentation. But ‘these 
emotions are not necessarily dramatic, and the music raises in us emotions of a general 
character which cannot be referred to the experiences of a particular person.’ (E1:270)  
The attainment of  something tantamount to the perfection in  the accommodation  of 
music  to  emotion  in  Glück  (which  inspires  praise  from  some  quarters  of  the  opera 
audience) is achieved at the price of a certain abstractness.  
Wagner, by contrast, can portray human emotional life with realism and immediacy, 
and  as  such  his  music draws  on  our  sympathies  more  completely. But  he  does  not 
achieve this consistently: ‘And yet, swept away as we are at some moments, there are 
others when we seem to be dropped again’. (E1: 270) In her diagnosis of this failing, 
she sets out another key difference that is of course constitutive of the form itself, the 
difference between word and music. She describes the attempt of the ordinary operagoer  
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to reconcile the apparent disparity between Wagner’s music with his mythic narratives. 
She asks,  
 
Perhaps there is some cleavage between the drama and the music? Music (it may be) 
raises associations in the mind which are incongruous with associations raised by 
another art; the effort to resolve them into one clear conception is painful, and the 
mind is constantly woken and disillusioned. (E1: 270) 
 
Persuasive though this analysis is, the tone of the essay does not settle into anything 
like a verdict or a negative judgement on the Opera (which it could easily become). 
Rather,  the  contradictions  and  complexities  of  the  Opera  feed  into  her  distinctive 
technique of portraiture. The people that haunt the opera houses have found bizarre 
ways of occupying these unlikely and contradictory spaces. Woolf takes flight from the 
flow of the analysis to present the aesthetic side of her object, and arguably, one makes 
a mistake if one only consults this essay for information about operatic tastes in the 
early  twentieth  Century.  Wagner’s  music  has  in  fact  produced  new  cultures  of 
behaviour  which  mitigate  the  inconsistencies  she  pointed  out  above,  but  these 
behaviours need to be drawn, and they need a novelist’s acerbic eye: 
 
His and his characters appeal to people who would never listen to music in a concert-
room. They find a Wagner opera much the same as a play, but easier to follow, 
because the emotions are emphasised by the music. They find the men and women 
much like themselves, only with a wonderful capacity for feeling things. How many, 
as the opera goes on, see themselves in the place of Tristan and Iseult [sic], are 
delighted with the depth of their own capacities, but feel little sympathy with the 
passages where they cannot undertake the parts? (E1: 270-71) 
 
She continues in vivid, comic style: 
 
Strange men and women are to be found in the cheap seats on a Wagner night: 
there is something primitive in the look of them as though they did their best to 
live  in  forests,  upon  the  elemental  emotions,  and  were  quick  to  suspect  their 
fellows of a lack of ‘reality’ as they call it. They find a philosophy of life in the 
operas, hum ‘motives’ to symbolise stages in their thought, and walk off their 
fervour on the Embankment, wrapped in great black cloaks […] And the scholarly 
Wagnerians,  detecting  ‘motives’  by  the  flash  of  their  electric  lamps,  and 
instructing humble female relatives in the intricacies of the score. (E1: 271) 
 
Aside  from  the  tone,  which  is  cutting  and  humorous,  Woolf’s  technique  in  this 
passage  is  sophisticated.  One  notes  that  there  is  a  distinct  lack  of  conjunctions  in 
adjoining  phrases  (formally  known  as  asyndeton),  as  comma  after  comma  link  the  
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clauses and lends the experience of reading the text a pace and a rhythmic urgency. 
More  importantly,  however,  Woolf  threads  together,  and  concentrates  striking 
imaginative  pictures  that  represent  the  panoply of  sights  and  experiences  associated 
with attending the opera. The comic structure is clear enough: no intellectual posture 
comes without an associated physical and social symptom. The ardent Wagnerians sit in 
the cheap seats, wear black cloaks and hold their own emotional lives in higher regard 
than those of their fellows; the scholars (by implication male) carry special lamps so as 
to  read  the  scores  in  the  gloom  of  the  theatre  and  bore  their  female  relatives  with 
analytical details. And the opera house itself is painted with opulent detail, as is the 
poverty of its immediate surroundings: 
 
We see the immense house, with its vast curved sides, its soft depths of rose colour 
and cream,  the  laces  hanging  down  in  loops from  the boxes,  and the twinkle  of 
diamonds within […] Undoubtedly the great dome which has risen so pompously 
among the cabbages and slums shelters one of the oddest of all worlds – brilliant, 
beautiful, and absurd. (E1: 271-72) 
 
It can clearly be seen that this essay has a double character: it shows and tells, it does 
what it says. The last paragraph sets out the basic position: ‘These are but a few points 
of view, but the variety seems to show that there is, at any rate, no general idea as to the 
true nature of the Opera.’ (E1: 271) In the absence of a general idea and a true nature, 
what is left is a series of raids on the ‘complex vision’ that is the Opera. In this sense, 
the Opera is the perfect subject matter for the essay since anything the eye, the ear or the 
imagination alights upon immediately become relevant to that vision. Without a centre, 
there can be no periphery; there is nothing that can be passed over as merely incidental 
to  the  picture  that  is  being  constructed.  With  no  final  truth  on  the  matter,  there  is 
nothing to constrain the writer to one subject or another, and nothing to inhibit the 
writer is noting down whatever fragmentary vignettes a night at the Opera bestows.  
This peculiar vision of the Opera liberates those details that one normally dare not 
mention in  a serious  reading of  the  Opera:  the curtains,  the  stage, the building, the 
people, the seats, the post-concert analysis and so on, and it is her continual recourse to 
the more oblique elements of such an experience that makes her criticism so generous.  
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Chapter 5 
Aspectual Non-Identity: Rhythm and Satire in Woolf’s 
Urban Musical Observations 
 
 
Methodologically  speaking,  this  chapter  is  constructed  around  a  dialectically 
elaborated concept of rhythm which, as will be shown, is able to capture and penetrate 
vitally important aspects of Woolf’s writing about music. The concept of rhythm, which 
Woolf  herself  foregrounds  as  being  essential  to  her  own  writing  practice,  is  here 
understood  beyond  any  simple  musical-technical  application.  Instead  I  explore  the 
metaphorical  complexity  of  the  notion  in  two  distinct  directions.  On  the  one  hand, 
rhythm  is  concerned  with  synchronisation,  with  picking  up  a  speed  or  tempo,  with 
“being  in  time”.  This  notion  is  suggestive  of  a  “fit”,  an  attunement,  or  resonance 
between two systems whereby energies are efficiently transferred or enhanced. On the 
other  hand,  rhythm  is  articulated  and  apprehended  via  interruptions,  impacts  and 
percussions. And there is always a resonant surface upon which the percussive event 
impacts, a surface which registers and amplifies the event. 
In this formulation, Woolf’s writing is another word for that resonant surface that 
is always being tuned to her environment. Thus, the pace of daily life in London is 
reflected in the tempo of Woolf’s writing, whereby the threat of impending engagements 
often forces her to break a line of thought. The telegraphic style of her diary entries can 
readily register any unexpected and/or rapid changes in the course of events or the flow 
of  thought.  And,  in  line  with  the  theme  of  the  non-identical  that  has  occupied  this 
dissertation hitherto, this rhythmicised writing does not provide a vantage point that 
would admit conceptual survey, intellectual command or authoritative pronouncement. 
Rhythm is the disruption of ordinary logical consistency (motivated by the need to put 
disorder in abeyance) for the sake of what is, perhaps, a higher consistency between 
word and the world as it is (not the world as we might like it to be). The staccato 
rhythms  of  Woolf’s  urban  observations  reinforce  the  impossibility  of  a  coherent 
synthesis of her experiences.  
Rhythm,  then,  informs  the  structure,  pattern  and  syntax  of  her  writing.  But 
rhythm, via techniques of interruption and digression, also informs what can be thought 
of as a comic register in her writing. That comedy sometimes emerges as she discusses 
music  is  especially  telling  because  she,  perhaps  inadvertently,  exposes  prominent  
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musical  ideologies  of  the  period:  music  is  precisely  that  which  relies  upon  dignity, 
decorum and artistic seriousness for its success. If that is interrupted, what then? And 
beyond that, at this time, (and possibly to this day), the development of musical taste 
and awareness can  be considered a central  obligation, not to say chore,  of personal 
“cultivation”. To interrupt this process, to keep the progress of musical taste faltering 
and uncertain, is a radical challenge to firmly entrenched Enlightenment (and class) 
values relating to the cultivation of Man as such.  
The importance of personal cultivation to Enlightenment thought is illustrated in 
Friedrich Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man from 1794. Schiller’s ‘goal’ was 
to set  out a systematic way of  overcoming what he  perceived as some of the most 
pressing problems of his age by way of an ‘aesthetic education.’ In fact, his thesis was 
that ‘every individual human being, one may say, carries within him, potentially and 
prescriptively, an ideal man, the archetype of a human being, and it is his life’s task 
through all his changing manifestations, in harmony with the unchanging unity of this 
ideal.’ (Schiller, 2005:17) Schiller’s view that one could progressively transform oneself 
into ‘an ideal man’ by way of an aesthetic education is exemplary of a strong line of 
post-Enlightenment, pre-Romantic German thought which gave way to the tradition of 
Bildung, or cultivation of the self. The idea of Bildung, in many ways, was concerned 
with liberation: liberation from the dominance of Kantian philosophy, liberation from 
pre-modern  political  systems  which  enslaved  people  in  feudal  states  by  means  of 
religious dogma and social custom, and liberation via techno-scientific disenchantment. 
Liberation,  is  achieved,  ironically,  not  by  freeing  oneself  from  the  aforementioned 
circumstances, either intellectually or materially, but by tightening one’s control over 
certain aspects of immediate reality – namely, one’s own relation to action. Bildung 
attempts to account for man’s disparateness and the unpredictability of his environment 
by imposing an ultimate shape on the fundamental formlessness of life. But by adhering 
to the belief that man’s vocation, as it were, is to realise his own ‘ideal’ archetype by 
way  of  an  aesthetic  education,  is  also  to  write  into  that  search  the  possibility  of 
disappointment and failure. And, in addition to this, conceiving of one’s life in terms of 
an ultimate trajectory also opens up the idea that this trajectory can be interrupted, and 
disrupted.  
In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the concept of Bildung fostered a 
view about the potential for art to be a means by which one might ‘improve’ one’s moral 
character. This view becomes pervasive across Europe and means that by the Victorian 
era in Britain, music is being contained by, and associated with, various ideological  
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forces. Such ideologies, moreover, can be seen to be manifested in the very traditions 
and  customs  that  uphold  the  practices  of  musical  performance  and  reception  at  the 
beginning of the twentieth century in Britain. Woolf’s level of musical consumption was 
typical of what one might expect of a woman of her class and background in early 
twentieth century London. She frequented concerts and musical evenings, purchased a 
pianola,  and  was  actively  involved  in  the  contemporary  discourse  about  opera  and 
musical  criticism.  Therefore,  she  would  also  have  been  exposed  to  much  musical 
etiquette; applauding after performances, sitting in silence in the concert halls, dressing 
formally  for  a  musical  event  and  cultivating  an  articulate  response  to  the  music  to 
communicate to one’s associates at the interval or post-performance. But buried beneath 
these customs is the belief that music was educative and useful to moral improvement.
42 
Woolf, I argue, disrupts this ideology by using satire as a technique to interrupt the 
narrative flow of her observations about musical life in London. Satire works at the 
level  of  the  rhythm  of  sentences  so  as  to  displace  the  logical  flow  of  events  and 
undermines  the  stabilisation  of  a  consistent  thesis  in  support  of  the  uncritical 
assumption about music’s ‘improving’ qualities. 
Much of the material of Woolf’s early diaries and letters makes continued reference 
to concert life in London at the turn of the twentieth century. She was an extremely 
active member of the London cultural scene, where music was often at the centre of an 
evening’s entertainment or socialising. In fact her frequent attendance at musical events 
could in some way contribute to a growing discourse that views Woolf as modernist 
flâneuse.
43 A musical event forced Woolf out of the relatively ordered and predictable 
environment of the domestic space and into the throng of the urban mass. Music was 
often not simply the destination of her journey, but was an accompaniment as she made 
her way through London: 
 
On the way I walked through a narrow street lined on both sides with barrows, 
where stockings and ironmongery  and candles and fish  were being sold. [The 
diary notes that Woolf was talking about Berwick Street Market in Soho] A barrel 
                                                
42 It was exactly this spirit that stimulated Sir George Grove (1820-1900) to found the eponymous music 
dictionary in the late 1870’s. See ‘Review: A Pyrrhic Victory for Scholarship? The New Grove Dictionary of 
Music and Musicians’ Perspectives of New Music, 20, pp.569-591. 
43 See Rachel Bowlby, ‘Walking, women and writing: Virginia Woolf as flâneuse.’ Still Crazy After All These 
Years:  Women,  Writing  and  Psychoanalysis.  (London:  Routledge,  1992)  1-33.  Also  Peter  Brooker,  ‘The 
Wandering Flâneur, or, Something Lost in Translation.’ In Miscelánea: A Journal of English and American 
Studies 20 (Zaragoza: University of Zaragoza, 1999): 115-130 
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organ played in the middle. I bought six bundles of coloured tapers. The stir and 
colour and cheapness pleased me to the depths of my heart. (D1: 135) 
 
The music from the barrel organ seems to heighten the sensation of being in the city: the 
colours are more vivid and the temptations of consuming more intoxicating, and yet, no 
less superficial. Music seems to be at the heart of the market experience and it provides 
the  background  to  the  chaos  of  the  activity  all  around.  Moreover,  its  place  in  this 
particular entry is in the middle – the music disrupts the narrative flow of the sentence, 
disconnecting Woolf’s observation that candles were on sale and her eventual purchase 
of ‘six bundles of coloured tapers.’ Her final reflection that ‘The stir and colour and 
cheapness pleased me to the depths of my heart,’ is ambiguous, but it does seem to 
reflect  something  of  the  swirl  of  visual  and  auditory  demands  made  on  her  at  the 
market.  The  insinuation  that  the  music  adds  to  the  sense  of  ‘cheapness’  comes 
somewhat as a relief to Woolf, as if she is relieved that music might actually not need to 
fulfil a certain seriousness of purpose. The barrel organ serves to reinforce the fractured, 
urban subjectivity in which music is just one of many sensory assaults to contend with. 
And, crucially, music functions as that which does not necessarily unify the disparate 
aspects  of  urban  experience. Woolf’s  experience  is  not  made  orderly  by  the  music, 
rather music is seen to contribute to the essentially un-orderly nature of experience. In 
this way, then, music is made to mirror those aspects of everyday life that are chaotic 
and unexpected– music is not shown to unify experience. In one particular letter to 
Roger Fry in 1923, Virginia Woolf writes: 
 
That old goat Sir Claude, only kept by the tightness of his white waistcoat from 
gushing  entrails all  over the carpet,  took it into his  head  to leave.  The  whole 
audience saw him move down the gangway. Suddenly he disappeared. There was 
a sound of coal sacks, bounding and rebounding. Then dead silence. He had fallen 
down a complete set of stairs; but is not hurt. (L3: 40) 
 
What is striking about her observations on the urban concert scene is the way in 
which she captures the unrelenting and often brutal pace of city life. But what is of 
greater importance, for the purposes of this chapter, is her subtle tendency to satirise the 
stock  characters  and  customs  of  musical  culture;  conductors,  performers  and  even 
concert etiquette all become subject to Woolf’s critical eye. In this sense, humour in her 
marginalia fulfills two functions. Firstly, satire effectively deflates potential symbolic 
excess  in  the  articulation  of  musical  experience,  and  secondly,  satire  undoes  the 
moralizing  discourse  of  the  legacy  of  Romantic  and  Victorian  notions  of  self- 
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improvement, as articulated by the concept of Bildung, and instead creates a subject 
position that rejects a ‘stultifying, over-codified society.’ (Connery and Coombe, 1995: 
ix) 
As has already been alluded to, Woolf’s recollections of the people and events of 
musical life in London are  often extremely vivid and  humorous,  and she is able to 
transform experiences of people and places into acute, precise observations, like a kind 
of literary sketch, complete with characters, a narrative and a punch-line. She frequently 
paints  amusing  scenarios  involving  conductors,  over-dressed  society-types,  and 
experimental musical theatre productions which allow the reader to imagine that these 
people are, in part, a literary creation. But Woolf’s tendency to fictionalise and, in many 
ways, to make fun of her musical encounters, also serves to illustrate a more critical 
point; Woolf’s satirisation actually questions and fundamentally destabilises many of 
the customs surrounding musical performance and presentation of the day, and by doing 
so,  she  brings  to  the  surface  potentially  ideological  issues  around  musical  social 
convention and the articulation of experience. 
But just what was London like when Woolf was attending concerts? Her accounts 
of concert life, some of which were written almost a hundred years ago, seem so full of 
energy and vivacity that she is able to overturn the transience of the pace of city life by 
capturing  it  so  precisely  in  her  writing.  Another  appealing  quality  about  her 
documentation of London’s burgeoning culture is that it can often be intriguing to read; 
it can seem puzzling or curious, as if it conceals secrets or intimacies that Woolf either 
wasn’t aware of, or didn’t know how to articulate. Music certainly had a marked impact 
on Woolf, but it was difficult for her always to say why it moved or captivated, or, as 
was  sometimes  the  case,  irritated  her.  Furthermore,  Woolf’s  musical  marginalia  are 
often only partially about music, thus, this chapter argues that the urban environment 
contributes  to  the  fragmented  subjectivity  in  Woolf’s  work.  Her  observations  about 
London often only have the shadow of formed ideas and prose; the diaries and letters 
read just as if she had dashed down thoughts in the hurried, stolen moments between 
social  engagements.  And,  of  course,  this  was  precisely  the  case,  and  the  writing, 
therefore,  becomes  a  mirror  of  the  pace  and  rhythm  of  life  in  London  at  the  time. 
Moreover, Woolf’s jottings reveal the extent to which her capacity to make meaningful 
judgements  about  any  particular  performance  was  often  reduced  by  the  impending 
urgency of the next social engagement. She made observations on the move, as it were, 
and the pace of the city, to a large extent, dictated her ability to spend time reflecting on 
the numerous parties, concerts and social events she attended. However, this fact did not  
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diminish the quality of her observations, rather, the rhythm of the city contributes to the 
sense that her aesthetic reflections on music could only ever be partial. To put it another 
way, the observations Woolf makes about musical life in London are incomplete without 
the references to the city and its environment –music and musical life are co-existent 
with London, its places, people and rhythms. 
 
Rhythm 
 
Another way that rhythm comes to inflect Woolf’s writing can be found if we look 
at this example of her attendance of a performance of William Walton’s Façade. 
On Wednesday, 13
th June 1923 she writes in her diary: 
 
Nessa  is  back  and  the  London  season  of  course  in  full  swing.  So  I  judged 
yesterday  in  the  Aeolian  Hall,  listening,  in  a  dazed  way,  to  Edith  Sitwell 
vociferating through the megaphone. (D2: 244) 
 
The diary’s editors note that: 
 
The occasion was the first public performance of Façade, a collaborative effort by 
the Sitwells and the composer William Walton, in which the words and the voice 
(both Edith Sitwell’s) were intended to play an equal and interdependent part with 
the instrumental music. The poems were recited through a ‘Sengerphone’ which 
protruded through the mouth of a grotesque head in the centre of a drop-curtain 
painted by Frank Dobson. The performance called forth almost universal obloquy 
from the press. (D2: 244) 
 
The entry continues: 
 
I should be describing Edith Sitwell’s poems, but I kept saying to myself “I don’t 
really  understand…I  don’t  really  admire.”  The  only  view,  presentable  that  I 
framed, was to the effect that she was monotonous. She has one tune only on her 
merry go round. And she makes her verse keep step accurately to the Hornpipe. 
This seems to be wrong; but I’m all sandy with writing criticism, and must be off 
to my book again. (D2: 244) 
 
 
Woolf’s ‘dazed’ listening is the first clue that her judgement of this particular concert 
is going to be less than favourable. But it is her frank admission that she didn’t really 
understand or like it that is most important for it allows access to Woolf’s private 
thoughts  in  such  a  way  that  might  inspire  sympathy  from  someone  who  had  
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experienced  a  similar  effect  upon  listening  to  music.  It  is  an  unspoken  rule  of 
concert-going life that if you do not understand the work being played, then the last 
thing  you  would  do  is  admit  it.  Woolf’s  private  comments  about  Walton  and 
Sitwells’ Façade make a space for our own, perhaps private, experiences of finding 
ourselves  without  understanding  in  the  face  of  a  musical  encounter.  She  gives 
validity to our own suspicions that we do not ‘get’ the piece and her uncertainty 
gives a voice to our uncertainty. Moreover, and more importantly, Woolf’s position 
gives us an insight into the development of avant-garde art in England in the early 
twentieth century and from her work, we can see what the prevailing attitudes and 
behaviours  were  regarding  music  in  London  circa  1923.  Façade  represents  an 
interesting turning point in the development of the British modernist aesthetic, and 
Woolf’s ostensible rejection  of this  new kind of art tells  us  something about the 
distinctiveness of her attitudes and tastes. Her criticism of the piece reveals that she 
is able to make sharp technical observations about the interplay between the words 
and the music. She claims that Sitwell is ‘monotonous’, she is not impressed by what 
she sees, she deems it naïve, childish- ‘merry go round’, she thinks that the work is 
impoverished, that it is not musical enough. Sitwell’s poetry becomes ‘monotonous’ 
set to music, which itself lacked variation and complexity. The music had only ‘one 
tune’ and presumably Woolf thinks that the piece underestimates the relationship 
between poetry and music. As a fervent opera goer, we can be assured that Woolf 
had detailed knowledge and experience of the traditions, language and behaviour of 
musical theatre, but a the same time, Edith Sitwell, too, went to great lengths to 
defend her thinking about the creative forces behind Façade in her own biography, 
denying us the simple conclusion that Woolf would have had the critical upperhand 
here.  
Sitwell’s  theorisation  about  the  relationship  between  rhythm  and  meaning  is 
reflective of a burgeoning modernist aesthetic that is concerned with angles and shapes 
and the disruption of meaning. But Sitwell’s conception of rhythm contrasts sharply 
with Woolf’s which she treats more as a device that supports and enhances meaning. 
Rhythm, for Woolf, gives more meaning to that which is already there. Even Woolf’s 
diary entry has its own particular rhythm that discloses the periodical nature of the day; 
her writing in the diary must end so that she can move on, forwards to her book. For 
Sitwell, rhythm is melody without pitch, suggesting that rhythm is not subordinate to 
melody, but is as equally important, and can in fact, replace melody as the focus of a 
musical text. Woolf’s response to Façade and Sitwell’s thoughts on rhythm tell us two  
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significant things about Woolf’s aesthetic. The first is concerned with rhythm as it is 
conceived of as a fact of musical performance, that is, rhythm as it exists in the piece of 
music. One could speculate that one of the reasons why Woolf disliked Façade was 
because she associated dance rhythms with the behaviour of her servants and thus lively 
rhythms were the domain of the lower orders. In a letter written to Emma Vaughan in 
1903, she writes: 
 
A fresh lot of tunes came today chosen by Adrian and a very mixed set – Bach 
and Schumann and the Washington Post and the Dead March in Saul, Pinafore 
and the Messiah. We find the difference in quality a very good thing because all 
our servants sit beneath the drawing room window all the evening while we play – 
and  by  experiment  we  have  discovered  that  if  we  play  dance  music  all  their 
crossnesses vanish and the whole room rings with their shrieks and then we tame 
them down so sentimentally with Saul or boredom with Schumann – on the whole 
their silence is the most desirable thing. (L1: 88) 
 
Here, ‘dance music’ has an anaesthetic effect on the servants and is seen to appease 
their  frustration,  it  makes  them  ‘shriek’  and  they  must  be  calmed.  This  kind  of 
behaviour  was  not  something  that  Woolf  could  admire,  and  therefore,  the  similarly 
rhythmic robustness of Façade would remind her that her servants might perhaps have 
been more appreciative of Sitwell’s efforts than she was. Another noticeable term that 
Woolf  employs  when  she  writes  about  music  is  ‘tune’.  Composers  write  tunes, 
according to her diaries and letters, and she often remarks that she enjoyed listening to 
the tunes of the music. This  privileging  of melody contradicts Sitwell’s attempts to 
reflect on the status of rhythm. In 1921 she writes in her diary: 
 
But every afternoon for a week I’ve been up to the Aeolian Hall; taken my seat 
right at the back; put my bag on the floor and listened to Beethoven quartets. Do I 
dare say listened? Well, but if one gets a lot of pleasure, really divine pleasure, 
and knows the tunes, and only occasionally thinks of others things – surely I may 
say listened. (D2: 114) 
 
The diary notes ‘During a Beethoven Festival Week, 25-30 April, at the Aeolian Hall, 
the  London  String  Quartet  played,  in  chronological  order,  all  17  Beethoven  string 
quartets.’ (D2: 114) Woolf, accordingly, sees Façade as devoid of the pleasure of tunes, 
and the full extent to which she disapproved of the Sitwells is evidenced in a letter to 
Jaques Raverat written in July in 1923: 
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As  for  the  Sitwell’s,  though  I  paid  3/6  to  hear  Edith  vociferate  her  poems 
accompanied by a small and nimble orchestra, I understood so little that I could 
not judge.  I  know  Osbert  slightly.  They  take themselves  very  seriously.  They 
descend  from  George  the  IVth.  They  look  like  Regency  bucks.  They  have  a 
mother  who  was  in prison. They probably need careful reading, which I have 
never  given  them,  and  thus  incline  to  think  them  vigorous,  but  unimportant 
acrobats. (L3: 59-60) 
 
Even though she thought the Sitwell’s ‘unimportant’ and ‘acrobats’, Woolf shares her 
preoccupation with rhythm. We have seen that she views dance music rhythms rather 
unfavourably, but in terms of her aesthetic disposition, she considers rhythm absolutely 
central to writing. She states this again in a letter to Vita Sackville West in 1926: 
 
Indeed, these are the first letters I have written since I was married. As for the mot 
juste, you are quite wrong. Style is a very simple matter; it is all rhythm. Once 
you get that, you can’t use the wrong words. But on the other hand here I am 
sitting after half the morning, crammed with ideas, and visions, and so on, and 
can’t dislodge them, for the lack of the right rhythm. Now this is very profound, 
what rhythm is, and goes far deeper than words. A sight, an emotion, creates this 
wave in the mind, long before it makes words to fit it; and in writing (such is my 
present belief) one has to recapture this, and set this working (which has nothing 
apparently to do with words) and then, as it breaks and tumbles in the mind, it 
makes words to fit it: But no doubt I shall think differently next year. (L3: 247) 
 
For  Woolf,  style  means  rhythm.  Here  she  seems to  be  gesturing  towards  a  kind  of 
rhythm that precedes meaning; she argues that something happens in consciousness, a 
movement  of  some  kind,  or  a  disturbance.  Following  on  from  this,  words,  and 
eventually meaning find their place within that shape. The task of writing is to represent 
this  original  motion.  Rhythm  is  perceived  long  before  meaning  occurs.  This  is  in 
contrast to Edith Sitwell’s conception of rhythm that works on material that is already 
given. Rhythm shapes, changes and manipulates  the  meanings already given  by the 
words, it does not persuade words to manifest themselves the way Woolf implies. In 
Sitwell’s version rhythm is a tool that we have at our disposal; we are ultimately in 
control of rhythm and can make it come under our command. For Woolf, it is more like 
we are at the mercy of a rhythm that is always present, always forming in our minds, 
shapeless  and  meaningless,  forming  as  it  goes  and  providing  the  vital  impetus  for 
writing.  Woolf’s  understanding  of  rhythm  allows  us  to  conclude  that  it  had  two 
significant meanings to her. On the one hand, quick and lively rhythms still symbolized 
a kind of lower social class – her servants enjoyed ‘rhythmic’ music. And this points us 
to  the  kind  of  conservative  approach  Woolf  might  have  been  encouraged  to  have 
towards music and musical performance. On the other hand, and perhaps slightly at  
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odds with this social and moral obligation to view rhythm as subversive, Woolf knew 
that  rhythm  had a fundamental role to play in writing. As much as rhythm was an 
indicator of social status, it was also a powerful aesthetic device. Christopher Butler in 
Early Modernism argues that the concept of rhythm in an urban landscape would have 
been crucial not just to writers like Woolf, but to the development of an early modernist 
subjectivity. He suggests that in the early twentieth century, the explosion of the urban 
environment causes philosophers and artists to consider ‘its effects upon the rhythms of 
the consciousness.’ (Butler, 1994: 134) 
  In addition to this  dual aspect of rhythm, Woolf’s  knowledge  of and frequent 
attendance to some of London’s best known musical venues was impressive.  In the first 
volume  of  Woolf’s  diary  written  between  1915  and  1919,  twelve  of  the  nineteen 
references  to  music  make  mention  of  her  attendance  at  a  concert.  An  entry  from 
Wednesday, 6
 January 1915 reads: 
 
Now I have to decide whether I shall go up again, to a party at Gordon Square, 
where the Aranyis are playing. (D1: 9)
44  
 
From Sunday, 17 January: 
 
I went to a Queen’s Hall Concert, stayed for three beautiful tunes and came back. 
(D1: 20)
45  
 
And from Monday, 19 November 1917: 
 
On Friday we went to a concert, walking out when the English piece came on into 
a disreputable side street clinging to the back of Bond St. (D1: 78)
46  
 
Of the London venues that Woolf frequented, it was the Queen’s Hall and the Aeolian 
Hall that seem to have featured most prominently, though there are also references in 
the marginalia to concerts at the Old Vic Theatre and the London Palladium, and opera 
performances at the Theatre Royal Drury Lane and the Shaftesbury Theatre: 
 
                                                
44 (The diary notes that the d’Aranyis sisters were Hungarian concert musicians who remained in England 
from 1914-18). 
45 The diary notes that the music Woolf heard was Bach’s 4th Brandenburg Concerto, the Symphony in D 
by Cesar Franck and three movements of Lalo’s Symhponie Espagnole. 
46 The diary notes that the concert was at the Aeolian Hall, Bond Street and was performed by the London 
Trio.  
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Then on to Figaro at the Old Vic. It’s perfectly lovely; breaking from one beauty 
into  another, and  so  romantic  as  well as  witty  –  the  perfection  of  music, and 
vindication of opera. (D1: 83)  
 
I went to a concert at the Palladium this afternoon; but on the whole I regretted it. 
A man called Julian Clifford played Mozart as if it were a Dream Waltz, slowly 
and  sentimentally  and  with  a  kind  of  lugubrious  stickiness  which  spoilt  my 
pleasure in the G minor (D1: 142)
47  
 
I went to the Magic Flute, and thought rather better of humanity for having that in 
them.  Goldie  was  in  the  same  row  as  me,  thinking  I  daresay  much  the  same 
thoughts, though the proximity  of two youthful men may have coloured them 
differently. (D1: 153)
48  
 
And from Monday, 17 June 1918, ‘I went to Don Giovanni, to my infinite delight.’ (D1: 
157)
49 Woolf also attended many private concert series, including those organised by 
Bruce Richmond at Shelley House, and at Ham House. In terms of the repertoire that 
these concerts exposed the general public to, it was mostly imported from Europe and 
Woolf notes attending performances of music by Handel, Haydn, Beethoven, Mozart, 
Bach, Schumann, Brahms, Debussy, Glück, Dvořák and Wagner. But Woolf’s musical 
palette was not just limited to European Art music; she also makes mention of more 
popular musical forms that she would have seen performed in the Music Halls. Musical 
comedies by Gilbert and Sullivan are noted, as well as performances of works by British 
composers Ralph Vaughan Williams, Ethel Smyth and William Walton.  
In terms of Woolf’s listening experiences she would have largely been going to see 
the performance of music that had been part of a professional musical canon for the last 
hundred years or so. This is notable because it might be tempting to imagine that Woolf 
is  satirising  an  emerging  or  modern  musical  culture,  but,  in  fact,  she  was  passing 
judgement  over,  what  would  have  been  by  the  1910s  and  20s,  quite  old  fashioned 
concert practices. And this is interesting for us because many of the practices that might 
have seemed dated to Woolf at the beginning of the twentieth century remain part of our 
concert-going culture today, As Catherine Dale notes in her book Music Analysis in 
Britain in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, a rich concert life had been 
established in Britain even before 1850: 
 
                                                
47 Julian Clifford 1877-1921 was a conductor, pianist and composer. 
48 The diary notes that the concert Woolf attended was at the Theatre Royal Drury Lane and was part of Sir 
Thomas Beecham’s ‘Summer Season of Grand Opera in English’. 
49 The diary also notes that this was part of the same season ‘Grand Opera in English’ at the Shaftesbury 
Theatre.  
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The foundation  of  the Philharmonic  Society  in  1813 made a high  standard  of 
orchestral music available to the aristocracy and the new, wealthier bourgeoisie 
alike, and from 1835 specialised concerts, including the chamber concert and the 
solo recital, also began to appear regularly. (Dale, 2003: 2) 
 
 
Dale describes how the dissemination of music grew steadily in the late nineteenth and 
early centuries. However, this expansion was not just limited to the major cities. There 
was, she remarks: 
 
a rise in the number of musicians from 19,000 in 1871 to 47,000 in 1911 as more 
people benefited from increased purchasing power and were able to buy musical 
instruments;…(there was) a huge diversification in the type of musical activities 
available which ranged, in most towns, from brass bands to amateur orchestras 
and choral societies. Finally, as a result of nationalisation and the growth of the 
railways in particular, a national network of music publishers, touring musical 
companies  and  an  expanding  system  of  state  education  were  able  to  flourish. 
These  developments,  combined  with  the  later  inventions  of  broadcasting  and 
recording, permitted music to reach a much wider audience. (Dale, 2003: 2) 
 
 
But Woolf’s involvement in the musical concert of life of London did not begin and end 
with her presence in the audiences of such concerts. In fact, as this letter to Emma 
Vaughan from 23 February 1905 reveals, certainly early on in her critical career, Woolf 
felt that she had much to contribute to British musical discourse: 
 
My National Review article is about [Street] Music so you can imagine what a 
flutter is going through the musical world – it has probably reached Dresden. My 
remarks will revolutionise the whole future of music. (L1: 179) 
 
It is difficult to know how ironic Woolf was being in this article, but what she perceived 
as a lack in music criticism was something she was to later mention in her exchanges 
with the British composer Ethel Smyth. Again, this is important because Woolf sensed 
that music criticism was not as well defined a practice as, say, literary criticism, and this 
fact would come to dictate much of the content of her letters to Smyth. One figure, with 
whom  Woolf  was  familiar,  who  did  know  the  British  musical  scene  extremely 
intimately and who was perhaps a more established musical commentator, was George 
Bernard  Shaw,  who,  in Music  in  London  writes about  the  Philharmonic  Orchestra’s 
latest performance: 
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But its last performance of the Ninth Symphony seems to have aroused the British 
lion. The critics said the usual thing; but one Edward Carpenter, an unattached 
essayist of credit and renown, declares, on the contrary, that the symphony was 
miserably  unsatisfying.  I  was  not  at  the  concert  myself,  because,  though  I 
forewent Patti and the Albert Hall to attend, yet when I reached St James’s Hall it 
was so full that I could only get one of those acutely uncomfortable stalls in the 
niches of the wall for my seven and six-pence. Now, for a good performance of 
the Ninth Symphony I would cheerfully sit the whole time on a sack of nails. For 
an  average  Philharmonic  performance  no  seat,  I  regret  to  say,  would  be  too 
comfortable – a fourposter would be best of all; so I looked askance at that ticket, 
with its discouraging “Row FF”; hesitated a moment; and  - got my money back. 
(Shaw, 1932: 31) 
 
Shaw’s three volume book is full of candid observations and criticisms about British 
musical life and his writing bristles with attitude and humour as he presents his analysis 
of the contemporary situation. Shaw’s humour and attitude could be said to be repeated 
in Woolf’s musical observations too. But one of the less obvious things worth picking 
up on in this particular quote is the issue of money and the extent to which economic 
factors would have played a huge part in Woolf’s exposure to and capacity to participate 
in musical culture. Her attendance at the private concerts mentioned above meant that 
she  was  in  a  somewhat  privileged  position,  so  far  as  listening  to  live  music  was 
concerned. But her social position also meant that she was subject to certain kinds of 
behaviour too. In a letter to Clive Bell from 1911, Virginia Woolf writes: 
 
Gumbo [Marjorie Strachey] is seated at the piano, dressed in a tight green jersey, 
which makes her resemble the lean cat in the advertisement, singing O Dolce 
Amor, to her own accompaniment. The accompaniment ends: she flings her hands 
up, and gives vent to a passionate shriek; crashes her hands down again and goes 
on. A dry yellow skin has formed around her lips, owing to her having a fried egg 
for  breakfast.  Save  that  her  songs  are  passionate,  we  have  not  mentioned  the 
subject. (L1: 449) 
 
The final statement in this letter gives us a clue as to what would have been expected of 
someone of Woolf’s class in the early part of the twentieth century, and much of this 
behaviour could be said to have its legacy in cultural literature of the late nineteenth 
century, like Matthew Arnold’s Culture  and Anarchy (1869) in which he makes the 
connection between culture and law enforcement. As Derek B. Scott observes in his 
book Sounds of the Metropolis: The Nineteenth-Century Popular Music Revolution in 
London, New York, Paris, and Vienna: 
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An audience may shout, stamp, applaud, or hiss at will at low entertainment, but a 
strict reception code operates for high art: you do not talk; you do not turn up late; 
you do not hum along; you do not eat, and so on. (Scott, 2009: 61) 
 
It is likely that Woolf was subject to this kind of code of behaviour, attending mostly 
what would be called ‘high art’ events. Conversely, however, some social beliefs still 
held that music had the power to incite civil uprising or disturbance, an attitude that can 
be seen in Woolf’s fear that her servants responded wildly to music that she or her 
companions played. Moreover, there was great concern that the dancing which music 
accompanied contributed to a decline in moral stoutness. Scott identifies that the waltz
50 
proved the most ‘threatening’ of all the dances: 
 
The waltz offers an example of how music could be perceived as being linked to a 
physical threat to public morality. When the waltz first began to be danced “in 
society”, it provoked moral outrage in some quarters. Existing society dancers 
were more decorous; the minuet and gavotte may have been dances for couples, 
but they emphasised graceful movement and involved delicate contact with the 
fingers  only.  In  the  waltz  you  could  hold  your  partner,  and  not  just  with 
fingertips…but you could (still) hold your partner close…The waltz combined 
closeness with a sensation of the room spinning around, and this could prove an 
erotic and giddy experience. (Scott, 2008: 64)  
 
It is obvious from Woolf’s musical marginalia that she was attending all manner of 
musical concerts, and that she certainly knew not just about the activities of the upper-
middle  class,  as  this  selection  of  letters  shows:  ‘This  afternoon  we  are  going  to  a 
Beethoven  concert  –  opening  Wigmore  Hall  (the  old  Bechstein)’  (L2:  135),  then  a 
month later; ‘What is the truth of the rumour that Barbara (Saxon) is going on the Music 
Hall  Stage?  I  went  to  hear  a  new  Debussy  sonata  for  the  harp  flute  and  viola 
yesterday…I rather liked the Sonata.’ (L2: 140) And, to Edward Sackville-West in 1925, 
‘But the piano arrived safely, and has already given a two hour concert, when one of 
Angus Davidson’s brothers sang, and it was the greatest success. I hope to give many 
more concerts of this kind in the autumn, and we shall consider you our patron.’ (L3: 
195) 
Woolf’s mention of her acquisition of a piano made her one of twenty thousand 
people in Britain who were making similar purchases. Pianos were still very affordable, 
costing somewhere between £14 and £16 in 1911. (Pearsall, 1975: 125) Moreover, the 
                                                
50 As late as 1885 the waltz was begin attacked by moral speakers. Scott notes that ‘Mr Burband of the 
Aberdeen Presbytery launched a widely reported attack on ‘dancing parties, and promiscuous gatherings 
of  people  of  both  sexes  for  indulging  in  springs  and  flings  and  artistic  circles  and  close-bosomed 
whirlings.’ (Scott, 2008: 64)  
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piano was still at the centre of the salon music tradition and the instrument provided a 
focus  for  what  was  known  formally  as  a  Musical  Evening.  The  Musical  Evening 
remained a staple of Edwardian cultural life because, as Ronald Pearsall has noted in his 
book Edwardian Popular Music, it was thought that the musical evening symbolized a 
host’s  cultural,  social  and  moral  sophistication.  As  Pearsall  goes  on  to  note,  the 
evening’s entertainment mostly consisted of ballads: 
 
Because  so  many  ballads  were  published amateurs eagerly  read  reports in  the 
newspapers  to  find  out  what  was  good  and  what  was  not.  Many  of  them 
frequented ballad concerts, the most important of which were held at the Queen’s 
Hall,  and  the  advertisements  in,  for  example,  the  Daily  Telegraph  would  list 
singers who were performing the most popular ballads on the same evening all 
over the country. (Pearsall, 1975: 119-120) 
 
 
What  is  interesting  about  the  ‘musical  evening’  is  that  although  it  was  normally  a 
private affair that took place in people’s homes, and the music that was played largely 
conformed  to  their  expectations  of  a  late  Victorian  ballad;  i.e.  tonal  in  harmony, 
relatively lightly  textured, often sentimental in character, there was no  escaping the 
seeds of modernism that were finding their way into British contemporary cultural life. 
As Pearsall observes: 
 
Even in the world of salon piano music, modernism was rearing its ugly head, and 
Roloff’s ‘Russian Lullaby’ was attacked for ‘the awful reiterated seventh’. Cyril 
Scott’s  ‘Barcarolle’  had  ‘occasional  lapses  into  discord  [that]  gives  one  the 
shudders’,  while  Reginald  Somerville’s  ‘Automobile  Valse’  was  an  ill-timed 
excursion into the fashionable. There was easy-to-play modern music that was 
acceptable  both  at  recitals  and  at  musical  evenings,  such  as  Debussy’s 
‘Arabesques’,  but  anything  more  advanced  than  these  graceful  pieces  was 
unequivocally eschewed. (Pearsall, 1975: 119-120) 
 
 
It can be observed, therefore, that there was an enormous variety of musical activity and 
events for Woolf to be involved in and attend, many of which existed in tension with 
one another. Traditional musical  concerts as we still know them  today were readily 
available to  the  general  public, but, alongside  the  recognizable face  of Western  Art 
music were the embryonic mutterings of modernism. Also in tension was the belief that 
music  was  a  powerful  tool  in  aiding  and  improving  one’s  moral  character,  and  the 
opinion  that  music  should  be  mistrusted  on  account  of  its  power  to  incite  moral 
waywardness.  
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Interestingly, however, as much as modernism was creeping towards the Edwardians 
with ever increasing urgency, music, at the turn of the century, could not yet escape an 
ideology of respectability and improvement; an ideology that, arguably, we retain to this 
day.  This  meant  that  music  was  thought  of  as  offering  people  some  kind  of  moral 
education  and  was  often  encouraged  in  industrial  workplaces  to  tempt  the  working 
classes to join the self-improvement bandwagon. Scott: 
 
Music  for  the  nineteenth-century  middle-class  home  aligns  itself  with  one  the 
fundamental “Victorian Values” – that of improvement. It was the possession of 
an improving or edifying quality that allowed music to be described, in a favourite 
Victorian phrase, as “rational amusement” (Scott, 2008: 65) 
 
 
‘Victorian Values’, Music and Bildung 
 
In fact, these ‘Victorian values’ can be traced back to a similar movement which 
flourished a century earlier in Germany. I want to now look more closely at the concept 
of Bildung in order to examine the extent to which it informs the development of music 
criticism and was still prevalent at the time that Woolf would have been writing. The 
idea of aesthetic education as the route to  self-improvement was formally known as 
‘Bildung’ in European circles and was concerned with the objective spiritual progression 
of man. With its origins in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and the notion of the ‘highest 
good’,  Bildung  came  to  embrace  ethical,  moral,  and  spiritual  questions  concerning 
humankind and man’s role in the world. Frederick Beiser gives us an indication of how 
we might think about the word Bildung: 
The German term Bildung is notoriously untranslatable. Depending on the context, 
it can mean education, culture and development. It means literally “formation,” 
implying  the  development  of  something  potential,  inchoate,  and  implicit  into 
something actual, organised, and explicit. Sometimes the various connotations of 
the  term  join  together  to  signify  the  educational  process  or  product  of 
acculturation, or the ethical process or product of self-realisation. If we view the 
romantic ideal of Bildung from a general philosophical perspective, it would be 
most accurate to describe it as an ethics of self-realisation.
 (Beiser, 2003: 28)  
 
In the following section, I will examine whether the tension evident in a developing 
modernist aesthetic versus a rather more conservative view about music, can be traced 
back to a view about music that holds true to its morally improving character. In other 
words, to what extent might Woolf’s views on music have been trapped by ideological  
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constraints that have their intellectual legacy  in German Romanticism? And to  what 
extent,  therefore,  does  Woolf’s  criticism  contain  traces  of  the  ideology  of  Bildung? 
Moreover, and more importantly for this dissertation, by looking at the role of ‘vocation’ 
in the concept  of Bildung,  I will show  that this  particular aspect of Bildung can  be 
viewed as another attempt by man to ‘master’ his environment, and indeed, himself. 
Focusing on the term 'vocation' for a moment, this word implies initially, that one is 
inclined  to  pursue  a  certain  occupation  that  would  be  particularly  suitable  to  one's 
character  or  disposition.  We  understand  a  vocation  to  be  something  that  one  feels 
inclined to do, to act out or to realise, as a consequence of recognising that one has 
certain  beliefs,  values  or  interests.  But  it  is  the  complexity  of  this  inclination  that 
interests me, for, at first glance, we might assume that one is choosing these certain pre-
occupations and that one is ultimately free and able to control such desire. However, 
what is vital to the concept of a vocation is that one ultimately does not have the choice 
about what it is one feels compelled to invest in, and that to accept one's vocation is a 
potentially rather difficult and painful process. A vocation is something one is bound to, 
spiritually, morally and intellectually, and it  is not  something one  is able  to choose. 
Again,  one is  bound to  something – a cause,  an ethics, a  set of beliefs, an Other – 
without even being aware one has consented to such a commitment. It is a commitment 
that transcends anything one is able to articulate; it occupies a place outwith experience 
and  it  is  a  commitment  that  shows  little  regard  for  rationality.  This  promise  knows 
nothing of time or of space, it is immeasurable, unconquerable and unflinching. What is 
implicit in the word 'vocation' is the idea of an ending, a completion, or a teleology. It 
implies the fulfilment of a purpose or it implies that one considers existence has an 
intention. But there is a problem with the idea of vocation in Bildung, and it has been 
best addressed by the philosopher Maurice Blanchot, who makes a useful connection 
between  the  concept  of  vocation  and  Virginia  Woolf.  When  Blanchot  writes  about 
Woolf, he identifies in and through her the need to attend to the notion of vocation. For 
Blanchot, however, (and one suspects for Woolf also during her most self-conscious 
moments) the term ‘vocation’ becomes a deeply problematic, and at times, crippling 
accompaniment to the act of writing. Living in the shadow of the perceived urgency of 
vocation, the writer is aware of an overarching necessity to write, but this being aware of, 
or knowing that one is at the mercy of vocation, is not a simply act of recognition. 
Rather, vocation becomes a psychic burden: 
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Each person has an essential –perhaps unique-goal that he devotes his existence to 
refusing or accomplishing, nonetheless struggling almost always against it in an 
obscure, desperate and living fight. (Blanchot, 2003: 101) 
 
This  quote  comes  from  a  passage  from  the  essay  ‘The  Failure  of  the  Demon:  The 
Vocation’,  from  Blanchot’s  The  Book  to  Come,  and  falls  under  a  section  entitled 
‘Perfidious  Calling’.  Given  that  Blanchot  devotes  so  much  time  to  exploring  the 
vocational pull of the nature of writing, one might assume that he has faith in the idea 
that to write or to be a writer is, in part, a response to this vocational necessity. However, 
paradoxically, Blanchot labels the idea of vocation as ‘perfidious’. On what grounds 
though, might Blanchot presume that the nature of a calling or a vocation might be 
deceitful? If we assume that Blanchot is questioning the very nature of vocation itself, 
then  we  might  understand  that  he  views  the  idea  of  a  subject  being  indebted  to  a 
vocation as unbelievable or inaccurate, and the perfidy would be in the very idea of 
vocation itself. That is to say, Blanchot might be suggesting that there is ‘no such thing’ 
as a vocation. On the other hand, though, there is another way we might understand 
Blanchot’s oxymoron, and that would be to assume that he is not, in fact, questioning 
the existence of a vocation, but that he is commenting on the nature of vocation itself. If 
this  is  the  case,  then  Blanchot  is  suggesting  that  any  vocation  carries  inside  it  an 
element  of  deceitfulness,  and  that  a  characteristic  of  the  idea  of  vocation  is  that  it 
represents  an  element  of  untruth.  Whether  or  not  this  untruth  is  a  reflection  of  the 
subject who, misguidedly, follows what he believes to be his ‘calling’, or whether it is 
the calling itself that has deceived him, is unclear. But certainly Blanchot’s staging of 
the idea of vocation with reference to Woolf makes it seem as though he is interpreting 
the notion of vocation as being ultimately false, unfulfilling and unattainable: 
 
The idea of a calling (of a fidelity) is the most perverse that can afflict a free artist. 
Even and especially apart from any idealistic conviction (in which this idea is 
more easily tamed), we feel it close to each writer like a shadow that precedes him 
and that he flees, or that he pursues, deserter of himself, imitating himself or, 
worse,  imitating  the  inimitable  idea  of  the  Artist  or  of  the  Man  he  wants 
spectacularly to present. (Blanchot, 2003: 102) 
 
 This idealised conception of the individual, as embraced by the notion of Bildung 
(where reason and desire are fully united), was a reaction on the part of the Romantics 
to the events of the French Revolution. Philosophically speaking, they had identified a 
tension between the tendencies to think of oneself as completely rational, as a purely 
cognitive being and had awoken the desire to recognise one's emotions, feelings, desires  
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and sensibilities. If one could conduct oneself only on a fully rational, reasonable level, 
why were they witnessing so much suffering and destruction? Philosophy's (specifically 
Kant’s) explanation of the world had argued that the entirety of one's being could be 
explained  by  a  series  of  cognitive  processes  in  which  there  was  little  room  for 
irrationality. Such an idea could not sustain itself in reality, and there arose a conflict 
between  philosophy  and  practice,  between  philosophy  and  experience.  Indeed,  with 
philosophical hindsight it seems that many of the intellectual and artistic projects of 
Romanticism were a reaction to the short-comings of previous philosophical attempts to 
explain the world and the nature of reality, and the concept of Bildung was no different, 
except  that  it  was  not  so  much  a  criticism  of  Kantian  philosophy,  rather,  it  was  a 
development of some of Kant's original theses on aesthetics and the nature of aesthetic 
experience. Beiser suggests how the Romantic concept of Bildung could be (and indeed 
was by the Romantics) articulated within the domain of aesthetics: 
To develop all one's human and individual powers, to form them into a single 
whole, was to create a work of art. Hence Schlegel, Tieck, and Novalis were fond 
of saying that the individual should make his life into a novel, a beautiful whole. 
There  were  two  analogies  sustaining  this  aesthetic  concept  of  Bildung,  two 
concepts upholding the connection between the ideal of self-realisation and beauty. 
First, both the self-realised individual and a work of art are organic wholes, where 
conflicting forces (reason versus sensibility) are welded into an indissoluble unity. 
Second, both the self-realised individual and a work of art exhibit freedom, the 
absence of constraint or outside interference, since both appear to follow their 
own  internal  laws,  their  own  inner  dynamic,  independent  of  external  forces.” 
(Beiser, 2003: 28)  
The  Romantic  conception  of  Bildung  stood  in  contrast  to  the  two  other  possible 
alternatives regarding what could be considered the 'highest good' at the end of the 
eighteenth century. The first was the hedonism of the English utilitarians and the French 
philosophes, who regarded pleasure as man's highest good. The Romantics rejected this 
idea  because, according to the philosopher Novalis, the pursuit of hedonism creates 
philistines – that is, man seeks pleasure in an un-self-conscious, un-reflective manner; 
enjoying art because it is entertainment, engaging with religion because it brings him 
comfort and so forth. But neither could the Romantics find relief in the alternative to 
hedonism – Kant's stoic morality – which they regarded as too morally bounded and 
found Kant's tendency to prioritise reason over sensibility intolerable. But one of the 
main reasons why art and man become fundamentally linked is because, like a work of 
art, man remains incomplete. Or, to put it another way, there are parallels between the 
development and growth of an art work, and the development and growth of a man.  
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Thus, man becomes like a work of art. He is treated like a living project; his sensibilities, 
his feelings, his desires are cultivated and are considered as equally important as his 
reason, his intellect and his rationality. Man is unified and made whole, and it was 
thought  that  only  once  this  had  been  achieved,  could  he  become  truly  enlightened. 
Beiser again: 
Schiller's most detailed account of how a person can become a work of art appears 
in his treatise Anmut und Wurde. Here, he  puts forward his  ideal of  the “the 
beautiful soul” (die schone Seele), the person whose character is a work of art 
because all his or her actions exhibit grace. For Schiller, a graceful action is one 
that shows no sign of constraint – whether that of a physical need or a moral 
imperative – and that reveals the spontaneity and harmony of a person's whole 
character....In graceful action, then, our desires and feelings are neither repressed 
according  to  reason,  nor  indulged  according  to  sensibility,  but  refined  and 
ennobled, or, to use a modern term, “sublimated.” (Beiser, 2003: 96-7) 
 
One of the most lingering tropes of Romantic thought during the period in which Woolf 
was writing, was the reciprocal nature of the relationship between art and morality, and 
there was still a sense, certainly in the circles that Woolf moved in, that art was able to 
speak directly to, and about, the concept of the good. It followed quite naturally then, 
that any consideration of art in Bloomsbury circles must necessarily entail a similar 
consideration  of  ethics.  What  this  did,  of  course,  was  highlight  a  developing 
correspondence  between  art,  politics  and  subjectivity.  The  social  reforms  that  were 
taking  place  at  the  time  allowed  such  discourses  to  play  a  more  prominent  role  in 
everyday  life.  Whilst,  on  the  surface,  this  may  seem  like  a  valuable  or  worthwhile 
change, for Woolf, it in fact represented just the opposite, and perhaps there is a sense 
that some of the original ‘grace’ in Schiller’s ideas about the ‘beautiful soul’ had been 
corrupted  and  restrained  by  Victorian  values.  In  her  essay  entitled  ‘Socialism  in 
Bloomsbury: Virginia Woolf and the Political Aesthetics of the 1880s’, Ruth Livesey 
notes that this shifting political and aesthetic climate only reinforced Woolf's perception 
that the Georgian era represented a period that had been left aesthetically stunted by the 
Edwardians: 
 
Morality...can come only from the purely aesthetic realm of the poets, and hence 
the  unaesthetic  Edwardians  have  left  her  (Woolf's)  generation  of  Georgians 
orphaned. (Livesey, 2007: 127) 
 
  
 
134 
 
Livesey is referring to Woolf’s frustration at the contemporary literary scene which she 
believed was lacking in both sound morality and poetic sensibility. Such a sensibility 
could be overtly identified in the writing of Schiller and his contemporaries, but Woolf 
was  concerned  that  this  had  been  lost  to  an  age  of  industry  and  growing  political 
revolution. Her frustration would prove vital to her developing critical consciousness. 
Woolf’s way of responding to some of the intellectual, moral and social constraints of 
her era was to develop a form of criticism that essentially deflates potential symbolic 
excess, especially in her writing about music. In other words, her writing refuses to 
comply with the commonly held view, reinforced by social customs like the ‘musical 
evening’ and concert etiquette, that music has a morally improving character. Instead, 
Woolf focuses on the more marginal aspects of musical experience and uses humour to 
recount her musical outings. 
 
Humour in Woolf’s Musical Writings 
 
I  will  now  show  how  Woolf  responds  to  the  moralizing  discourse  of  her 
contemporaries and also to the lingering ideologies of a romanticized conception of 
music by examining the role of humour in her musical writings. It has already been 
noted that Woolf’s relationship with opera was perhaps the most significant engagement 
she had with music and as her diary notes: 
 
In August 1909 Virginia went with Adrian and Saxon Sydney-Turner to Bayreuth, 
for  the opera, and then to  Dresden for more opera and pictures. Finding their 
company faintly uncongenial, perhaps because she failed to match their musical 
enthusiasm to the full, she consoled herself by writing letters to Vanessa which 
were among her most affectionate. (L1: 404) 
 
The trip to Bayreuth yielded a cluster of letters written to Vanessa about the opera, 
and she relied on her contemporaries, in particular Saxon Sydney-Turner and Edward 
Sackville-West to inform her about the finer details of musical form and composition,  
as she felt inadequate about her own lack of technical musical vocabulary. Nonetheless, 
and despite the fact that Woolf was in the relative infancy of her critical development, 
the notes she makes about the opera remain some of the most pointed and humourous 
observations  about  musical  life  that  she  was  to  make.  In  a  letter  to  Vanessa  from 
Sunday, 8 August 1909 she writes: 
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We heard Parsifal yesterday – a very mysterious emotional work, unlike any of 
the others I thought. There is no love in it; it is more religious than anything. 
People  dress  in  half  mourning,  and  you  are  hissed  if  you  try  to  clap.  As  the 
emotions are all abstract – I mean not between men and women – the effect is 
very much diffused; and peaceful on the whole. However, Saxon and Adrian say 
that it was not a good performance, and that I shan’t know anything about it until I 
have heard it 4 times. Between the acts, one goes and sits in a field, and watches a 
man hoeing turnips. The audience is very dowdy, and the look of the house is drab; 
one has hardly any room for ones knees, and it is very intense. I think earnest 
people only go – Germans for the most part, in sacks, with symbolical braid…We 
have been discussing obscure points in Parsifal all the morning. It seems to me 
weak vague stuff, with the usual enormities, but I can only read the German with 
great difficulty. The time seems to go in preparing for the opera, listening to it, 
and discussing it afterwards – but tomorrow I must begin to write – you will laugh. 
(L1: 404) 
 
Woolf was not just concerned with the actual content of the opera performances, that is, 
the music itself, but she was always looking around her, at the environment, at the kinds 
of  people  she  saw,  the  kinds  of  things  they  were  wearing  and  the  ways  they  were 
behaving, as if all of these elements constituted her musical experience.  In terms of the 
actual opera, she calls it many things; ‘mysterious’, ‘emotional’, ‘religious’, ‘abstract’ 
‘peaceful’ ‘weak’, and finally, ‘vague’, and all of these conclusions she manages to 
reach without too much difficulty, though she adds the conjecture that she ‘shan’t know 
anything about it until I heard it four times’. (L1: 404) 
However, I wish to suggest that it is her descriptions of the non-musical events and 
observations that bring the extract to life. She adds to her thoughts about the music by 
including all of  her experiences. The effect that this has on  the overall style  of the 
extract is that she diffuses the intensity of the opera (which she remarks is itself diffuse ) 
by  counter-balancing  a  potent  emotional  encounter  with  a  humourous  interlude 
regarding  the  appearance  of  the  German audience.  Note,  though, that  the following 
Thursday, 12 August 1909, she writes again to Vanessa: 
 
We heard Parsifal yesterday; it was much better done, and I felt within a space of 
tears. I expect it is the most remarkable of the operas; it slides from music to 
words almost imperceptibly. However, I have been niggling at the effect all the 
morning, without much success. It is very hard to write in ones bedroom, without 
any  books  to  look  at,  or  my  especial  rabbit  path,  into  the  next  room.  I  have 
balanced my box on my commode, and made a shaky desk. (L1: 406) 
 
Woolf admits that opera moved her to tears; an experience had left its mark on her, 
but  an  experience  about  which  she  was  unable  to  speak  or  write.  She  blames  her 
‘writer’s block’ on her immediate environment, claiming that she cannot write without  
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her familiar home comforts, but one suspects that it was more than just her lack of an 
adequate  desk  that  made  turning  her  experience  into  words  particularly  difficult. 
Nothing else is mentioned about the effect the performance had on her, and by the next 
week, Woolf displays her humour to the full in this description of the German opera 
tradition: 
 
I write in haste – this is no device, to excuse my dullness – but I am scrambling 
through my article, which has got into a fix, and the opera at 4 cuts the day short. 
They don’t do the thing as well as we do it, I think: our seats are very near, and 
the ugly creatures look still uglier. I can never quite get over the florid Teuton 
spirit, with its gross symbolism – and its flaxen tresses. Imagine a heroine in a 
nightgown, with a pigtail on each shoulder, and watery eyes ogling heaven. Saxon 
says nothing; Adrian prods him for an opinion. He reclines on his hip between the 
acts, and pulls at a weed. There is a great crowd, and we get stared at, not for our 
beauty. (L1: 407) 
 
 
This  passage  might  be  amusing  for  the  British  reader  because  the  highly  vivid 
descriptions of the opera singer seem so absurd, and we are forced to imagine a woman 
on  stage  in  nothing  but  a  night-dress,  a  bad  wig  and  an  over-developed  sense  of 
earnestness. The exaggerated tone of the remark makes us also suspect that Woolf is 
being rather critical about the German production of the opera, and indeed, she boasts, 
‘they don’t do the thing as well as we do it…’ Interestingly, though, so much of the 
effect of Woolf’s humour relies on our ability to see what she sees, and, moreover, the 
visuality of the performance all but dominates the passage. She mentions, ‘creatures 
look[ing] […] uglier […] watery eyes ogling heaven […] and we get stared at […’. 
Although  it  is  noted  that  these  recollections  take  place  away  from  Britain  and 
Woolf’s usual London scene, I think they are still important in identifying one of the 
techniques  Woolf  develops  to  write  about  musical  aesthetic  experiences,  that  of 
exaggerated visual humour. In addition to these diary entries and letters written from 
Germany, we also have these extracts from Woolf’s letters to illustrate how important 
and frequent her opera outings were at one point in her life: 
 
I saw Saxon last night…a merry humour came over us, after a ‘fairly satisfactory 
–  yes,  I  think  I  may  say,  very  fairly  satisfactory’  performance  of  the 
Götterdämmerung and we sat here, over our galantine, till three thirty. (L1: 329) 
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To Lytton Strachey Monday, 18 May 1908:  
 
Could you come to tea with me on Thursday? I have got so miserably involved in 
opera and the German language that that seems to be the only free afternoon. (L1: 
333) 
 
To Lady Robert Cecil, May 1908:  
I am going to another opera on Tuesday, so, unless I could come early, I am afraid 
that afternoon is useless. I am so bewildered with operas – we go regularly – that I 
can’t make sensible arrangements. (L1: 333) 
 
To Violet Dickinson June 1908: 
 
I will come on Wednesday, but I must go back by the six something, because we 
are going to the opera. (L1: 335) 
 
To Violet Dickinson, early July 1909: 
 
I go to Cambridge on the 10
th – and both Thursday and Friday are taken up with 
opera. (L1: 400) 
 
To Violet Dickinson July 1909: 
 
If you could have me another day next week, it would be easier – as I only come 
up from Cambridge on Monday morning, and we are going to the opera in the 
evening. (L1: 400) 
 
 
In addition to this, the following set of examples illustrate Woolf’s humour in writing 
about experience. Often this comes from her frequent tendency to place an incident 
concerning something to do with music in very close proximity to an entirely unrelated 
matter. They also, again, rely on the creation of surprising conjunctions. She writes to  
Vanessa Bell in 1908: 
 
They (Herbert, Helen and Katharine Stephen – v’s cousins) are all solidly devoted, 
of course, but I don’t remember Helen much – except once, when we asked if she 
could play, and she strummed through a Beethoven Sonata, with the tramp of a 
regiment of dragoons […] I […] tried to write Melymbrosia. But a violin began 2 
doors off, and all the tradesmen called, and they came and bashed the floor over 
my head. (L1: 342) 
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To Violet Dickinson, Thursday 13
th May 1909: 
 
Last time we met was in that sumptuous Jewesses [Miss Schreiner] room, when 
everything was like an illusion. Do you remember that curious episode on the 
empire sofa, when she played Brahms or Schumann to us, and all in her boots? 
(L1: 394) 
 
 
To Lytton Strachey 6
th November 1911: 
 
I’ve just come back from the [Francis] Cornfords- from the 7
th Symphony, from a 
scene with __ __, from an interview in a W.C. and, while I wash my teeth, a 
painter sings on a board outside my window. (L1: 479) 
 
One of the most significant ways we see satire at work in Woolf is in her descriptions 
of the British composer Ethel Smyth. Here, it is possible to see that the success of 
Woolf’s satire depends upon her construction of particular illusory subjectivity. The 
descriptions are funny because they are a temporary liberation from the conformity of 
society. In order for satire to work, there must be a common understanding between 
writer  and  audience  which  the  work  has  to  undermine.
51 We  understand  that  Ethel 
Smyth  is  not  as  ludicrous  as  Woolf  seems  to  make  out  that  she  is,  but  this 
understanding only arises from a shared conception of ‘normal’ standards of behaviour. 
She writes to Ethel Smyth 22 April, 1930 p.158 
 
Today for the first time I have seen nobody, and my book, a very flickering flame 
at the moment, begins to draw. I don’t know if music needs a shelter round it. 
Writing is so damnably susceptible to atmosphere…This house, you understand, 
contains two outer rooms, in which I live; it contains a large room where we sit 
and eat, play the gramophone, prop our feet up on the side of the fire and read 
endless  books)…Are  you  writing?  How  does  one  write  music?...Naturally 
therefore I warble on, unnecessarily to Dame Ethel Smyth; who won’t read all this, 
being in a hurricane today, putting in trumpets, cello’s [sic] and a trombone or two 
in the bass. She thumps it out on her piano; and is only roused to life by her dog; 
does she ever eat her dinner, or is it always cold? (L4: 158) 
 
 
And her private remarks about Ethel: 
                                                
51 W.H. Auden in the essay ‘Satire’ explains: ‘Satire flourishes in a homogeneous society with a common 
conception of the moral law, for satirist and audience must agree as to how normal people can be expected 
to behave[…]’ (Connery B., and  Kirk Combe, Theorizing Satire: Essays in Literature Criticism (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1995: 204).   
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The reason why Ethel Smyth is so repulsive, tell Nessa, is her table manners. She 
oozes; she chortles; and she half blew her rather red nose on her table napkin. 
Then she poured the cream – oh the blackberries were divine – into her beer; and I 
had rather dine with a dog. But you can tell people they are murderers; you can 
not tell them that they eat like hogs. That is wisdom. She was however full – after 
dinner – of vigorous charm; she walked four miles; she sang Brahms; the sheep 
looked up and were not fed. And we packed her off before midnight. (L5: 226-7) 
 
In  addition  to  the  humourous  images  of  singing  tradesmen  and  an  ‘oozing’  and 
‘chortling’ Ethel Smyth, another striking feature of these excerpts is Woolf’s seamless 
inclusion of musical references into life’s ordinary activities. It is so refreshing to read 
that  music  is  neither  more  nor  less  special  than  any  other  kind  of  experience.  Not 
because this is the categorical truth about musical experience (sometimes it definitely is 
more or less exciting/interesting/boring than other experiences), but because we are not 
being subjected to florid descriptions of the music or facile metaphors that say nothing 
at all about the actual experience. We are not trying to be convinced that simply by 
virtue of there being music, that something stupendously life-changing is happening to 
us, for which we must be grateful. Woolf’s ability to write honestly about experience 
means  that  it  is  honoured  in  its  entirety;  it  is  not  over-determined  or  distorted  by 
description. And it is for this reason therefore, that Woolf’s writing allows us to see 
more clearly the particularities of individual moments of experience. Experience need 
not signify anything, it need not even be articulated, and by not attempting to master an 
experience, Woolf remains faithful to an authentic version of experience.  
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Chapter 6 
Sovereignty and Autonomy in Aesthetic Experience 
 
Characteristic  of  modern  reflection  on  aesthetic  experience  is  an  unresolved 
ambivalence.  It  manifests  itself  in  the  two  lines  of  tradition  that  have  shaped 
modern aesthetics from its outset. In one tradition, aesthetic experience represents 
just one element among the various discourses and modes of experience making 
up  the  undifferentiated  realm  of  reason.  In  the  other,  aesthetic  experience  is 
ascribed a potential that exceeds the limits of reason of nonaesthetic discourses. 
Already intertwined in Kantian aesthetics, these two lines of tradition are even 
more enmeshed in their most recent confrontation: in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory. 
In his central thesis on the “antinomy of aesthetic semblance” Adorno claims that 
the  clarification  of  this  relationship  is  the  real  problem  confronting  aesthetics 
today. (Menke, 1998: vii) 
 
Christopher Menke is perhaps the most able and sophisticated critic to join the group 
of  explicators  of  Aesthetic  Theory
52and  his analysis  of  Adorno’s  text  is remarkably 
cogent.  The  way  Menke  formulates  key  problems  in  Adorno’s  theory  is  extremely 
persuasive and confirms that many of his digressive and dialectical lines of enquiry 
continue to respond successfully to analytical scrutiny. One of the problems he gives 
close  attention  to  in  The  Sovereignty  of  Art:  Aesthetic  Negativity  in  Adorno  and 
Derrida
53 is set out above and concerns the preservation of the antimony between two 
different  interpretations  concerning  the  ways  in  which  aesthetic  experience  derives 
significance. The first of these interpretations has it that art belongs to reason by virtue 
of its autonomy. Art is differentiated from other ‘realms’ such as the Good and the True 
but it is nevertheless subject to reasonable laws and conditions that are given to itself 
and  upon  which it founds its  own  internal  tradition  and logic.  The  second  of these 
interpretations  sees  art  ‘exceed[ing]  the  limits  of  reason’  and  Menke  defines  this 
                                                
52 For further reading see Brunkhorst, H. 1999. Adorno and Critical Theory (Cardiff: University of Wales 
Press), Buck-Morss, S. 1978. The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin and the 
Frankfurt Institute (Hassocks: Harvester Press), Herbele, R. (ed.). 2006. Feminist Interpretations of Theodor 
Adorno (University Park, PA.: Pennsylvania State University Press), Huhn, T. and Zuidervaart, L. (ed.). 
1997.  The Semblance of Subjectivity: Essays in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory (Cambridge,  Mass.;  London:  MIT 
Press), Jarvis, S. 1998. Adorno: A Critical Introduction (Oxford: Polity Press), Jay, M. 1984. Adorno (London: 
Fontana Paperbacks), Roberts, D. 1991. Art and Enlightenment: Aesthetic Theory after Adorno (Lincoln, Neb.; 
London: University of Nebraska Press), Zuidervaart, L. 1991. Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory: The Redemption of 
Illusion (Cambridge, Mass.; London: The MIT Press). 
53 Menke,  C.  1998.  The Sovereignty of Art: Aesthetic Negativity in Adorno and Derrida  (Cambridge,  Mass.; 
London: The MIT Press)  
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through the concept of sovereignty. Art is taken to be in excess and transcendent of the 
non-aesthetic. In summary then, Menke states: 
 
Whereas the autonomy model confers relative validity upon aesthetic experience, 
the sovereignty model grants it absolute validity, since its enactment disrupts the 
successful  functioning  of  non-aesthetic  discourses.  The  sovereignty  model 
considers  aesthetic  experience  a  medium  for  the  dissolution  of  the  rule  of 
nonaesthetic reason, the vehicle for an experientially enacted critique of reason. 
(Menke, 1998: viii) 
 
Woolf reflects both types of interpretation, and in this chapter I will show how she 
preserves the antinomy between the two along the lines that  Adorno and Menke 
suggest as being valid. For example, take the following quote from Tuesday 20
th 
April, 1920 when Woolf makes the following note in her diary: 
 
To the Bach choir last night; but one of our failures. Is it the weather? I’d made 
out on walking, such a perfect day; and wasted the cream of the morning on the 
telephone. Then the weather; great bouncing gusts all set about with rain soaking 
one; buses crowded, left typewriting paper in the bus; a long time waiting at the 
Club – then Bach unaccompanied isn’t easy – though at last (after L. had gone 
home) I was swept up to the heights by a song. Anna Magdalena’s song. (D2: 
32)
54   
 
 
Woolf’s experience of the choir singing Bach is recounted as one experience amongst 
many  she  had  that  day.  The  sequential  statements  about  her  attendance  at  a  Bach 
concert, her feelings that it was not a successful outing, and her suspicion that the whole 
affair could be explained by the weather, are all presented one after the other, with 
seemingly little to connect the different statements. In what follows, we are given vivid 
descriptions of the turbulent meteorological conditions, and then suddenly we read her 
revelation  that  ‘Bach  unaccompanied  isn’t  easy.’    Importantly,  this  statement  is  an 
example  of  Menke’s  aesthetic  autonomy  because  this  judgement  is  internal  to  her 
understanding of the musical performance. The very presence of her judgement aligns it 
specifically to aesthetic autonomy because judgement necessarily infers the architecture 
of the constitutive separation of the Good, the Beautiful and the True. Moreover, this 
                                                
54 The diary notes that ‘among the works performed on 19 April by the London Bach Choir were three 
unaccompanied motets.’ It also notes that Woolf was probably referring to ‘Bist Du bei mir’ which was 
No.25 in the Klavierbüchlein für Anna Magdalena Bach most likely to have been composed by G.H. Stölzel 
and sung by Ethel McLelland. 
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statement refers back to the earlier assertion that the evening was a ‘failure’ and we now 
have a greater understanding of why she judged it to be so.  
  However, reading on Woolf declares that ‘at last…I was swept up to the heights by a 
song.’ This revelation exemplifies Menke’s opposing theory about aesthetic experience 
in which he sets out what he terms ‘aesthetic sovereignty’. Woolf refrains from going 
into detail about the precise nature of her aesthetic experience, and yet her words are 
enough  to  convince  us  that  she  really  did  experience  something  transcendent.  Her 
figurative language invokes Menke’s notion of aesthetic sovereignty because Woolf’s 
experience ‘exceed[ed] the limits of reason of nonaesthetic discourses.’ In other words, 
the Bach song has ‘at last’ delivered an experience that exceeds all other experiences of 
that day. As if from some divine source, the song transcends the disappointment and 
frustrations  of  the  weather  and  the  disastrous  bus  journey.  The  theme  of  the 
unpredictable weather is made to linger in the reader’s imagination as Woolf is ‘swept 
up’ by a rogue current of wind, perhaps, as she experiences the full pleasure of the 
music.  The  idea  of  the experience  being  in  excess  of any  other experience,  that  is, 
according to Menke, the experience being sovereign, is further embedded by the image 
of  ‘height’ as that  which goes above and beyond the ordinary limits of experience. 
Further to this is also the sense that as Woolf is being ‘swept up’ there is the danger that 
she  becomes  unbalanced;  she  might  be  knocked  off  her  feet,  swayed  a  little  as  the 
music/wind lifts her clean off the ground and transports her to somewhere beyond the 
realm of the ordinary, and beyond the realm of the reasonable. 
According to Menke, this second model of aesthetic experience is based on the 
‘sovereignty of art’. Distinct from the ‘autonomous’ mode, the ‘sovereign’ theory of 
aesthetic experience suggests that art does not occupy a place in relation to all other 
non-aesthetic  experience,  but  rather  exceeds  non-aesthetic  experience.  In  a  letter  to 
Ethel Smyth from 1932, Woolf writes: 
 
We had thunder at night of course, but not very tremendous, only enough to spoil 
the Promenade [Concert] to which we were listening. Odd – there was a crack of 
lightning over Caburn, and instantly Mozart went zigzag too. Modern life is a 
very  complicated  affair  –  why  not  some  sudden  revelation  of  the  meaning  of 
everything, one night? – I think it might happen. (D5: 96) 
 
Yet again, the weather seems to precipitate a comparison with the activity of the music. 
The lightning seems to visibly charge the night-sky and the performance of the Mozart 
too, making it ‘zigzag.’ Again, the experience of the music is described in terms of a  
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loss of form; the lightning surges through the atmosphere, and for a split second the 
Mozart  is  electrified  and  angularised,  form  becomes  sharp-edged  and  inconsistent 
instead of consistent and integrated. But significantly, this combination of the thunder 
and lightning  and the  performance  of  the  Mozart  seems  to  cause  Woolf  to  think  it 
possible  that  the  ‘meaning  of  everything’  might  be  revealed  in  a  sudden  flash  of 
inspiration that would  transcend the ‘very complicated affair’ of  ‘modern life.’  One 
might have thought that the lightning could have sufficed to illuminate the nature of the 
greater depths of meaning that Woolf imagines possible, and yet, the lightning on this 
occasion does not ‘light up’ in the revelatory sense. Lightning, this time, only makes 
things appear in distorted form in a brash blast of exaggerated colour. But again this 
particular letter makes it possible to see Menke’s ‘autonomous’ and ‘sovereign’ modes 
of experience at work. Music is both one experience amongst many, and at the same 
time, could be said to be considered a ‘sovereign’ form of experience which exceeds 
ordinary experience. 
The problem for modern aestheticians, and for criticism, has been the attempt to 
reconcile these two opposing modes of thoughts. But, in fact, what is required is not a 
reconciliation of the ‘autonomous’ and ‘sovereign’ modes of interpretation, but rather a 
preservation of their differences. This gives way to Menke’s interpretation of Adorno’s 
theory which claims that what is required is:  
 
An  adequate  conceptualisation  of  aesthetic  experience  [that]  must  avoid 
sacrificing  either  of  these  two  elements  whilst  simultaneously  finding  a 
comprehensive resolution of the tension between them. (Menke, 1998: viii) 
 
 
From a diary entry written in 1932, we read: 
 
 
To sit to Nessa; gay and debonair; to tie up parcels; to the Busch Quartet where I 
met Elena R. and reflected upon the transiency of human beauty, passion, and 
illusion; and so up to lunch. (D4: 77-8) 
 
 
Woolf’s attendance at the Busch Quartet concert is simply one thing amongst many, and 
yet, it is the catalyst for much deeper reflection on the ‘transienc[e] of human beauty, 
passion, and illusion’. But before any fuller explication of these terms is offered, Woolf 
cuts off her thought and announces that she went off to lunch. Typically, as we now 
know, Woolf’s tendency to resist broader philosophical development of her aesthetic  
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reflections was very common. It has been shown in previous chapters that this tendency 
supported the idea that music in Woolf functioned to sustain the irreconcilability of 
subjectivity. In this particular instance, it is possible to interpret her self-interruption as 
the presentation of the both sides of the autonomy/sovereignty interpretation. There is 
the  intimation  that  music  can  provide  access  to  a  realm  beyond  that  of  ordinary 
experience, and yet, the precise nature of either the means of access or the realm itself is 
never fully disclosed. 
Menke notes that this is a typically Modernist stance: ‘The modernity of aesthetic 
reflection is defined by this refusal to sacrifice either side of the antinomy, and indeed, 
by the insistence on granting full expression to both in all their mutual tension.’(Menke, 
1998: viii) Woolf’s musical marginalia work within this dynamic of mutual tension. But 
although this might be a typically Modernist stance, Menke explains that this notion of 
mutual tension has continued relevance for contemporary aesthetics. He does this by 
first explaining why having to choose between ‘autonomous’ and ‘sovereign’ modes of 
interpretation is no longer necessary. In fact, he goes so far as to suggest that anyone 
who claims that aesthetic experience can only be explained either in terms of autonomy 
or sovereignty is outdated and no longer relevant. These claims, he suggests, are typical 
of what has come to be called avant-garde and postmodern positions.  The survival of 
aesthetics, they argue, requires it to choose one or the other of the sides of the antinomy.   
The autonomous argument faces resistance from avant-gardists and postmodernists 
because  they  claim  that  differentiating  aesthetic  experience  from  non-aesthetic 
experiences  actually  reifies  aesthetic  experience  because  it  relies  on  a  nostalgic 
conception of a bourgeois ideal of aesthetic autonomy. An ideal, which it claims, ‘has 
been  definitively  overcome  by  […]  art  in  its  avant-garde  and  post  modern  forms.’ 
(Menke, 1998: ix) The second challenge to a nostalgic interpretation of the aesthetic 
antinomy  argues  that  art  cannot  be  sovereign  because  its  conception  of  aesthetic 
experience as something which exceeds and ultimately critiques reason is based on ‘a 
nostalgia  towards  idealistic  truth  claims,  which,  being  irredeemable  in  nonaesthetic 
terms, are projected on aesthetic experience.’ (Menke, 1998: ix) In this respect, aesthetic 
experience as sovereign faces the charge of overburdening art (Menke, 1998: ix). JM 
Bernstein puts it this way: 
 
If art is taken as lying outside truth and reason then if art speaks in its own voice it 
does not speak truthfully or rationally; while if one defends art from within the 
confines of the language of truth-only cognition one belies the claim that art is 
more truthful than truth-only cognition. (Bernstein, 1992: 2)   
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Bernstein recognises the problem of attempting to ground theoretical considerations 
of art from within the discourse of a philosophy which has traditionally concerned itself 
with the project of truth; a truth regarding the nature of the world and art, and our 
relation to this world. Historically, if art was considered as something that lies beyond 
the boundaries of our cognition, experience or rationality, or if art has been seen to pose 
a  challenge  to  certain  epistemologies  of  truth,  then  we  become  subject  to  a  ‘truth’ 
oriented task of aesthetics and, conversely, we face the pressure to locate art somewhere 
beyond the confines of a philosophical domain. 
However, Menke points out that the antimony model still has relevance so long as: 
 
It can be shown in detail that the apparent contradiction between these two terms 
can be resolved without illegitimate compromises: that is, that it is indeed possible 
to conceive of the autonomy and the sovereignty of art at one and the same time. 
(Menke, 1998: x)  
 
It appears, then, that what is required, if the two sides of this antinomy are to be 
preserved, is a kind of writing that allows both the autonomous and sovereign modes 
of aesthetic experience to be fully apparent, and yet, neither must be subordinate to 
the other. Woolf’s writing about music fulfils this particular condition. 
 
Aesthetic Negativity 
 
For Menke, a conceptual linking of the autonomous and sovereign discourses can be 
identified through the concept of aesthetic negativity. Aesthetic negativity, he claims, is 
central  to  Adorno’s  understanding  of  modern  art.  However,  Menke  suggests  that 
Adorno’s aesthetic negativity is badly defined, and thus, needs further clarification in 
order to see how it contributes to the autonomy/sovereignty debate. Although Adorno’s 
category of negativity in aesthetics is not defined precisely enough for Menke and lacks 
clarity, he does see it as ultimately capable of resolving the antinomy: 
 
For, when adequately conceived, aesthetic negativity is capable of achieving the 
twofold task: by reformulating the internal logic of aesthetic experience in its full 
scope, it gives force to the potential of aesthetic experience to provide a critique 
of reason without reshaping this experience to meet extrinsic ends. The concept of 
aesthetic negativity is the key to understanding the twofold definition of modern 
art  in  Adorno,  of  art  as  both  one  of  several  autonomous  discourses  and  a 
sovereign subversion of the rationality of all discourses. (Menke, 1998: xi).  
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Menke  argues  that  the  problem  left  to  modern  aesthetics  by  Adorno’s  concept  of 
aesthetic  negativity  can  be  best  addressed  by  a,  ‘systematic  reconstruction  of  this 
theory’s  basic  concepts…undertaken  and  in  light  of  other  theoretical  approaches.’ 
(Menke, 1998: xi) 
According  to  Menke,  Adorno’s  aesthetic  negativity  is  crucial  to  our  ability  to 
understand  works  of  art  as  autonomous.  Aesthetic  negativity  states  that  in  order  to 
understand the internal logic and coherence of a work of art, we have to view art in 
relation to everything that it is not, thus our negotiation of the aesthetic is mediated by 
the non-aesthetic. He goes on to suggest that there are two main aspects to Adorno’s 
negativity. The first example of aesthetic negativity stems from the view that art is a 
critique of all that is not art in social reality (social-critical). And the second instance of 
aesthetic  negativity  considers  that  art  is  a  domain  that  radically  intensifies  lived 
experience in relation to non-aesthetic experience (purist). Both instances of aesthetic 
negativity in some way reject the realm of the non-aesthetic, but in the case of the 
social-critical model, this rejection takes the form of critique. This is in opposition to 
the  purist  form  in  which  the  rejection  of  the  nonaesthetic  is  necessary  for  the 
intensification of experience. 
We can see examples of these instances of aesthetic negativity in two of Woolf’s 
letters, written in 1901 and 1902. The first extract is an example of the social-critical 
aspect of aesthetic negativity in which art is seen as a critique of all that is not art. She 
writes to Emma Vaughan on the 23 April, 1901: 
 
The only thing in this world is music – music and books and one or two pictures. I 
am going to found a colony where there shall be no marrying – unless you happen 
to fall in love with a symphony of Beethoven – no human element at all, except 
what comes through Art – nothing but ideal peace and endless meditation. (L1: 40) 
 
Woolf intimates that she wishes to leave behind the world as it is, and imagines a 
world defined by art. Art allows her to construct a Utopia liberated from the constraints 
of human interaction. Her critique of social reality leads her to the idealism of absolute 
art. But Woolf’s letter also seems to say more than the theoretical justification for such 
a comment. In providing us with an example of aesthetic negativity she also gives us an 
insight into her distaste for the ‘human element’ and her dislike of ‘marriage.’ In a later 
letter to Vita Sackville-West written in 1925, she writes: 
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This way of seeing people might be gigantically successful, and then your cousin 
[Eddy] has lent me his piano, and I intend to break up the human horror with 
music. (L3: 214)  
 
Woolf identifies art as a domain into which she could escape the unpleasantnesses of 
the world. She gives music the power to ‘break up the human horror’ as if it were really 
possible to achieve such a thing. Menke argues that this social-critical conception of 
aesthetic negativity is misleading because it suggests that art has the power to overcome 
the social reality from which it seeks to escape, ‘[This] misconception distinguishes art 
from  society  as  its  critical  negation;  in  doing  so,  it  implies  the  idea  of  potentially 
overcoming aesthetic difference.’ (Menke, 1998: 4) This is problematic because another 
assumption follows if we were to believe that art could achieve this overcoming: 
 
Art  brings  to  bear  potentialities,  capabilities  and  insights,  which,  though  still 
unrealised in society, can in principle remove themselves from the esoteric reality 
of the aesthetic and become incorporated into social relations. The equation of 
aesthetic  and  critical  negativity  occurs  within  the  framework  of  a  potential 
identity of that which is distinguished, art and society. (Menke, 1998: 4) 
 
In other words, this model of aesthetic negativity is based upon a separation of art 
and  society  that  art  could  potentially  and  ultimately  overcome.  However,  such  an 
overcoming  is  dependent  on  the  terms  provided  by  social  reality  and  on  art’s 
reintegration into the reality from which it  seeks to escape.  In other words, art and 
aesthetic experience remain trapped by the discourses belonging to the social reality 
they attempt to overcome or escape from.  
In summary then, the social-critical model of aesthetic negativity whereby reflection 
on aesthetic experience includes a critique of material reality, is conceptually flawed. It 
fails to account for its dependency on the already established ‘potentialities, capabilities 
and insights’ of reality, and secondly it does not provide an account of the ways in 
which  the  esoteric  aesthetic  world  could  ‘become  incorporated  (back)  into  social 
relations.’ (Menke, 1998: 4) 
The second example of aesthetic negativity, the purist conception, considers art to 
intensify lived experience. We can see intimations of this phenomenon in Woolf’s letter 
to Emma Vaughan from October 1902: 
 
The  Pianola  is  flourishing,  and  plays  after  dinner  till  the  other  side  (the 
Mackenzies, who only do hand playing) are vanquished. Really it is a wonderful 
machine – beyond a machine in that it lets your own soul flow thro’. (L1: 56)  
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In this extract, Woolf thinks of the pianola as an instrument which allows the human 
soul to express itself – lived experience is made more intense by the piano. ‘Normal’ 
life does not occasion such occurrences, but aesthetic experience does. The pianola is 
‘beyond a machine’, it is given powers greater than that of the natural world. Beyond its 
material  reality,  the  pianola  can  discern  movements  from  the  soul  and  is  able  to 
communicate them. Again, however, according to Menke, this conception of aesthetic 
experience  is  also  conceptually  flawed  because  it  makes  the  distinction  between 
aesthetic and non-aesthetic experiences insurmountable: 
 
In  contrast,  the  purist  understanding  of  aesthetic  negativity  insists  on  the 
insurmountability of the two. On this view, the intensification of lived experience 
that art promises retains its purity only through its indifference to social reality. 
Whereas  the  social-critical  misconception  conceives  of  aesthetic  difference  in 
terms of its potential surmountability, the purist model rigidly establishes it as 
representing a static unrelatedness of distinct spheres. (Menke, 1998: 4-5) 
 
 
One of the consequences of this examination of aesthetic negativity is the way in which 
it acts upon any original aesthetic pleasure. Subjecting art and aesthetic experience to 
such involved theoretical intricacies could be said to take away from considering art as 
merely  something  to  appreciate  or  enjoy.  Woolf’s  remarks  about  music,  albeit 
conceptually inconsistent, retain the sense that she got enormous pleasure from musical 
encounters.  Her  writing  does  not  relinquish  pleasure  for  the  sake  of  an  intellectual 
posture. Whilst many of the aesthetic priorities of Woolf’s contemporaries may have 
been changing from a dependence on the concept of Kantian aesthetic pleasure and 
disinterestedness to a more Modernist rejection of aesthetic enjoyment, Woolf’s musical 
marginalia are odd in the respect that she maintained a more conventional attitude to 
music’s capacity to arouse pleasure. Menke points out that the social-critical model of 
aesthetic negativity in particular comes to distort pleasure because its frame of reference 
is always that of critique and, as such pleasure remains subject to moral judgement: 
 
This  demonstrates  that  in  Adorno’s  social-critical  understanding  of  aesthetic 
negativity aesthetic pleasure can only be understood – whether it be rejected or 
accepted – at the price of being subsumed under moral judgement: either it is 
rejected for obscuring the true task of art – which is to indict present social ills – 
or it is accepted as an anticipation of a future reconciliation of those ills. (Menke, 
1998: 8) 
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Woolf’s writing avoids this problem because she relies so heavily on the temporality of 
aesthetic experience, and thus the category of pleasure becomes subject to the vagaries 
of the material world. Importantly, this corresponds to Menke’s argument that one of 
the  ways  Adorno  avoids  the conceptual  deficiencies  of the  social-critical  and purist 
models is by arguing for the ‘processuality of aesthetic experience against the purist 
conception  and  the  importance  of  aesthetic  pleasure  against  the  social-critical 
conception.’ (Menke, 1998: 6)  
 
Processuality 
 
The idea of processuality is extremely important, not just to this chapter and aesthetic 
negativity, but to the notion of the essayistic spirit, to Woolf’s musical marginalia, and 
to  this  dissertation’s  larger  concern  with  the  discourse  of  criticism.  The  theory  of 
processuality stipulates that aesthetic pleasure is not derived from a direct encounter 
with the object, rather pleasure comes from the ‘reflective recourse or return’ to the 
experience of the object: 
 
Accordingly,  aesthetic  pleasure  should  never  be  thought  of  as  a  direct  or 
unmediated response or reaction; instead it always refers to that which occurs in 
aesthetically experiencing an object. As such, this connection between aesthetic 
pleasure  and  aesthetic  experience  further  construes  aesthetic  experience 
essentially as a process. Aesthetic pleasure arises in reflection not on what the 
individual contents of the experience are, but rather on what happens during the 
process of their becoming aesthetic experiences. (Menke, 1998: 13)  
 
It  seems  vital to acknowledge  that  our  own aesthetic  pleasure is  never  unmediated. 
Pleasure arises from the fact of its arising in the face of an object. To this end, Woolf is 
exemplary in that she remains faithful to the process of aesthetic pleasure. Furthermore, 
as has been shown, essayism is precisely the form of writing that allows this process to 
remain visible. The essay allows the essayist to document ‘what happens during the 
process of their becoming aesthetic experiences.’ (Menke, 1998:13) 
With  the  theory  of  processuality,  aesthetic  negativity  is  freed  from  the  purist 
misconception, which deems all aesthetic experience as superior to reality, because it 
makes  the  condition  of  aesthetic  pleasure  dependent  on  an  unstable  formulation  of 
aesthetic experience. If we accept that aesthetic experience is a retrospective activity, 
then  we  deny  ourselves  the  possibility  of  speaking  with  any  authority  about  the 
sovereign nature of art. If aesthetic experience relies on the transition from reality to art,  
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then  art  cannot  be  granted  the  autonomy  to  intensify  our  experience,  nor  can  it  be 
granted the complete separation from the reality on which it relies. 
Woolf’s  writing  supports  the  idea  that  aesthetic  experience  is  unstable  and  is 
constructed from a retrospective position. This has been shown already in this work 
when the idea of the Common Reader was explored in the second chapter. However, we 
also have the following diary entry from Wednesday, 7 May 1919 which demonstrates 
the capturing of aesthetic experience retrospectively: 
 
They were going to hear Bertie lecture; but I preferred the songsters of Trafalgar 
Square. The steps  of the column were built up, pyramid fashion,  with elderly 
respectable householders grasping sheets of music, which they rendered, in time 
to a conductor on a chair beneath, with great precision. It was Life Boat day and 
the elderly people were singing sailor’s chanties and Tom Bowling. This seemed 
to me a very amusing and instructive spectacle; and being famished for music, I 
could not get past, but stood and felt thrilled with an absurd visionary excitement; 
and walked over Hungerford Bridge making up stories. (D1: 270) 
55  
 
In this particular instance, Woolf does not separate art from reality, nor does she 
grant it autonomy through the intensification of her experience, rather she binds art and 
reality together by noting that the music she heard prompted her to invent stories whilst 
she walked over the Hungerford Bridge. She also makes reference to the way the elderly 
people held their sheets of music and the chair upon which the conductor was sitting. 
She is referring to the very real things that were taking place, she is not making recourse 
to rarefied artistic spirit. Her aesthetic experience is also unstable in that it does not just 
occur in the temporal reality of the music playing, but rather it continues to exist long 
after  the  music  has  played  by  virtue  of  the  stories  she  makes  up,  retrospectively 
constructing another experience. By dealing with what is actually happening, Woolf 
avoids subjugating aesthetic pleasure to the conceptual problems of the social-critical 
and purist conceptions of aesthetic negativity. Menke puts it this way: 
 
The concept of aesthetic negativity gains another defining quality: “negativity” 
designates  the  structural  principle  of  an  experiential  process,  the  reflection  of 
which  produces  aesthetic  pleasure,  and  which  is  oriented  toward  the  aesthetic 
spirit of a representation.  (Menke, 1998: 16) 
 
                                                
55 The diary notes that ‘Lifeboat day was marked by entertainment in Trafalgar Square organized by the 
League of Arts and consisting of Morris dancing and folk songs by a choir of 500 voices. ‘Tom Bowling’ is 
a nautical song by Charles Dibdin dating from the late 18th century.’ 
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Woolf’s essayistic spirit seems to tie in very neatly with Adorno’s rejection of the 
Kantian understanding of aesthetic experience as the embodiment of artistic spirit. This 
turn  away  from  the  spirit  of  the  art  work  marks  a  fundamental  shift  in  the  way 
contemporary aesthetics has come to conceive of aesthetic experience because it works 
on  one of the concepts that has come to  define how we engage  with works of  art, 
namely that of representation. Menke: 
 
To define aesthetic experience as the experience of the spirit of an artwork is to 
take  it  to  be  the  comprehension  of  a  representation  (of  something).  Such  a 
comprehension  as  representation  can  also  be  called  the  interpretation  or 
understanding (Verstehen) of a work of art. The negativity of aesthetic experience 
is related to this in the following way: aesthetic experience negates the possibility 
of the interpretive comprehension of an artwork as the embodiment of its spirit. 
This raises the question as to how negative aesthetic experience experiences its 
object, if not interpretively as a representation of its spirit. (Menke, 1998: 16-17) 
 
In order to answer this question, Adorno turned his attention to the artwork’s letters 
or literalness, and thus makes a negative relation to the possibility of interpreting the 
work through its spirit. Reflections on representation and interpretation are familiar in 
Woolf’s work also and appear, for example, in ‘Mr Kipling's Notebook’ from Books 
and  Portraits:  Literary and  Biographical  Writings  in  which  Woolf  queries  how  we 
might match up the things in the world to the words we have at our disposal. According 
to Woolf, representation is one of the conditions of reality, for things cannot truly exist 
unless they are properly described. She comments on a young writer’s desperate search 
for the right representation of descriptions that are dutifully recorded in the form of a 
notebook that contains an endless list of 'maimed objects-half-realized trees, streams 
that are paralytic in their flow’ (BP: 63) The simple act of word-choosing becomes 
immediately problematic for Woolf's writer who believes that this tree or this stream 
cannot have any life, cannot really be there, until the words that justify the beauty, or 
the ugliness of the thing, are found.  She describes the process of matching the word to 
the thing, of concept to object, as a task which becomes not only an act of judgement 
but also an act of discernment, of decision, and of evaluation. One cannot describe, for 
example,  the  winter  sun  in  any  old  way,  one  is  compelled  to  almost  re-realise  the 
experience of that sun in words. It is as if the sensory experience of that sun must be 
reconstituted by the very words that write it down. However, Woolf comments that this 
is, in fact, the incorrect way to proceed in writing literature, and that, much as the act of 
describing the object gives us some indication of the nature of the thing, it cannot lead  
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us to the truth or the spirit of the object or the landscape etc. She implies that descriptive 
precision is methodologically naive and is akin to a practice that relies on the entries in 
one's  notebook.  Her  critique  of  Kipling's  work  is  based  on  the  suggestion  that  his 
writing adopts this very practice. She accuses Kipling of being unreadable precisely 
because his endless note taking prohibits the process of reading: 
 
All notebook literature produces the same effect of fatigue and obstacle, as if there 
dropped across the path of the mind some block of alien matter which must be 
removed or assimilated before one can go on with the true process of reading. The 
more vivid the note the greater the obstruction. (BP: 64)  
 
Woolf argues for the kind of sentence that does the work of note-taking. In other 
words, the sentence must contain within it traces of the process of note-taking, but must 
not itself be in the form of the note. Her point is twofold; first, she suggests that note-
taking which is subsequently turned into a form of literature is deeply unsatisfying for 
the reader, and merely results in the impossibility of a continuous or unified text. She 
calls into being a type of writing that may or may not have engaged in plenteous note-
taking 'behind the scenes', as it were, in which the work of thinking has taken place 
already,  so  that  the  sentence  which  is  finally  produced  carries  within  it  all  the 
perturbations of thought. 
Woolf’s musical marginalia contain the kind of sentences that she identifies as those 
which could offer a solution to the problems of representation. The notes on music are 
not  finished  prose,  but  they  manage  to  draw  such  precise  and  pointed  observations 
about musical experience that one cannot deny that a certain amount of crafting had 
taken place beforehand. This is not to say that this element of pre-thought contradicts or 
impedes the immediacy of Woolf’s remarks about music, but rather, we get the sense 
that  she  is  always  very  self-conscious  about  the  form  that  these  observations  take. 
Woolf’s note-taking responds to the reality of a musical experience as it happens, and in 
doing so she is faithful to the unstable and fleeting nature of aesthetic experience. Her 
notes do not try to represent the spirit of musical works, rather she responds to the the 
literal facts of the entire experience. This kind of essayistic writing omits nothing about 
the musical encounter, the essayist does not conceal any aspect of experience, rather this 
kind of writing preserves the experience by representing it in its aesthetic entirety. In 
other  words,  essayism  does  not  interpret  the  experience  and  consign  it  to  symbolic 
representation, rather it reads the experience like a text, and, by reading it aesthetically, 
it is able to recreate qualities of that experience in writing.   
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Take, for example, the following letter Woolf writes to Roger Fry in 1923 about one 
of her many outings to the opera, which has been mentioned before but which can be 
examined from another angle: 
 
Two  nights  ago  I  went  to  the  Opera  with  Saxon  [Sydney-Turner];  both  in 
attenuated evening dress, for he takes stalls. There was Sir Claude Philips
56, Mrs 
Norman  Grosvenor;  Mrs  Strep; and  so  on  and  so  on. We  had  a  divine  Bach, 
Phoebus and Pan; towards the end of which, with the lights still low, that old goat 
Sir Claude, only kept by the tightness of his white waistcoat from gushing entrails 
all over the carpet, took it into his head to leave. The whole audience saw him 
move down the gangway. Suddenly he disappeared. There was a sound of coal 
sacks,  bounding  and  rebounding.  Then  dead  silence.  He  had  fallen  down  a 
complete set of stairs; but is not hurt. (D3: 40) 
 
 
Here, Woolf mentions the music in passing, using only ‘divine’ to describe it, but it is 
the description of Sir Claude Philips’ unfortunate exit that is captivating. Her vivid, 
grotesque  picture  of  ‘gushing  entrails’,  and  the  short,  punchy  account  of  his 
disappearance, followed by ‘then dead silence’ lend her story drama and humour that 
one can only imagine she had experienced at the hands of the ‘divine Bach.’ Her writing, 
therefore, appears to remain faithful to the ‘processuality’ of aesthetic experience. As a 
consequence, and in part as a solution to the antinomy of autonomy and sovereignty, 
Woolf avoids subsuming aesthetic experience to either notion because she fails to fully 
separate art from reality, and thus music cannot be seen to truly intensify experience. 
Furthermore,  she  cannot  separate  it  from  the  reality  in  which  music  occurs,  thus  it 
cannot be seen to be sovereign.  
Whilst  it  can  be  seen  that  Woolf  preserves  the  ‘literal’  character  of  the  musical 
experience, and that this in turn is one way of avoiding the problem of autonomy and 
sovereignty, there is a further caveat worth addressing around the precise distinction 
between the spirit, the letter and the work of art. According to Menke, Adorno realises 
that the project of aesthetic literalness leaves itself vulnerable to a misinterpretation if 
we take it that literalness is perceived in direct opposition to the work’s spirit. The 
charge that can be wagered against literalness is one of positivism if we take it that the 
aesthetic object is ‘indistinguishable from…its literal comprehension.’ (Menke, 1998: 
18) In other words, if we assume that the work of art is only what it is, devoid of any 
spirit and any representation then we deny the work the possibility of being interpreted 
aesthetically,  because  all  the  work  would  constitute  would  be  the  presentation  of 
                                                
56 Diary notes that Sir Claude Philips was an art critic.  
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objective facts. So, in fact, it becomes clear that to abstractly separate the art work’s 
letters and spirit would be to fundamentally obscure the task of aesthetics. Menke notes 
that the danger of ending up with a positivist argument led Adorno to reject the notion 
of  aesthetic  literalness  altogether  unless  it  can  be  configured  in  such  a  way  that 
preserves the inter-relationship between letter and spirit. Menke: 
 
The attempt to save aesthetic literalness by means of the abstract negation of the 
aesthetic spirit is itself premised on a false understanding of their relationship: 
spirit  and  letter  can  abstractly  negate  each  other  only  if  they  are  taken  to  be 
unrelated  to  one  another.  In  this  way  however,  the  postulate  of  literal 
comprehension  suffers  from  the  same  prejudice  as  its  opponent,  traditional 
hermeneutics, which seeks to comprehend in isolation the spirit embodied in the 
letter through acts of symbolic interpretation. There is a correspondence between 
the cult of the surface of the aesthetic letter and that of the depths of the aesthetic 
spirit. Both of them divide that which, as the aesthetic, can only be conceived of 
in its interconnectedness. (Menke, 1998: 19) 
 
 
The point about Virginia Woolf’s musical marginalia is that, by virtue of the fact that 
Woolf is a writer, and by virtue of the fact that her musical writing embodies what we 
have termed the essayistic spirit, she represents the point at which the aesthetic spirit 
and the art work’s literalness come together. Her musical marginalia are an example of 
the interconnectedness of the characteristics of the aesthetic object and the expression of 
the ideas they represent.  
The claim that Woolf’s writing could embody a type of criticism that preserves both 
the spirit and the literalness of the art work can be supported if we examine how Menke 
treats Kant’s concept of the aesthetic spirit. He claims that Kant’s definition has two 
aspects.  In  the  first  instance,  spirit  is  used  in  terms  of  the  ‘genius’  of  aesthetic 
production, and in the second instance, spirit is used to define the precise contents of the 
aesthetic object. The two aspects are related, though: 
 
In this way, aesthetic spirit – understood as the ability of the genius to “create, as 
it were, another nature” – is not the productive power of the imagination set free 
and on its own, but only that imagination able to represent or express its ideas. 
(Menke, 1998: 19)  
 
Kant states in the Critique of Judgement: 
 
The second talent is properly the one we call spirit. For in order to express what is 
ineffable in the mental state accompanying a certain representation and to make it 
universally communicable…we need an ability to apprehend  the imagination’s  
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rapidly passing play and to unite it in a concept that can be communicated without 
the constraint of rules. (Kant, 2007: 120) 
 
Woolf’s  writing  about  music  responds  profoundly  to  the  idea  of  making  the 
‘ineffable…universally communicable’ in such a way that allows the co-existence of 
both the work’s spirit and its literalness. Take, for example, the following letter she 
writes to Violet Dickinson in 1906: 
 
I have been having a debauch of music and hearing certain notes to which I could 
be wed – pure simple notes – smooth from all passion and frailty, and flawless as 
gems. I read then, and feel beauty swell like ripe fruit within my palm: I hear 
music woven from the azure skeins of air; and gazing into deep pools skimmed 
with the Italian veil I see youth and melancholy walking hand in hand. (L1: 263) 
 
 
Her description of the musical notes as ‘flawless as gems’ is a vividly imaginative 
way of describing the sound, and by transforming an ineffable quality of the music by 
virtue  of  the  image  of  a  gemstone,  she  makes  that  ineffable  quality  universally 
communicable.  Her  expression  responds  to  the  mysterious  nature  of  the  particular 
characteristics of a musical sound. It seems plausible that anybody, whether or not they 
are an expert in musical matters, could relate to and could recognise the idea of the 
music  sounding  as  smooth  and  flawless  as  a  gemstone.  In  other  words,  Woolf’s 
representation of the musical gesture takes nothing away from- and in fact perhaps adds 
to- the work’s spirit.  
According to Menke, then, the goal for aesthetics is to preserve the antinomies latent 
in the aesthetic autonomy/sovereignty debate. What is needed, therefore, is a form of 
criticism that transforms the way we think about and articulate aesthetic experience. 
Such  a  model  of  criticism  regards  aesthetic  experience  as  neither  autonomous  nor 
sovereign, but rather, it is a form of criticism that is resistant to the sovereignty of 
synthesis. And what I mean by this is that we need a form of writing about aesthetic and 
cultural experiences that remains faithful to the non-signifying element of experience; to 
the  part  of  our  experience  that  means  nothing,  that  has  no  value  and  that  is  not 
remarkable. This is important, and conceptually logical, because it reinterprets Adorno’s 
claims about the synthesis of the art work and the paratactical nature of a response to an 
art work: 
 
In themselves, artworks ineluctably pursue nature-dominating reason by virtue of 
their element of unity, which organises the whole. But through the disavowal of  
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real  domination  this  principle  returns  transformed,  truncated,  in  a  shadowy 
fashion, to put it metaphorically, which is perhaps the only way to describe it. 
Reason in artworks is reason in gesture: they synthesize like reason, but not with 
concepts, propositions, and syllogisms – where these forms occur in art they do so 
only as subordinated means – rather they do so by way of what transpires in the 
artworks. Their synthetic function is immanent; it is the unity of their self, without 
immediate relation to anything external given or determined in some way or other; 
it is directed to the dispersed, the aconceptual, quasi-fragmentary material with 
which in their interior space artworks are occupied. (AT: 387) 
 
As has been shown thus far, and as I intend to show more fully in the following 
conclusion, Woolf’s writing about music satisfies much of the criteria for this model of 
criticism. This can be seen in a number of ways. Firstly, her recourse to non-masterful 
criticism; both in the way that she does not over-determine experiences, and in the way 
that she ‘fictionalises’ past events as seen through the figure of the Common Reader, 
allows the non-signifying particularity of experience to remain intact. In addition to this, 
we have seen how the discourse of essayism, by remaining faithful to the ‘process’ of 
experience, and by refusing to conform to the expectations of academic rhetoric and 
logical  argument,  gives  us  an  account  of  music  that  is  authentic,  as  opposed  to  a 
synthesized rendering of the art-work and the ensuing experience. It was also shown 
that  Woolf  responded  to  another,  potentially  synthesizing  discourse  surrounding  the 
legacy of Romantic ideals about music, by deflating symbolic excess through the use of 
humour. And finally, I have tried to show in this chapter that Woolf’s writing sustains 
and preserves the antinomy of aesthetic autonomy and sovereignty, but also clarifies the 
relationship  between  the  two  by  making  the  ineffable  universally  communicable 
without fundamentally destroying the unique and inexpressive elements of experience.  
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Conclusion 
 
The  intention  of  this  doctoral  dissertation  has  been  to  instigate  a  series  of 
salvagings  of  Virginia Woolf’s  writings  on music  via  T.W.  Adorno’s theory  of  the 
aesthetic. In the course of this study, certain problems associated with the writing of 
music criticism have also been identified and addressed.  
  Criticism can appear to be a hybrid or unconstrained discursive practice, surviving 
at  the interstices  of  an enormous  range  of  styles and  intellectual traditions, such  as 
journalism, the novel, philosophy, academic writing and the memoir. I argued that it is 
possible to show that criticism enjoys a common origin with these other practices by 
virtue of a specifically Romantic and post-Hegelian set of questions and priorities which 
are  concerned  with  the  truthful  understanding  of  the  world,  experience  and  the 
development of human consciousness.   
In addition to the difficulties imposed on it through the philosophy of judgement 
(reflective judgements are produced freely, without rules), music criticism must also 
contend with the perceived lack of clear semantic content in music. Music criticism 
tends to traffic musical impressions without unambiguous reference to textual materials. 
This throws the linguistic strategy of music criticism into peculiar relief.    
It  is therefore sometimes  difficult to determine the precise object of criticism; 
whether it is the score, the work, the performance, the concert environment, members of 
the  audience,  or  the  content  of  the  critic’s  own  imagination.  In  practice  however, 
criticism does not need to decide between these objects.  
For Woolf, criticism, as a form of writing, must also be good writing. Woolf’s 
musical marginalia have been shown to be philosophically robust and demonstrate an 
experiential  depth  and  fidelity.  And  these  characteristics  provide  content  for  the 
adjective ‘good.’ Moreover, via the technique of parataxis, they are stylistically rich. 
Woolf’s musical marginalia can be considered exemplary of a New Paradigm in music 
writing.    
To re-iterate, then, it was found that one of the most pressing problems concerning 
the writing of music criticism appears to be the sheer number of disparate schools of 
thought that could consider themselves to engaging in what might be termed 'music 
criticism'.  In  other  words,  there  exists  no  absolute  definition  of  the  term  ‘music 
criticism’, and to that end, the second chapter of this dissertation attempted to explore a  
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general taxonomy of music criticism. By looking at the development of the discourse of 
musical criticism diachronically, and by re-reading Simon Jarvis’s article ‘An Undeleter 
for Criticism’, I then argued, as Jarvis does, that what was needed was a renewal of the 
field of music criticism. This need arises from not just the lack of a stable meaning of 
music criticism (the acquisition of which would not reveal anything other than a starting 
point  for  reflection),  but  from  the  desire  to  understand  and  realize  the  persistent 
conceptual antinomies that have come to characterise the discourse of criticism. Using 
the example of Subotnik’s appeal to a musical-critical writing that avoided, or was at 
least aware of, the lure towards technical or analytical ‘mastery’, I tried to show that 
Virginia  Woolf’s  writing  about  music  could  be  said  to  be  non-masterful.  Only  by 
relinquishing the need to possess and to master and to make mean, will it be possible to 
release the political potential of aesthetic reflection. This idea has been supported with 
evidence  from  Woolf’s  essays  and  musical  marginalia  in  which  it  was  shown  that 
aesthetic experience was constituted negatively, that is, without systematic analysis or 
interpretation. 
The fourth chapter  of this  dissertation outlined some  of the main theoretical and 
philosophical issues that arise when we consider the form of the essay. I concentrated 
on the philosophy of the essay as outlined most dramatically by Adorno who examined 
various aspects of the essay including style, subject, the epistemological concerns of the 
essay  and  also,  lastly,  the  literary  aspect  of  the  essay.  It  was  shown  that  precise 
definitions of the essay are seldom found in much of the literature on the essay, and in a 
sense this inability to be defined is perhaps the closest thing the essay gets to formal 
definition. This indeterminate aspect of the essay was considered important for a model 
of  criticism  that  seeks  to  remain  faithful  to  those  indeterminate,  fugitive  aspects  of 
experience. Adorno’s essay formed a backdrop to this chapter primarily because from it, 
it is possible to discern a distinct intellectual development that articulates a relation 
between the form of the essay and the practice of critique. It was shown that Adorno 
(and Lukács) explores the essay’s potential to symbolise the ultimate tool of a critical 
consciousness.  But,  as Claire  de  Obaldia  notes,  there  is  one  distinct  difference  that 
separates Adorno and Lukács’s essays on the essay that is perhaps indicative of the 
intellectual  shift  from  nineteenth  century  German  idealism  to  the  more  fragmented, 
political concerns of twentieth century critique:  
 
The shift from man’s (the human soul’s) ‘struggle toward the absolute’ to ‘man’s 
relationship to the world in its historical reality’, and thus ‘the definition of forms  
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dictated by an awareness of historical and sociological ties between art, history 
and society rather then purely subjective idealism’, will occur a few years later in 
his (Lukács’s) Theory of the Novel. In contradistinction, the awareness of these 
ties  determines  every  aspect  of  Adorno’s  essay  on  the  essay:  the  essentially 
critical quality of the genre is inseparable from its counter-ideological motivation, 
that is, from its challenge of the status quo and of the doxa as examined in the 
context of Montaigne. (de Obaldia, 1995: 99) 
 
The counter-ideological potential of the essay form I consider to be one of the most 
important ideas for the purposes of this dissertation, and I tried to show that Virginia 
Woolf’s essays successfully negotiate the relationship  between the aesthetic and the 
cognitive that is at the heart of the essay’s critical potential. 
Chapter Five discussed the social historical context of Woolf’s life in Bloomsbury, 
and showed how her exposure to the dialogic nature of the Bloomsbury Group’s artistic 
and intellectual discussions supported the notion of the essayistic spirit. I then explored 
a  more  general  social  history  of  musical  life in  Britain at the turn  of the  twentieth 
century so as to gain insight into the entirety of an age defined somewhat by the tension 
between  tradition  and  progress.  This  included  examining  the  concept  of  Bildung  to 
show  that,  in  an  Edwardian  society,  there  was  still  the  belief  that  music  had  some 
general capacity to ‘improve’ a person’s character. At the end of the fifth chapter I 
argued  that  the  use  of  humour  in  Virginia  Woolf’s  writings  about  music  was  an 
effective way of countering the potentially overbearing way of articulating a musical 
encounter. Moreover, it was shown that Woolf’s humourous appraisals of the musical 
customs  and  people  she  encountered  allowed  her  to  gently  critique  the  social  and 
cultural ideologies surrounding musical consumption and performance.    
In Chapter Six, I explored a more theoretical reading of the way in which Woolf’s 
work contributes to this discussion on criticism and this was done by looking at the 
problem of aesthetic autonomy and sovereignty in recent aesthetic theory. It was shown 
that Woolf’s writing remained faithful to the experience of music because it preserved 
the antinomy of aesthetic autonomy and sovereignty without destroying any aspect of 
the original experience. This chapter also argued for the importance of ‘processuality’ in 
the articulation of aesthetic experience; an idea that can also be directly linked to the 
discourse on essayism.  
In this concluding chapter I will now continue to theoretically develop the notion of a 
mode of critical writing that bears witness to the problem of synthesis, as outlined by 
Adorno in Aesthetic Theory. As I have shown in this dissertation, Adorno’s seminal 
work  continues  to  be  one  of  the  most  important  texts  in  recent  philosophical  and  
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aesthetic scholarship, and his reflection upon the apparent wane in interest in the study 
of aesthetics proves particularly useful in assessing the problems of criticism. In the 
‘Draft Introduction’, Adorno comments on a number of complexities that arise from the 
consideration  of  the  relationship  between  philosophy  and  aesthetics.  According  to 
Adorno, as we have seen,  one of  the  problems  that characterises the philosophy/art 
debate  stems  from  the  conceptualising  tendencies  of  philosophy  and  the  resulting 
difficulty with which we may speak of an aesthetics that is free from the subsuming 
inclinations of philosophy: 
 
After the demise of idealistic systems, the difficulty of an aesthetics that would be 
more than a desperately reanimated branch of philosophy is that of bringing the 
artist’s closeness to the phenomena into conjunction with a conceptual capacity 
free of any subordinating concept, free of all decreed judgement; committed to the 
medium of concepts, such an aesthetics would go beyond a mere phenomenology 
of artworks. (AT: 422) 
 
To put it more clearly, Adorno argues that one of the difficulties of dealing with the 
discourse  of  aesthetics  and  criticism  is  that  it  inevitably  adopts  the  vocabulary  of 
philosophy, and thus, becomes indebted to a conceptual language that seeks to subsume 
artworks under generalising concepts. He argues that one of the problems facing the 
discipline of aesthetics is that its interpretation of its object of study is conditioned by 
theories  that  define  that  object,  thus,  aesthetics  becomes  caught  up  in  certain 
philosophical theories of knowledge: 
 
There is a double reason for this pluralism of aesthetic theories, which are often 
even left  unfinished:  It  resides  on the one  hand  in the fundamental  difficulty, 
indeed  impossibility,  of  gaining  access  to  art  by  means  of  a  system  of 
philosophical categories, and on the other, in the fact that aesthetic statements 
have traditionally presupposed theories of knowledge. The problematic of theories 
of knowledge returns directly in aesthetics, because how aesthetics interprets its 
objects depends on the concept of the object held by the theory of knowledge. 
(AT: 422) 
 
The philosophy of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century sought to conceptualise 
art  in  ‘universals’.  The  philosophy  of  Kant  and  Hegel  could  officially  speak  of 
aesthetics,  without  really  ever  talking  about  art,  because  they  believed  that  general 
concepts could speak on art’s behalf:  
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Hegel and Kant were the last who, to put it bluntly, were able to write major 
aesthetics without understanding anything about art. That was possible so long as 
art  itself  was  oriented  to  encompassing  norms  that  were  not  questioned  in 
individual works and were liquefied only in the work’s immanent problematic. 
(AT: 424) 
Adorno  argues  that  it  was  possible  for  philosophy  to  conceptualise  art  because 
philosophy and art had not yet been ‘torn apart’. They existed within the realm of spirit, 
they could refer to one another because they were like one another, philosophy could 
talk ‘substantially’ about art, without ‘surrendering itself to the works’ (AT: 424) 
The conceptualising tendency of philosophical aesthetics remains problematic for the 
domain of criticism. By subordinating aesthetic experience to the domain of universal 
concepts, criticism then too faces the charge of being burdened by the pursuit of the 
objective  ‘truth’  of the art work or experience. For Adorno, and for aesthetics, one 
solution  appears  if  we  resist  the  temptation  to  talk  about  works  of  art  in  their 
universality,  and  instead  concentrate  on  the  specificity  of  individual  works.  The 
historical  universal  determinations  of  art  were  therefore  incompatible  with  its  non-
identity. That way out for Adorno, was of course, dialectics: 
Aesthetic dialectics is not to presuppose a metaphysics of spirit, which in Hegel as 
in Fichte was to guarantee that the individual, with which induction begins, and 
the universal, which provides the basis for deduction, are one. (AT: 436)  
 
Non-identity requires us to think that reality is determinately negated by the spirit of 
the artwork. This spirit represents the opposite of our empirical experiences. If it is the 
spirit  of  artworks  that  represents  the  negation  of  our  social  reality,  the  determinate 
negation of empirical life, our material existence, then it must also be that the work is to 
be considered dialectically, because whilst the work of art embodies spirit, it in no way 
possesses  or  presents  spirit  absolutely,  the  work  represents  a  “crystalisation”  of  the 
process between spirit and its other. Adorno claims that for Hegel, the truth of spirit was 
the objectivity of the artwork, that is to say, the ability of the work of art to embody 
aspects  of  its  otherness,  and  its  otherness  is  the  empirical  world  around  it.  In  this 
instance, Hegel’s emphasis on spirit means that, ‘it is spirit that has gone over to its own 
otherness and become identical with itself. For Hegel, spirit is one with totality, also 
with the totality in art.’ (AT: 437) This suggests then that for spirit to achieve identity 
with itself, it must pass over to its own otherness, it must recognise and confront its  
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negation, and in this case the negation of spirit is accessed through the objectivity of the 
artwork. However, spirit is recognised as being only one aspect of the artwork, as we 
have  noted earlier,  and the  problem  for  criticism  deepens  when  we  look at  how to 
represent  an  experience  or  an  object  without  believing  that  concepts  can  reveal 
everything about that experience or object, ‘The content (Gehalt) of art does not reduce 
without  remainder  into  the  idea,  rather,  this  content  is  the  extrapolation  of  what  is 
irreducible.’ (AT: 170) 
The question of meaning and of the truth content of an aesthetic experience or a work 
of art is bound up also with the idea of an absolute or an ideal. The question that is 
asked of a work- 'what does it mean?' also asks questions about notions of truth content 
and absolutes. The telos of this question commits the work to the discourse of idealism 
and imposes on it specific and well-rehearsed conceptualities. That the question is even 
possible seems to suggest that the artwork is capable of an answer, thus, such questions 
of meaning and truth content guide the work towards certain conclusions. The fact that 
experience has a kind of coherence in itself, that no experience is without a coherence of 
sorts, implies that the truth content or meaning can be revealed by interrogating this 
coherence. And even if experience appears incomplete and ill-drawn, criticism remains 
a slave to the idea of completeness. Only in its total lack of regard for, and in ignorance 
of, this teleological burden, can criticism be authentic. 
  The way of escaping this teleological burden for Adorno, involves bringing to the 
fore ideas of parataxis and non-identity; and here we see the link between Adorno’s 
work  in  Aesthetic  Theory,  Woolf’s  critical  writing  and  the  domain  of  criticism. 
Parataxis and non-identity connect most profoundly with the practice of writing. Critical 
writing, as a form of paraliterature, is also heir to the problems of literary determination 
and thus criticism must reflect its relationship to the work of art's logicality and mimetic 
power. It becomes apparent then, that what is required is a form of criticism that is 
strongly  invested  in  (and  aware  of  the  limits  of)  a  theoretical  and  philosophical 
vocabulary but which is also a form of art in itself. This would allow criticism to be a 
form of writing which bears witness to experience, to the practice of thought and to the 
act of creating.  
  But what else can we say about this kind of criticism? And why in particular have 
I argued that Virginia Woolf’s work serves as an example of the kind of criticism that 
fulfils these criteria? One answer to these questions comes by examining the work done 
by Maurice Blanchot (mentioned earlier in this dissertation) in The Space of Literature  
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from 1955
57. The reason I have chosen Blanchot is that his work too is strongly invested 
in the discourse of Hegelian philosophy. This investment is crucial because Blanchot 
devotes much attention in The Space of Literature to the relationship between death and 
writing, and constitutes death and writing as a comment on Hegelian negativity. In the 
fourth chapter there are no less than six sections devoted to a philosophical account of 
death; 'The Work and Death's Space', 'Death as Possibility', 'Rilke and Death's Demand: 
1. The Search for a Proper Death 2. Death's Space 3. Death's Transmutation'. It may 
strike the reader that a continued reference to the concept of death is unnecessarily or 
provocatively pathological, but in fact this critical discussion of death represents the 
crucial link between Blanchot and the tradition of German philosophy to which he is so 
intimately bound. In its wider aspect, Blanchot's conception of death can be taken as 
pure negativity in an Adornoian sense, and as the negativity which impels his dialectic 
forwards through history, through art and through humanity. Blanchot sees death not 
just as the annihilation of being, or the end of existence, but as a creative and, indeed, 
life-giving  force  that  penetrates  through  and  contributes  to  existence.  Non-being, 
absence, or that which is simply 'not' is not an empty space or a nothingness, but is an 
otherness or an 'outside' of what is already there. Blanchot's concern with non-being 
allows him to discover a movement, or an inner logic, within the concept of death that 
transforms the potential bleakness of non-being into something powerful. Let it be said 
too though, that Blanchot's treatment of the concept of death, in the philosophical sense, 
is also a critique of the practice of writing, and, as such, can be described as an example 
of a theoretically invested 'style' of criticism. 
Blanchot frequently refers to the 'abyss of non-being' in order to locate within that 
abyss a force that connects it to the domain of being, to existence and to the act of 
writing.  This connection is also a continuity between that which is and that which is not. 
Negativity, in this philosophical sense, is not to be taken as scepticism or pessimism but 
rather  as  an  integrated  and  integral  element  of  the  unity  and  completeness  that 
constitutes much of Hegel's idealism and the idea of the whole. Blanchot's account of 
death and subjectivity is played out and developed through the literary figures of Rilke 
and Kafka amongst others, and he frequently utilises various fragments of their work to 
examine their contemplation of death and the act of writing. Blanchot often uses these 
writers’ personal letters and diaries rather than their literary texts, one suspects, perhaps, 
                                                
57 Blanchot, M.  The Space of Literature, trans. by Ann Smock, (Lincoln; London: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1982).  
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because he sees these forms as revealing something that would otherwise be concealed 
in a more academic or public text. 
It can be seen, therefore, that Blanchot's explication of death is both a comment on 
subjectivity, and a theorisation of the process of writing (in which one must truly 'lose' 
himself, before he can begin to write). He describes a state in which one dies completely 
as oneself, that is, entirely individually. Value is given to the man who dies undivided 
from himself, to he who is thought to be at the centre of his being. (Nietzsche too 
believes that a man who dies singularly and as himself is more faithful to an idea of 
death we may have.) This state is contrasted with the less esteemed (the more horrific) 
state of dying as a result of disease or some other outside influence. The man who dies 
because he is, in a sense, taken by death, suffers a double blow- in being taken by death, 
in having his individuality or his uniqueness undermined by a consumptive death, he 
not only suffers the indignity of having to relinquish an image of himself that is unified 
and complete, but he must also endure the torment of the anonymous death. Unable to 
choose his death, the condemned man must be satisfied with the kind of death that 
renounces him, that recognises neither his individuality, nor his uniqueness and is the 
kind of death that anyone could suffer, ‘Contempt for anonymous death, for the 'They 
die' is the disguised anguish to which the anonymous character of death gives rise.’ 
(Blanchot, 1982: 122) 
Commenting on Rilke's writing in the Book of Hours, Blanchot questions Rilke's 
commitment to enduring the horror of an anonymous, overbearing or unchosen death 
when Rilke appears to give up this existential burden and replaces it with a sense of 
hopefulness that would see him eventually achieving a chosen, well-timed 'amicable' 
death. Blanchot argues that Rilke's turning away from the intense fear of the anonymous 
or  undignified  death  marks  the  precise  point at  which  he  also  turns  away  from the 
preferred death; by refusing to sustain oneself in the potential of the death that divides, 
one also renounces the hope of ever evolving through this pain, of ever reaching that 
point of affirmation which comes from the bearing of that which is in excess of us. In 
other words, Blanchot believes that the only way Rilke could free himself of the burden 
of the unchosen death would be to somehow think and sustain himself through this state, 
until all the eventual possibilities of this state themselves became the site of familiarity 
and 'amicability' that Rilke had hoped to achieve by simply hoping.   
The connection between Blanchot’s text and Woolf and criticism hinges on the 
idea of sustaining oneself in a moment of ‘non-being’. By sustaining oneself in and 
thinking through aspects of experience that do not necessarily immediately mean or  
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make sense, it becomes possible to allow those moments to be what they are. To be 
more  specific;  if  there  are  aspects  of  a  musical,  or  for  that  matter,  any  aesthetic 
experience that do not make sense, that do not mean, then one must relinquish the desire 
to find sense or meaning. 
Blanchot’s ‘space’ of literature is configured in opposition to the meaning centred, 
apodictic criticism which follows the Hegelian rules of the concept i.e. that the concept 
resolves itself in synthesis. This is because Blanchot presents us with what we might 
refer to a literary idea of criticism. This kind of criticism disrupts a conceptual concern 
with meaning and synthesis. Blanchot’s ‘space of literature’ is closed to interpretation, 
because, as he suggests, the essential power of language is its absence of meaning and 
its ability to distance or negate itself from the actual reality of objects. Blanchot’s work, 
therefore, could be viewed as a fundamental critique of synthesis that essentially differs 
from  Adorno’s  'negative  dialectics'.  Instead  of  remaining  entirely  invested  in  the 
concept, this kind of criticism renegotiates the concept by exposing it as meaningless, or 
at least, partially destructive in its very nature.     
  Perhaps one of the greatest responsibilities criticism has, therefore, is to continue 
to resist the sovereignty of synthesis. Consciousness's responsibility in turn is to be self-
conscious of a dominating impulse which seizes hold of the work, makes it mean, and 
gestures towards reason. Our debt to the language of conceptual thinking, therefore, 
must be realised. To speak of art or to think of art is to wield a power bound by a 
vocabulary that takes for granted the work of history, and it is to assume that we have 
mastered, or are, indeed, capable of mastering this negotiation with the past. We attempt 
to contend with the cinders of philosophical discourses; remains of ideas filter their way 
through  history,  they  become  ahistorical,  concepts  are  adopted  and  vulgarised.  The 
passing of time renders them transient, mutable and unfixed. But what is at stake here is 
that certain ideas seem to continue to offer themselves up for re-examination. In other 
words, the persistence of certain historical philosophical and  conceptual dialogues find 
their  afterlife  in  contemporary  thought;  ideas    pertaining  to  notions  of  subjectivity, 
aesthetic  experience,  interpretation  and  criticism.  The  desire  to  make  sense  of,  to 
interpret or to analyse, a piece of music, a text, must, therefore, be recognised as a 
positioning of oneself; it is, in a sense, to commit oneself to the responsibility of a 
questioning  that  can  only  be  set  in  motion  once  the  conditioning  discourses  of  the 
question  have  been  destabilised.  Certainly,  the  figure  of  Hegelian  synthesis  weaves 
itself amorphously in amongst our consciousness, but that is not to say that we are 
without options. As the editors of Aesthetic Theory suggest:  
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Paratactical form[s] are the expression of the attitude of thought to objectivity. 
Philosophical parataxis seeks to fulfil the promise of Hegel's program of a pure 
contemplation by not distorting things through the violence of preforming them 
subjectively, but rather by bringing their muteness, their non-identity, to speech. 
(AT: 463) 
 
The musical marginalia of Virginia Woolf could be considered as paratactical forms; 
her essays, diaries and letters are all fragmentary forms of writing, and as such, they will 
continue to speak for non-mastery, for non-identity, and for muteness. 
 
Towards a Poetics of Criticism 
 
In ‘The Narrow Bridge of Art’ first published in the New York Herald Tribune in 1927, 
Woolf writes: 
 
But one has sometimes asked oneself, must the duty of the critic always be to the 
past, must his gaze always be fixed backwards? Could he not turn around and, 
shading his eyes in the manner of Robinson Crusoe on the desert island, look into 
the future and trace on its mist the faint lines of the land which some day perhaps 
we may reach? […] Is it not the critic’s duty to tell us, or to guess at least, where 
we are going? (GR: 11) 
 
And so, as we look back to Woolf’s work, we are told also to look forwards and to try 
and predict in what direction criticism might be going. And perhaps something of this 
task owes itself to the sense of loss written into both Blanchot and Woolf that arises 
when  they  contemplate  the  task  of  writing  and  the  future  of  criticism.  Loss  that 
articulates itself through poetry is a concern that Woolf and Blanchot share; loss that 
arises from continually trying to (re)capture events, people, feelings from the past in 
writing. But all writing can do is testify to the impossibility of this (re)capturing. In A 
Room of One’s Own, Woolf writes: 
 
It [the world] does not ask people to write poems and novels and histories; it does 
not need them. It does not care whether Flaubert finds the right word or whether 
Carlyle scrupulously verifies this or that fact. Naturally, it will not pay for what it 
does not want. And so the writer, Keats, Flaubert, Carlyle, suffers, especially in 
the creative years of youth, every form of distraction and discouragement. A curse, 
a cry of agony, rises from those books of analysis and confession. ‘Mighty poets 
in their misery dead’ – and that is the burden of their song. If anything comes 
through inspite of all this, it is a miracle, and probably no book is born entire and 
uncrippled as it was conceived. (RO: 60)   
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More precisely then, what inspires both Woolf and Blanchot to write is loss. And this is 
what  ultimately  connects  them,  and  what  connects  the  project  of  criticism  with  the 
writing of (musical) experience. Just as Woolf tries to recapture events, moments and 
the past, Blanchot tries to renegotiate death as he attempts to recapture the loss of life 
that death implies. Music criticism too, tries to recapture and retrace, but it cannot do so 
unless it accepts this sense of loss, unless it writes this loss into the writing. This thesis 
has argued that marginal writing could take account of and give a voice to this loss. 
Blanchot says this about the diary form: 
 
The Diary is linked to the strange conviction that one can observe oneself and that 
one must know oneself. But Socrates did not write. The most Christian centuries 
ignore  this  examination,  whose  only  intermediary  is  silence.  We  are  told  that 
Protestantism  favours  this  confession  without  confessor,  but  why  should  the 
confessor be replaced by writing? We must rather return to a cumbersome jumble 
of  Protestantism,  Catholicism,  and  Romanticism  so  that  writers,  setting  off  in 
search of themselves in this false dialogue, can try to give form and language to 
what cannot speak in them. Those who realise this and little by little recognise 
that  they  cannot know themselves, but  only  transform  themselves  and  destroy 
themselves, and who pursue this strange struggle in which they feel drawn outside 
of themselves to a place which they nonetheless do not have access, have left us, 
according to their abilities, fragments, sometimes even impersonal ones, that we 
may actually prefer to any other works. (Blanchot, 2003: 186-7) 
 
Woolf has left us fragments. And I think it is possible to read in them her search for a 
self, or at the very least we could read her fragments as the attempt to ‘give form and 
language  to  what  cannot  speak.’  But,  as  Blanchot  suggests,  absolute  knowledge  of 
oneself,  of  experience,  or  of  an  object  or  text  is  an  illusion.  Instead,  a  process  of 
transformation and destruction replaces systematic conclusion and conceptual synthesis. 
Blanchot calls this process a ‘strange struggle’, and I think we have seen this struggle in 
Woolf’s musical marginalia where she has been ‘drawn outside’ of herself ‘to a place 
which [she] nonetheless [does] not have access [to].’ 
  In  ‘The  Failure  of  the  Demon:  The  Vocation’  Blanchot’s  seven  page  essay 
dedicated to Virginia Woolf, he makes the following comments: 
 
Deeply disturbing, but often difficult to read. Readers who are not indulgent risk 
being irritated in seeing the Virginia they love so taken with success, so happy 
with praise, so vain about a moment of recognition, so wounded at its lack. Yes, 
that is surprising, painful, almost incomprehensible. There is something enigmatic 
in  these  distorted  reports  that  place  a  writer  of  such  delicacy  in  such  gross 
dependence. And each time, with each new book, the comedy, the tragedy is the  
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same. This repetition, of which she is very aware – who was more lucid? – is 
made even more annoying by the abridgements of the Journal, but these errors of 
perspective  also  have  their  truth.  And  suddenly  the  outcome:  that  death  she 
chose[…] How can we dare link it with her creative life? How can we see in it the 
completion of her destiny? What is fitting in this most unsuitable end? […] We 
understand better now the words of young Goethe – “For me, there could be no 
question of ending well” – a certainty that accompanies him during his whole 
youth  until  the  day  he discovers and  accepts the  demoniacal  power  that  must 
protect him, he thinks, against the fear of losing himself. This power did protect 
him, true, but then began his infidelity to himself, and the glorious decline from 
which Virginia Woolf preferred to escape by sinking. (Blanchot, 2003: 97-104) 
 
For Blanchot, Woolf’s death makes sense because he sees it as ‘the completion of her 
destiny.’ And this destiny is her vocation as a writer. But, as he sees it, this vocation is 
also to blame for her, ‘most unsuitable end.’ Her vocation has lead to her demise: 
 
To link oneself to  dispersion, to  intermittency, to the fragmented brilliance  of 
images, to the shimmering fascination of the instant, is a terrible movement – a 
terrible happiness, especially when it must finally give way to a book. Is there a 
way to gather together what is dispersed, to make continuous the discontinuous 
and to maintain the wandering in a nonetheless unified whole? Virginia Woolf 
sometimes finds it. (Blanchot, 2003: 101) 
 
Indeed, Woolf does sometimes ‘gather what is dispersed’, she does ‘make continuous 
the discontinuous’, but even if, as been shown, this continuity is essentially false, her 
writing continually bears witness to that very process of failure.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 
 
The following extracts are taken from The Letters of Virginia Woolf edited by Nigel 
Nicolson  and  Joanne  Trautman.  The  Volumes  were  originally  published,  in 
chronological order, with the following titles: The Flight of the Mind (1888-1912), The 
Question  of  Things  Happening  (1912-22),  A  Change  of  Perspective  (1923-28),  A 
Reflection of the Other Person (1929-31), The Sickle Side of the Moon (1932-35), Leave 
the Letters Till We’re Dead (1936-41). 
 
 
Volume One: 1888-1912 
 
(p.40) 
To Emma Vaughan 
 23 April, 1901 
 
The only thing in this world is music – music and books and one or two pictures. I am 
going to found a colony where there shall be no marrying – unless you happen to fall in 
love with a symphony of Beethoven – no human element at all, except what comes 
through Art – nothing but ideal peace and endless meditation.  
 
(p.56) 
To Emma Vaughan 
October, 1902 
 
The Pianola is flourishing, and plays after dinner till the other side (the Mackenzies, 
who only do hand playing) are vanquished. Really it is a wonderful machine – beyond a 
machine in that it lets your own soul flow thro’.  
 
(The diary notes that Virginia’s Hyde Park Gate neighbours were the Mackenzies.)   
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(p.59) 
To Thoby Stephen 
 October/November 1902 
 
The Pianola is going strong. 
 
(p.64) 
To Emma Vaughan 
Late December, 1902 
 
I write nonsense, because the pianola is playing with extreme brilliance and precision in 
the next room. 
 
 
(p.88) 
To Emma Vaughan 
 24 July, 1903 
 
A fresh lot of tunes came today chosen by Adrian and a very mixed set – Bach and 
Schumann and the Washington Post and the Dead  March in Saul, Pinafore and the 
Messiah. We find the difference in quality a very good thing because all out servants sit 
beneath the drawing room window all the evening while we play – and by experiment 
we have discovered that if we play dance music all their crossnesses vanish and the 
whole room rings with their shrieks and then we tame them down so sentimentally with 
Saul or boredom with Schumann – on the whole their silence is the most desirable thing. 
USED 
 
(p.139-40) 
To Violet Dickinson  
6 May, 1904  
 
She (Beatrice Thynne) is as red and tough as a very fine apple; her face is positively 
muscular, with character which seems to have stiffened there. We took her to dine with 
Bell last night, a real Bohemian party, after he heart. Kelly the painter was there, and we  
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stayed talking of Art, Sculpture and Music till 11.30. This was all in the common café, 
while we smoked half a dozen cigarettes a piece. Kelly is an enthusiast, and Beatrice 
seeing this contradicted him. She expounded theories on Wagner which were, I know, 
made that moment. He actually shook his fist at her across the table, and at one moment 
I held her down – a stormy scene. 
 
(p.147) 
To Violet Dickinson 
30 October, 1904 
 
They don’t realise that London means my own home, and books, and pictures, and 
music, from all of which I have been parted since February now, -and I have never spent 
such a wretched eight months in my life. 
 
 
(p.150) 
To Emma Vaughan 
1 Nov, 1904  
  
The great Ralph [Vaughan Williams], I hear, from Florence, is giving a concert at the 
Queen’s Hall, composed entirely of his works. 
 
(p.179) 
To Emma Vaughan, 
23 Feb, 1905 
 
My National Review article is about [Street] Music so you can imagine what a flutter is 
going through the musical world – it has probably reached Dresden. My remarks will 
revolutionise the whole future of music.  
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(p.183) 
To Violet Dickinson  
April 5
, 1905 
 
You see, there ain’t much news; you can’t think how bored everybody is, and how hard 
up  for  something  to  do  or  think  about.  They  play  the  piano  all  day  long,  and  eat 
sandwiches and drink soup.  
 
(p.190) 
To Violet Dickinson 
May, 1905 
 
It is now time to apologies for my egoism, and ask you how you are. However, one 
more thing. Kitty writes that she had made great friends with the writer of Elizabeth’s 
German Garden; who says, what is the point of the story, that my article on Music 
interested her so much!!! 
 
(p.222) 
To Lady Robert Cecil 
Wed 18 April, 1906 
 
But beautiful writing is like music often, the wrong notes, and discords and barbarities 
that one hears generally – and makes too. 
 
(p.263) 
To Violet Dickinson  
Sun 16 Dec, 1906 
 
I have been having a debauch of music and hearing certain notes to which I could be 
wed – pure simple notes – smooth from all passion and frailty, and flawless as gems. 
That means so much to me, and so little to you! Now do you know that sound has shape 
and colour and texture as well?  
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(p.282) 
To Clive Bell  
Feb, 1907 
 
I read then, and feel beauty swell like ripe fruit within my palm: I hear music woven 
from the azure skeins of air; and gazing into deep pools skimmed with the Italian veil I 
see youth and melancholy walking hand in hand. 
 
 
(p.288) 
To Violet Dickinson 
March, 1907 
 
We are going to concert on Tuesday, or we would have come. 
 
(p.308) 
To Violet Dickinson 
Sunday 1 September, 1907  
 
Further, I write in the morning and read Pindar, in a room which overlooks the Marsh; 
beneath Adrian takes notes on English History, and spells out Wagner on the piano. 
 
(p.312) 
To Emma Vaughan 
29 September, 1907  
 
However, noting will induce me to sacrifice my Richter…I heard from Aunt Mary the 
other day; and the ten children are all either coming to-day for the night, going to balls, 
staying  at  Seaford,  hearing  R[alph  Vaughan  Williams]s  piece  at  Cardiff,  producing 
children… 
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(p.329) 
To Clive Bell 
Wednesday 6 May, 1908 
 
I saw Saxon last night…a merry humour came over us, after a ‘fairly satisfactory – yes, 
I think I may say, very fairly satisfactory’ performance of the Gotterdamerung and we 
sat here, over our galantine, till three thirty. 
 
(p.333) 
To Lytton Strachey  
Monday 18 May, 1908 
 
Could you come to tea with me on Thursday? I have got so miserably involved in opera 
and the German language that that seems to be the only free afternoon. 
 
(p.333) To Lady Robert Cecil,  
May? 1908 
 
I am going to another opera on Tuesday, so, unless I could come early, I am afraid that 
afternoon is useless. I am so bewildered with operas – we go regularly – that I can’t 
make sensible arrangements. 
 
(p.335) 
To Violet Dickinson  
June, 1908 
 
I will come on Wednesday, but I must go back by the six something, because we are 
going to the opera. 
 
(p.342) 
To Vanessa Bell 
Friday 7 Aug, 1908 
 
They (Herbert, Helen and Katharine Stephen – v’s cousins) are all solidly devoted, of 
course, but I don’t remember Helen much – except once, when we asked if she could  
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play, and she strummed through a Beethoven Sonata, with the tramp of a regiment of 
dragoons…I…tried to write Melymbrosia. But a violin began 2 doors off, and all the 
tradesmen called, and they came and bashed the floor over my head.  
 
(p.347) 
To Saxon Sydney –Turner 
10 August, 1908 
 
I hope you will write and describe the operas – unworthy as I am to hear. 
 
(p.348) 
To Vanessa Bell 
Monday 10 August, 1908 
 
By  this mornings post, too, I got a card, with musical hieroglyphs; halfway though 
breakfast, I sang my song to keep myself in spirits, and saw it, as though in a mirror 
before me – mocking me. I at once changed my tune, and sang the second song; which 
no one knows. Tell the Chipmonk [Clive] his malice is thwarted; I sang for half an hour, 
and all the house crouched on the step to listen. 
 
(p.362) 
To Saxon Sydney-Turner 
28 August, 1908 
 
I suppose you are back again, and I note what you say about the concert. I am pining for 
music. Could you, if you think it necessary, get me a ticket for Tuesday night? 
 
(p.363) 
To Vanessa Bell 
Saturday 29 August, 1908 
 
It is amazingly comfortable to stretch one’s legs have one’s read out, and not to be 
interrupted at half past six, and spend the evening at the opera, or in talk about it. I 
never knew I had such a desire to read; and in London it is always fretted and stinted,  
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and always will be. I wish one could sweep one’s day clean, say not at home, and refuse 
ever to go out. 
 
(p.371) 
To Violet Dickinson 
Thursday 29 October, 1908 
 
I met Bruce Richmond last night at a concert, and we had an awkward moment. 
 
(p.382) 
To Lytton Strachey 
1 February, 1909 
 
Could you come early tomorrow – by the bye? Mr Ilchster [Saxon] has sent me a ticket 
for the Wagner Opera – what d’you call it – and I don’t want to miss the overture. 
 
(p.393) 
To Clive Bell 
April, 1909 
 
Perhaps we shall meet at the Freshfields music tonight. 
 
(p.394) 
To Violet Dickinson 
Thursday 13 May, 1909 
 
Last  time  we  met  was  in  that  sumptuous  Jewesses  [Miss  Schreiner]  room,  when 
everything was like an illusion. Do you remember that curious episode on the empire 
sofa, when she played Brahms or Schumann to us, and all her boots? 
 
(p.400) 
To Violet Dickinson 
July, 1909 
 
I go to Cambridge on the 10
th – and both Thursday and Friday are taken up with opera.  
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(p.400) 
To Violet Dickinson 
July, 1909 
 
If you could have me another day next week, it would be easier – as I only come up 
from Cambridge on Monday morning, and we are going to the opera in the evening. 
 
 
 
(p.403-4) 
To Vanessa Bell 
Saturday 7 August, 1909 
 
(From Bayreuth) 
 
Now we are going to read Parsifal, and then lunch, and then we shall hear the immortal 
work. 
 
(The letters note that, ‘In August 1909 Virginia went with Adrian and Saxon Sydney-
Turner to Bayreuth, for the opera, and then to Dresden for more opera and pictures. 
Finding their company faintly uncongenial, perhaps because she failed to match their 
musical enthusiasm to the full, she consoled herself by writing letters to Vanessa which 
were among her most affectionate.’)  
 
 
(p.404) 
To Vanessa Bell 
Sunday 8 August, 1909  
 
We heard Parsifal yesterday – a very mysterious emotional work, unlike any of the 
others I thought. There is no love in it; it is more religious than anything. People dress 
in half mourning, and you are hissed if you try to clap. As the emotions are all abstract – 
I mean not between men and women – the effect is very much diffused; and peaceful on 
the whole. However, Saxon and Adrian say that it was not a good performance, and that  
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I shan’t know anything about it until I have heard it 4 times. Between the acts, one goes 
and sits in a field, and watches a man hoeing turnips. The audience is very dowdy, and 
the look of the house is drab; one has hardly any room for ones knees, and it is very 
intense. I think earnest people only go – Germans for the most part, in sacks, with 
symbolical braid…We have been discussing obscure points in Parsifal all the morning. 
It seems to me weak vague stuff, with the usual enormities, but I can only read the 
German with great difficulty. The time seems to go in preparing for the opera, listening 
to it, and discussing it afterwards – but tomorrow I must begin to write – you will laugh.  
 
(p.406) 
To Vanessa Bell 
Thursday 12
 August, 1909 
 
We heard Parsifal yesterday; it was much better done, and I felt within a space of tears. 
I expect it is the most remarkable of the operas; it slides from music to words almost 
imperceptibly. However, I have been niggling at the effect all the morning, without 
much success. It is very hard to write in ones bedroom, without any books to look at, or 
my especial rabbit path, into the next room. I have balanced my box on my commode, 
and made a shaky desk.  
 
(p.407) 
To Vanessa Bell 
Monday 16
 August, 1909 
 
I write in haste – this is no device, to excuse my dullness – but I scrambling through my 
article, which has got into a fix, and the opera at 4 cuts the day short. They don’t do the 
thing as well as we do it, I think: our seats are very near, and the ugly creatures look still 
uglier. I can never quite get over the florid Teuton spirit, with its gross symbolism – and 
its flaxen tresses. Imagine a heroine in a nightgown, with a pigtail on each shoulder, and 
watery eyes ogling heaven. Saxon says nothing; Adrian prods him for an opinion. He 
reclines on his hip between the acts, and pulls at a weed. There is a great crowd, and we 
get stared at, not for our beauty.  
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(p.408) 
To Vanessa Bell 
Thursday 19
 August, 1909 
 
We  are  now  going  out  to  Lohengrin  –  a  very  dull  opera,  and  this  is,  I  expect,  a 
damnably dull letter, but the quickest Ape brain always flags after dinner. 
 
(p.410) 
To Vanessa Bell 
Tuesday 24
 August, 1909  
 
We went to Salome (Strauss, as you may know) last night. I was much excited, and 
believe that it is a new discovery. He gets great emotion into his music, without any 
beauty. However, Saxon thought we were encroaching upon Wagner, and we had a long 
and rather acid discussion. He has an amazing knowledge of detail – I can’t think why 
he doesn’t say something more interesting…I must start for the opera.  
 
(p.412) 
To Violet Dickinson 
21 September, 1909 
 
I  took  your  letter  to  Bayreuth  and  meant  to  answer  it.  But  the  opera  was  always 
interrupting. 
 
(p.425) 
To Clive Bell 
16 May, 1910 
 
It is possible that there will be tickets for Tristan at the opera itself. 
 
(p.427) 
To Saxon Sydney-Turner   
June, 1910  
 
I shall probably be alone. But I don’t know what operas there may be.  
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(p.432) 
To Saxon Sydney- Turner 
Monday 10 August, 1910 
 
Last night we crept under the windows of the grand hotel and saw Miss Mickle and Mr 
Thomas Dunhill playing Brahms to a great drawing room full of dowagers and athletes. 
 
(p.449) 
To Clive Bell 
23 January, 1911 
 
Gumbo [Marjorie Strachey] is seated at the piano, dressed in a tight green jersey, which 
makes her resemble the lean cat in the advertisement, singing O Dolce Amor, to her 
own accompaniment. The accompaniment ends: she flings her hands up, and gives vent 
to a passionate shriek; crashes her hands down again and goes on. A dry yellow skin has 
formed around her lips, owing to her having a fried egg for breakfast. Save that her 
songs are passionate, we have not mentioned the subject.  
 
(p.466) 
To Vanessa Bell 
Thursday 8 June, 1911 
 
As it is very hot, and Adrian and Saxon are sweating at the opera, I am going up to 
Hampstead to see if I can drag old [Janet] Case out for a walk among the lovers on he 
heath. 
 
(p.479) 
To Leonard Woolf 
21
 October, 1911 
 
Thankyou very much – I am going to this cycle [The Ring], but if I might come to your 
box for Siegfried on Monday I should like to. 
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(p.479) 
To Lytton Strachey  
6
 November, 1911 
 
I’ve just come back from the [Francis] Cornfords- from the 7
th Symphony, from a scene 
with __ __, from an interview in a W.C. and, while I wash my teeth, a painter sings on a 
board outside my window. 
 
(p.481) 
To Lytton Strachey 
Monday 20 November, 1911 
 
If you can’t come would you telephone to Gordon Sq. If you can, will you meet us at 
the box office hall (I mean the ordinary big hall) at the opera, 25 minutes past 8 – the 
opera beginning at 8.30, I presume, being out of the way of reading newspapers. 
 
(p.497) 
To Katherine Cox 
2 May, 1912 
 
Here is a cheque for the concert, though, considering I was in bed at Twinkenham at the 
time, I didn’t hear much ancient music for my money…Janet never came so I’m here 
alone, and go back rather melancholy this afternoon to settle in for the Summer, which 
will be absolutely dry, and all awhirl with Wagner, and Russian dancers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
182 
 
 
Volume Two: 1912-1922 
 
(p.5) 
To Lytton Strachey  
1 September, 1912 
 
Our habits are simple; 2 days in a place, one day in a train; we walk in the morning, 
read in the afternoon, make our tea, which is the point we have just passed, then walk 
on the sea-shore; and after dinner sit by a café, and, as its Sunday tonight, listen to the 
military band. 
 
(p.8) 
To Saxon Sydney-Turner  
17 September, 1912 
 
We are both starved for music-have to trail about after town bands. 
 
(p.20) 
To Katherine Cox 
18 March, 1913 
 
Things in London were much the same as usual 10 days ago. A good deal of love, spite, 
art gossip, and opera. We dine at the Cock, and see the usual run. However, we shall 
probably retire after Easter and live sensibly. 
 
(p.26) 
To Katherine Cox 
16 May, 1913 
 
We came up here 10 days ago to attend the Ring- and I hereby state that I will never go 
again, and you must help us both to keep to that. My eyes are bruised, my ears dulled, 
my  brain  a  mere  pudding  of  pulp  –  O  the  noise  and  the  heat,  and  the  bawling 
sentimentality, which once used to carry me away, and now leaves me sitting perfectly 
still. Everyone seems to have come to this opinion, though some pretend to believe still.  
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(p.51) 
To Katherine Cox 
12 August, 1914 
 
They discuss Thomson’s poetry, and post impressionism, and have read everything, and 
at the same time control all the trade in Hides, and can sing comic songs and do music 
hall turns. 
 
(p.81) 
To Lady Robert Cecil 
18 February, 1916 
 
I have been reading Mr Strutts musical reminiscences, with interest. I must have seen 
him at every concert and opera I ever went to, and he often describes the same concerts. 
It is very outspoken criticism, which is refreshing. 
 
(p.128) 
To Saxon Sydney-Turner 
27 November, 1916 
 
We went to a concert on Friday. 
 
(p.135) 
To Saxon Sydney-Turner 
16 January 1917 
 
This afternoon we are going to a Beethoven concert – opening Wigmore Hall (the old 
Bechstein) 
 
(p.140) 
To Saxon Sydney-Turner 
3 February 1917 
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What is the truth of the rumour that Barbara (Saxon) is going on the Music Hall Stage? I 
went to hear a new Debussy sonata for the harp flute and viola yesterday…I rather liked 
the Sonata. 
 
(p.144) 
To Vanessa Bell 
11 February, 1917 
 
I can’t remember a word of tonic-sol-fa… 
 
(p.184) 
To Vanessa Bell 
Wednesday 3 October, 1917 
 
I tried to sing the Wolf song this morning, tell Quentin.  
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Volume Three: 1923-1928 
 
(p.30) 
To Leonard Woolf 
Tuesday 25 April, 1923 
 
Now I’ve dined at our usual place – omelette, ham and pots, and spinach; Suisse, coffee 
and cream, then chocolate, very good, at the orchestra café, but the music was such that 
even I could dream no dreams, so came away, got straight to bed, and finished reading 
my Gissing book; which brings me to the present moment. 
 
(p.40) 
To Roger Fry 
Saturday 18 May 1923 
 
Two nights ago I went to the Opera with Saxon [Sydney-Turner]; both in attenuated 
evening dress, for he takes stalls. There was Sir Claude Philips (diary notes he was an 
art critic), Mrs Norman Grosvenor; Mrs Strep; and so on and so on. We had a divine 
Bach, Phoebus and Pan; towards the end of which, with the lights still low, that old goat 
Sir Claude, only kept by the tightness of his white waistcoat from gushing entrails all 
over the carpet, to it into his head to leave. The whole audience saw him move down the 
gangway. Suddenly he disappeared. There was a sound of coal sacks, bounding and 
rebounding. Then dead silence. He had fallen down a complete set of stairs; but is not 
hurt.  
 
(p.59-60) 
To Jaques Raverat  
July 30, 1923 
 
As for the Sitwell’s, though I paid 3/6 to hear Edith vociferate her poems accompanied 
by a small and nimble orchestra, I understood so little that I could not judge. I know 
Osbert slightly. They take themselves very seriously. They descend from George the 
IVth. They look like Regency bucks. They have a mother who was in prison. They 
probably need careful reading, which I have never given them, and thus incline to think 
them vigorous, but unimportant acrobats.  
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(p.81) 
To Ethel Sands 
1923? 
 
I wonder whether you could possibly tell me the address of Miss Fass, at whose house 
concerts are given by the English quartet? She sent me a programme, which I lost, and 
now I want one to give a friend, and would also like to try and come myself. (The diary 
notes that the Quartet was formed in 1902 and ‘achieved a high reputation for chamber 
music.’ It also notes that Marjorie Fass was a friend and the patron of composer Frank 
Bridge. 
 
(p.186) 
To Saxon Syndey-Turner 
31 May, 1925 
 
I have been to the Walkure, and to Lords: at both places I looked for you in vain. I saw 
Hearne make 56, by which time we were so cold we went home. Walkure completely 
triumphed,  I  thought;  except  for  some  boredom  –  I  can’t  ever  enjoy  those  long 
arguments in music – when it is obviously mere conversation upon business matters 
between Wotan and Brunhilde: however, the rest was superb. 
 
(p.195) 
To Edward Sackville West 
28 July, 1925 
 
But the piano arrived safely, and has already given a two hour concert, when one of 
Angus Davidson’s brothers sang, and it was the greatest success. I hope to give many 
more concerts of this kind in the autumn, and we shall consider you our patron. 
 
(p.201) 
To Janet Case 
Tuesday 1 September, 1925 
 
But how difficult criticism is! Not a single word has the same meaning for two people.  
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(p.214) 
To Vita Sackville-West 
Wednesday 23
 September, 1925 
 
This way of seeing people might be gigantically successful, and then your cousin [Eddy] 
has lent me his piano, and I intend to break up the human horror with music. 
 
(p.222) 
To Edward Sackville West  
November, 1925  
 
I am still kept strictly in bed and visitors rationed, but if you should be in London, I 
hope you will come and see me, only its better to ring up first. This explains why the 
piano has remained dumb. I make do with an algraphone, as I can’t get down to my 
studio.  
 
(The letters note that algraphone was a ‘joke-word for a gramophone in a sick-room 
 
(p.240) 
To Edward Sackville West  
Saturday 6 February, 1926 
 
I think you ought to take your piano away as soon as possible – the damp is something 
awful. 
 
(p.247) 
To Vita Sackville West 
16 March, 1926 
 
Indeed, these are the first letters I have written since I was married. As for the mot juste, 
you are quite wrong. Style is a very simple matter; it is all rhythm. Once you get that, 
you can’t use the wrong words. But on the other hand here I am sitting after half the 
morning, crammed with ideas, and visions, and so on, and can’t dislodge them, for the 
lack of the right rhythm. Now this is very profound, what rhythm is, and goes far deeper  
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than words. A sight, an emotion, creates this wave in the mind, long before it makes 
words to fit it; and in writing (such is my present belief) one has to recapture this, and 
set this working (which has nothing apparently to do with words) and then, as it breaks 
and tumbles in the mind, it makes words to fit it: But no doubt I shall think differently 
next year. 
 
(p.255) 
To Vita Sackville-West 
13 April, 1926 
 
We all chatter hard about music – Eddy explains about 19
th Century music and rhetoric 
– Duncan attacks: but seldom uses the word he means: sometimes has to unbutton his 
waistcoat while endeavouring: very interesting: we compare movies and operas… 
 
(p.267) 
To Edward Sackville-West 
Friday 1926?  
 
This is more like it (as far as I remember) that you had a passion for Wagner, were a 
fanatic, and thought Lawrence the best living English writer… 
 
(p.355) 
To Violet Dickinson 
Sunday 27 March, 1927 
 
But I thought of many odd people, you and Lady S. and Katie [Cromer] whom I sat next 
to at a Mozart opera the other night. 
 
(p.360) 
To Vanessa Bell 
 9 April, 1927 
 
There are explosions going on in the street and a general buzz and hum which rather 
entice me to step out into the Square and go to the movies; but we are off to Segesta 
early  tomorrow  so  we  are  having  a  quiet  night.  However,  they  are  at  this  moment  
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marching through the Square, playing a band, with lanterns, and some sacred object 
under a panoply – It is Easter, I suppose – I like the Roman Catholic religion. I say it is 
an attempt at art; Leonard is outraged…It seems to me simply the desire to create gone 
slightly crooked, and no God in it at all.  
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Volume Four: 1929-31 
 
(p.19) 
To Hugh Walpole 
10 February, 1929 
 
Berlin was very exhausting; very larger; very cold; lots of music. 
 
(p.45-6) 
To Ethel Sands 
24 April, 1929 
 
Heaven  knows  what  happened in  Berlin –  it  was a  very  odd affair;  Count  Kessler, 
pictures, operas, vast distances, icy cold, Vita in snowboots at one end, Eddy, Nessa and 
Duncan and I all far away at the other. It was hideous, and highly respectable in the 
midst of all its vice – we went to the Opera most nights and even Leonard pined for the 
diamonds of Lady Londonderry (is that right?) – so hairy and hearty and beery and 
cheery  and  like  Bessie  Trevelyan  eating  muffins  in  black  kid  gloves  were  they. 
Naturally I was ill. 
 
(p.115) 
To Hugh Walpole 
Saturday 7 December, 1929 
 
A catastrophe has happened. We are in for a lawsuit with the Imperial Hotel, which is 
driving us crazy with a Jazz band… 
 
(p.115) 
To Lady Ottoline Morrell  
December, 1929 
 
All my life is now upset by a lawsuit against a Jazz band in an hotel, and I may have to 
put you off and visit the eternal lawyers… 
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(p.116) 
To David Garnet  
10 December, 1929 
 
We are engaged in a lawsuit. It is against the Imperial Hotel and their infernal band – so 
may be a nuisance and begins on Friday. 
 
(p.132) 
To Ethel Smyth  
Tuesday 4 Feb, 1930  
 
But this is no return whatever for the immense pleasure I have had from your books (I 
dare not say music, because though willing, I am ignorant) in which my husband agrees 
with me. 
 
(p.134) 
To Clive Bell  
6
 February, 1930 
 
Oh I can’t remember, if indeed I ever knew what Duncan’s story was about, and so we 
went on, until the afternoon light was waning, and Duncan and I walked to Bond Street, 
and were so elated by every incident – for one thing the discovery of Blake’s house, for 
old man playing a violin said “Good bye to you,” that we found ourselves inside one of 
the smartest shops in Bond Street asking the price of rings. 
 
(p.145) 
To Ethel Smyth  
27 February, 1930  
 
I want to talk and talk and talk – About music; about love; about Countess Russell. 
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(p.146) 
To Saxon Sydney-Turner  
27 February, 1930  
 
What is your opinion of Ethel Smyth? – her music, I mean? She has descended upon 
like a wolf on the fold in purple and gold, terrifically strident and enthusiastic – I like 
her – she is a s shabby as a washerwoman and shouts and sings – but the question of 
her  music  crops  up  –  I  don’t  mean  that  she  cares  what  I  think,  being  apparently 
indomitable in her own view, but one day you must tell me the truth about it. 
 
 
(p.158) 
To Ethel Smyth  
22 April, 1930  
 
Today for the first time I have seen nobody, and my book, a very flickering flame at the 
moment, begins to draw. I don’t know if music needs a shelter round it. Writing is so 
damnably susceptible to atmosphere…This house, you understand, contains two outer 
rooms,  in  which  I  live;  it  contains  a  large  room  where  we  sit  and  eat,  play  the 
gramaphone, prop our feet up on the side of the fire and read endless books)…Are you 
writing? How does one write music?...Naturally therefore I warble on, unnecessarily to 
Dame Ethel Smyth; who won’t read all this, being in a hurricane today, putting in 
trumpets, cello’s and a trombone or two in the bass. She thumps it out on her piano; 
and is only roused to life by her dog; does she ever eat her dinner, or is it always cold?  
 
(p.163) 
To Ethel Smyth  
Tuesday, perhaps 6 May, 1930  
 
By the way, I heard the Wreckers years ago, from the pit, in some theatre. 
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(p.168) 
To Ethel Smyth 
Wednesday 13 [14
th] May, 1930 
 
Lord how difficult it is to write a letter! You painters and musicians don’t know the 
horror of pens that dry up and no blotting paper…I don’t see how you can play your 
music because I haven’t got a piano…Shall I go to the opera, shall I go to the cocktail 
party? So the ocean tosses its pebbles, and I turn them over, naked, a child, and no one 
helps me. There’s Ethel at Woking among her pear – no daffodil trees; with her bacon 
mouldering on the piano. 
 
(p.171) 
To Ethel Smyth 
Monday 26 May, 1930 
 
If only I weren’t a writer, perhaps I could thank you and praise you and admire you 
perfectly simply and expressively and say in one word what I felt about the Concert 
yesterday. As it is, an image forms in my mind; a quickset briar hedge, innumerably 
intricate and spiky and thorned; in the centre burns a rose. Miraculously, the rose is you; 
flushed pink, wearing pearls. The thorn hedge is the music; and I have to break my way 
through violins, flutes, cymbals, voices to this red burning centre. Now I admit that this 
has nothing to do with musical criticism. It is only what I feel as I sat on my silver 
winged (was it winged?) chair on the slippery floor yesterday. I am enthralled that you, 
the dominant and superb, should have this tremor and vibration of fire around you – 
violins flickering, flutes purring; (the image is of a winter hedge) – that you should be 
able to create this world from your centre. Perhaps I was not thinking of the music but 
of all the loves and ages you have been through…That’s what I call living; that’s the 
quality I would give my eyes to possess. Of course, in my furtive and sidelong way 
(being like a flatfish with eyes not in the usual place) I had read a good deal of this 
years ago in your books, and now I begin to read it and other oddities and revelations 
too in your music. It will take a long time not merely because I am musically feeble, 
but because all my faculties are so industriously bringing in news of so many Ethels at 
the same moment. 
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(p.181) 
To Ethel Smyth 
Thursday 26 June, 1930 
 
So I’ve had to take to dressing gown and sofa and can’t work. I shall be alright in a day 
or two: in fact I am better today; but it is a stealthy disease and pounces out if I give it a 
chance. So I shan’t attempt your concert: and I shan’t attempt answering your letters…I 
am sorry about the Concert. Tell me about it. 
 
(p.184) 
To Ethel Smyth 
Sunday 6 July, 1930 
 
I say Ethel – what a party! What a triumph! I can only assure you that when I saw all 
those hands stretched over the gate I felt I was being shut out from Paradise. I daresay 
it went on for hours after we left in the garden, under the roses. It was a superb affair, 
rolling and warbling from melody to melody like some divine quartet –no, octet.  
 
(p.204) 
To Ethel Smyth 
Thursday 28 August, 1930  
 
I think then that my difficulty is that I am writing to a rhythm and not to a plot. Does 
this convey anything? And thus though the rhythmical is more natural to me than the 
narrative, it is completely opposed to the tradition of fiction and I am casting about all 
the time for some rope to throw to the reader.  
 
(p.207) 
To Ethel Smyth 
Wednesday 3 September, 1930 
 
I  have a  devout  belief in  the  human  soul  –  when  I  meet  what can  be  called  such 
emphatically; and your power of soul completely daunts me. That’s an odd phrase – but 
I can’t stop – post going – to make a better, and will write anyhow tomorrow. No, no,  
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no, the pain is always hanging about after any spill; you kept it off. I say, I shall listen 
in; and hear the shouts and the music. 
 
(p.209) 
To Ethel Smyth  
Friday 5
 September, 1930 
 
Well, we listened in. ‘How like she is to her music’ L. said: a great compliment: for he 
sees  you  vividly  and  warmly.  I  thought  the  Anacreontic  Ode  very  exciting  –  even 
buzzed  at  it  was  across  England.  And  the  other,  the  songs,  very  satisfying  (like  a 
complete  demonstration  of  something).  Lord,  how  they  knocked  out  Berners!  How 
robust, and at the same time piercing. 
 
(p.214) 
To Ethel Smyth  
September, 1930 
 
(1): We want to know if you will let us publish the speech to the girls about Lambert, 
music etc?  
 
(The letters note that Lambert refers to Constant Lambert (1905-51), ‘the conductor, 
composer and writer on music. Ethel never published her lecture.) 
 
 
(p.215) 
To Ethel Smyth 
19 September, 1930 
 
(1) Hour: I say certainly, it can be legitimately two syllables; Leonard says, No: that is 
only done by the illiterate in writing, but can be done in music without offence. 
 
(p.225) 
To Ethel Smyth 
Sunday 5 October, 1930 
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Am I to vote for the Opera merger? A post card, with a stamp, has been sent me; as if 
Sir Thomas [Beecham] means business: I’ll put on 1 ½ if by so doing I can ensure a 
perfect performance of the Wreckers [Ethel’s opera]. 
 
(The Diary notes that ‘It was Beecham’s plan to amalgamate the Imperial League of 
Opera with the Covent Garden Opera in order to form a National Opera.’)  
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Volume Five: 1932-1935 
 
(P.15) 
To Ethel Smyth  
Friday 5 February, 1932 
 
I think I dislike them both equally – so clumsy – Where musical criticism sideslips – 
where musical criticism derails – I think it a mistake to be colloquial, vernacular, unless 
you hit it off exactly. Why not, simply and dully, Some fallacies of m.c. ‘Failings and 
fallacies of the Musical Critic.’ ‘Where Musical Criticism is at fault-‘ no I certainly 
don’t like where musical criticism derails. I leave it at that…Sing me the Jacobite songs 
one of these days.  
 
(The  letters note that Ethel  was writing an article eventually  called Where Musical 
Criticism Goes Astray.) 
 
(p.37) 
To Ethel Smyth  
Monday 21 March, 1932 
 
I’m scribbling with Leonard sneezing, and the effect is of a hen pecking up here one 
grain, there another – MB (Maurice Baring) has sent me his book, and I’ve snatched up 
his praise of your singing, which is all to my mind I mean what I would say myself, on 
the strength of half one of Schuberts songs that morning. Aren’t you happy to have that 
gift as well as the others?  
 
(Maurice Baring was a poet, novelist and friend of Ethel Smyth.) 
 
(p.96) 
To Ethel Smyth 
Sunday 21 August, 1932 
 
We had thunder at night of course, but not very tremendous, only enough to spoil the 
Promenade [Concert] to which we were listening. Odd – there was a crack of lightning 
over Caburn, and instantly Mozart went zigzag too. Modern life is a very complicated  
 
198 
 
affair – why not some sudden revelation of the meaning of everything, one night? – I 
think it might happen. 
  Are you, in a more humble way, appearing at the Queen’s Ha;;? I must make a 
note to listen –  
 
(The letters note that ‘The overture to Ethel’s opera The Wreckers was conducted by Sir 
Henry Wood at the Queen’s Hall on 22 August) 
 
(p.112) 
To Ethel Smyth 
Friday 21 October, 1932  
 
I wish I were at the Opera with you – cant be helped. It was my fault for going to the 
motor show before a dinner party. I’ve been drowsy all day – have read perhaps 2 
pages…Please please please write more – also write the Empress. I could write a book 
about your memoirs. Surely, if you sat over the fire o’nights, after music, you could 
drop out some more, like pearls – pearls that have got into one’s underclothes. Oh I’m 
so sleepy. Thank you for coming. 
 
(p.122) 
To Ethel Smyth 
Tuesday 8 November, 1932 
 
L. threw away the last L/ Mercury, before I’d read you. Cd. You lend me a copy? 
 
(The letters note that ‘Ethel’s article in the London  Mercury for November was entitled 
Delirious Tempi in Music, protesting that conductors played Gilbert and Sullivan music 
too fast.’) 
 
(p.126) 
 To Ethel Smyth 
13 November, 1932 
 
Really- I quite understand-I should be just as much out about music. And I’m better and 
we’re back, but I’m going to be very quiet.   
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(p.126) 
To Ethel Smyth 
Sunday 20 November, 1932 
 
I know I have been a wretch, as usual, not to write before, if only to indulge you in your 
mad Jane Austen mood, which amuses me immensely. Why on earth should you mind 
coming a howler once in a way about that article? As I said, I should be far more 
howling if I wrote to you about your music. Its only your d__d rashness that’s at fault –
and as you know I rather admire that quality in you…. 
 
 
(p.130) 
To Lady Ottoline Morrell 
25? November, 1932 
 
That reminds me- you must come to a quite ghastly party that Nessa and I are giving on 
Wednesday. It is a purely commercial (don’t whisper it) affair, to induce the rich to buy 
furniture, and so employ a swarm of poor scarecrows who are languishing in Fitzroy 
Street. 
 
(The letters note that “The party (on 30 November) was given by Virginia and Vanessa 
at  the  Lefebvre  Gallery  to  open  a  Music  Room  which  Duncan  and  Vanessa  had 
designed, down to the carpets, chairs and mirrors.) 
 
(p.135) 
To Ethel Smyth 
Sunday 11 December, 1932 
 
Nessa says she is sending me a letter of yours, so that’s all right – I went to Dido and 
Aeneas [Purcell] at the Wells and thought it absolutely and entirely satisfying: so come 
away before the English opera. My taste is very limited. I can’t judge music any more 
than someone else can judge articles in the T.L.S.  
 
(p.137)  
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To Ethel Smyth 
22 December, 1932 
 
The waits have just done singing: L. has given them 2/6 – but I can’t say I caught the 
music of old England, though I listened – which reminds me, is Vernon Lee’s book on 
music good? Ought I to order it? I like her trailing clouds of sub fulgent ink – why can’t 
she write tighter though? – that’s what trips me up, like falling over one’s train. 
 
(The  diary  notes  ‘Vernon  Lee  (1856-1935),  whose  real  name  was  Violet  Paget, 
published Music and its Lovers in 1932. She was an intimate friend of Ethel.’) 
 
(p.141) 
To Ethel Smyth 
28 December, 1932 
 
You sound a little raucous – your cold I suppose: and I hope its gone; and I hope you’re 
writing music; and I hope you’re thinking of me… 
 
 
(p.163) 
To Lady Ottoline Morrell 
Monday 27 February, 1933 
 
I’ve been listening to Jelly playing Bach in the [Westminster] Abbey; but the crowd was 
too great, and the violin took in gulps of air. 
 
(p.194) 
To Ethel Smyth 
Thursday 8 June, 1933 
 
No I don’t think I put my point effectively; I did not mean that I dislike facts and dates; 
What I mean was – oh dear how silly to try and explain – but my conscience is tender 
about writing – I meant, give it all the facts and all the dates; the more the better; but let 
them  be about other people, not E.S. My own longing in reading your  article is to 
escape the individual; and to be told simply, plainly, objectively in 1880 there was not a  
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single woman in an orchestra; there was not a single teacher to teach women harmony; 
the expense of going to Berlin was 165 pound ten; eight women were educated partly by 
1891; in 1902 [Henry] Wood took five violinists women into his orchestra; the number 
increased, and is now – (here is a table)…and so on, all the way through. But to be told 
My opera was not played because___My mass was played only once, Elgar 17 times – 
to have to listen to anecdotes,  hearsay, verbal anecdotes about how some unknown 
Austrian said that some unnamed conductor ought to be very proud of ES makes me 
feel,  and  will  I  think  make  any  moderately  intelligent  moderately  sensitive  man  or 
woman feel-Oh the woman’s got a grievance about herself; Shes unable to think of 
anyone else… 
 
(p.222) 
To Ethel Smyth 
Wednesday 6 September, 1933 
 
What a descriptive writer was lost when you took up the piano.  
 
(p.226-7) 
To Quentin Bell 
Tuesday 19 September, 1933 
 
The reason why Ethel Smyth is so repulsive, tell Nessa, is her table manners. She oozes; 
she chortles; and she half blew her rather red nose on her table napkin. Then she poured 
the cream – oh the blackberries were divine – into her beer; and I had rather dine with a 
dog. But you can tell people they are murderers; you can not tell them that they eat like 
hogs. That is wisdom. She was however full – after dinner – of vigorous charm; she 
walked four miles; she sang Brahms; the sheep looked up and were not fed. And we 
packed her off before midnight.  
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Volume Six: 1936-41 
 
(p.19) 
To Julian Bell 
11 March, 1936 
 
As for Leonard he works all day, drafting measures for the Labour party; answering that 
gaby Kingsley Martin, who can’t make up his own mind without tapping every other 
mind within a radius of twenty miles. He always interrupts our one resource against 
politics which is music. That’s why I curse him. 
 
(p.132) 
To Emphie Case 
3 June, 1937 
 
Here we are, having a few days off, before we go back to London which is all abuzz 
with the Opera. The season, the Coronation. 
 
p.135 
To Janet Case 
12 June, 1937 
 
Now in London there’s a lot of telephone ringing: L. has all his politicians at him, and I 
have old Ethel Smyth who stumps in for what she calls ten minutes. Its really two hours; 
one all long harangue, to  which I  listen, because  she’s stone deaf, and  her trumpet 
doesn’t work, but what does that matter, since she has a supreme belief in her own 
divine genius, and if you get he off on that, and love, and music, and her sheep dog, 
there’s no need to answer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
203 
 
p.190-1 
To Ethel Smyth 
Monday 13 December, 1937 
 
And how could my opinion of what you say of MB. Have any shade of value, coming 
from one purblind to the subject you’re dealing with? As well ask a deaf donkey to 
criticise Mozart. And how did the BBC do your concert? 
 
p.217 
To Ethel Smyth 
24 February, 1938 
 
Are women allowed to play in orchestras? When was this, allowed, if: and are they now 
musically, (as far as training goes) equal with the other sex? 
 
p.426 
To Mrs R.C. Trevelyan 
4 September, 1940 
 
It was delightful of you to write to me about my life of Roger. You have found out 
exactly what I was trying to do when you compare it to a piece of music. It’s odd, for 
I’m not regularly musical, but I always think of my books as music before I write them. 
 
p.450 
To Ethel Smyth 
6 December, 1940 
 
Now let us talk of something interesting. I was going to say why don’t you write a 
Common Reader review of music? Now consider that. Write your loves and hates for 
Bach Wagner etc out in plain English. I have an ulterior motive. I want to investigate 
the influence of music on literature. But there’s not a book on music that gives me a hint 
–  Parry  all  padding.  What  about  Tovey?  Too  metaphysical.  Ethel  is  the  [last  page 
missing] 
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Appendix 2 
 
The following extracts are taken from The Diary of Virginia Woolf, edited by Anne 
Oliver Bell and all contain either direct or indirect references to music, musical events 
and musical performances. The extracts have been reproduced as they appear in Bell’s 
edition and edited where necessary. I have also cited the notes from Bell’s edition in 
parentheses  after  several  of  the  entries,  when  they  have  been  thought  to  provide 
important supplementary information regarding the specificities of a concert program, 
particular performers or venues etc.  
 
 
Volume One: 1915-1919 
 
(p.5)  
Sunday 3 January, 1915 
 
We went to a concert at the Queen’s Hall, in the afternoon. Considering that my ears 
have been pure of music for some weeks, I think patriotism is a base emotion. By this I 
mean  (I am writing in haste, expecting Flora to  dinner)  that they played a national 
Anthem and a Hymn, and all I could feel was the entire absence of emotion in myself 
and everyone else. If the British spoke about W.C’ s and copulation, then they might be 
stirred by universal emotions. As it is, an appeal to feel together is hopelessly muddled 
by intervening greatcoats and fur coats.  
 
 (The diary notes that the concert began with the National Anthem, followed by ‘O God 
our Strength’ by Sir Henry Wood who was also conducting, followed by music by Bach, 
Handel, Beethoven and Wagner.) 
 
(p.9) 
Wednesday 6 January, 1915  
 
Now I have to decide whether I shall go up again, to a party at Gordon Square, where 
the Aranyis are playing.   
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(The diary notes that the d’Aranyis sisters were Hungarian concert musicians who lived 
in England from 1914-18)  
 
(p.20) 
Sunday 17 January, 1915  
 
I went to a Queen’s Hall Concert, stayed for three beautiful tunes and came back.  
 
 (The diary notes that the pieces played were Bach’s 4
th Brandenburg Concerto, the 
Symphony in D by Cesar Franck and three movements of Lalo’s Symphony Espagnole.)  
 
 
(p.33) 
Saturday 13 February, 1915  
 
We wrote and after luncheon L. went to the Library and I went to a concert at the 
Queen’s Hall. I ran into Oliver Strachey, standing very like a Strachey in the Hall, 
because he dislikes sitting inside waiting for the music. I got by luck a very good place, 
for the Hall was nearly full – and it was a divine concert. But one of the things I decided 
as I listened (its difficult not to think of other things) was that all descriptions of music 
are worthless, and rather unpleasant; they are apt to be hysterical, and to say things that 
people will be ashamed of having said afterwards. They played Haydn, Mozart no. 8, 
Brandenburg Concerto, and the Unfinished. I daresay the playing wasn’t very good, but 
the stream of melody was divine. It struck me what an odd thing it was – this little box 
of pure beauty set down in the middle of London streets, and people – all looking so 
ordinary, crowding to hear, as if they weren’t ordinary after all, or had an ambition for 
something better. Opposite me was Bernard Shaw.  
 
 
(p.70) 
Saturday 3, Sunday 4, Monday 5 November, 1917 
 
On Sunday I finished my Aksakoff, and writing has the advantage of making a weekday 
out of the Sabbath, in spite of the clamour and blare of military music and church bells  
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which always takes place at about eleven – a noise which the other people have no right 
to inflict.  
 
 
(p.78) 
Monday 19 November, 1917  
 
On Friday we went to a concert, walking out when the English piece came on into a 
disreputable side street clinging to the back of Bond St.  
 
(The diary notes that the concert was at the Aeolian Hall, Bond Street by the London 
Trio.)  
 
(p.83) 
Monday 3 December, 1917  
 
Then on to Figaro at the Old Vic. It’s perfectly lovely; breaking from one beauty into 
another, and so romantic as well as witty – the perfection of music, and vindication of 
opera.  
 
 
(p.135) 
Monday 8 April, 1918 
 
 A barrel organ played in the middle. I bought six bundles of coloured tapers. The stir 
and colour and cheapness pleased me to the depths of my heart.  
 
 
(p.142) 
Sunday 21 April, 1918  
 
I went to a concert at the Palladium this afternoon; but on the whole I regretted it. A 
man  called  Julian  Clifford  played  Mozart as  if  it  were a  Dream  Waltz,  slowly  and 
sentimentally and with a kind of lugubrious stickiness which spoilt my pleasure in the G 
minor.   
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(The diary notes that Julian Clifford 1877-1921 was a conductor, pianist and composer.)  
 
 
(p.148) 
Sunday 5 May, 1918 
 
Outside Dysart House we  heard a cuckoo, inside some forlorn week end party was 
listening to a pianola. Desmond put us off, I confess to our relief.  
 
(The  diary notes that the name of the house was  actually  Ham House  and was the 
residence of the Earl of Dysart.) 
 
 
 
(p.153) 
Friday 7 June, 1918  
 
I went to the Magic Flute, and thought rather better of humanity for having that in them. 
Goldie was in the same row as me, thinking I daresay much the same thoughts, though 
the proximity of two youthful men may have coloured them differently.  
 
(The diary notes that the concert Woolf attended was at the Theatre Royal Drury Lane 
and was part of Sir Thomas Beecham’s ‘Summer Season of Grand Opera in English’) 
USED 
 
 
(p.157) 
Monday 17 June, 1918  
 
I went to Don Giovanni, to my infinite delight.  
 
(The diary notes that this was part of the same season ‘Grand Opera in English’ at the 
Shaftesbury Theatre.) 
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(p.205) 
Friday 18 October, 1918 
 
 But I write hurriedly…since I must read a little about Voltaire before going up to hear a 
Promenade Concert at the Queen’s Hall. 
 
(p.206) 
Wednesday 23 October, 1918 
 
I  went up  to the concert and heard the ghosts of lovely  things, since the substance 
somehow escaped me; partly owing to my mood, partly to the usual vulgarity of Wood. 
Even so the ghosts of two Bach pieces (one for a duet of violins) were exquisitely 
lovely. Edith Sichel, whose entire soul is now open to me through her letters, makes me 
determine to write descriptions neither of pictures nor of music.  
 
(The diary notes that the concert was part of Sir Henry Wood’s Promenade Concerts 
and the pieces played were Bach’s Suite number 2 for flute and strings, and Concerto 
no. 3 for two violins and orchestra. Woolf also heard works by Beethoven, Mozart, 
Glück and Dvorak.)  
 
(p.219) 
Thursday 21 November, 1918 
 
I am overwhelmed with things that I ought to have written about; peace dropped like a 
great stone into my pool, and the eddies are still rippling out to the further bank. Has 
Nelly Cecil sunk beyond recall? And that concert at Shelley House, presided over, so 
appropriately by Bruce Richmond? 
 
(The diary notes that Woolf went to quartet concert at Shelley House, which is thought 
to  have  been  part  of  a  private  subscription  series  of  concerts  organized  by  Bruce 
Richmond.) 
 
 
(p.244) 
Tuesday 25 February, 1919  
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Meanwhile Sir Henry (Newbolt) confessed that  music, especially the music of strings 
moves  the  fount  of  poetry  in  him,  and  “something  always  comes  of  a  concert  – 
something will come this evening” – he assured me, as a priest foretelling a miracle, or 
a conjuror producing a rabbit. 
 
 
p.245 
Tuesday 25 February, 1919 
 
The company was decorous and fur bearing as usual; and the music like the voice of 
spirits in another world enticing he hopelessly damned. Sir Henry wrote a patriotic song 
to the tune of it. But how nice they are too!  
 
 
(p.270) 
Wednesday 7 May, 1919 
 
They were going to hear Bertie lecture; but I preferred the songsters of Trafalgar Square. 
The  steps  of  the  column  were  built  up,  pyramid  fashion,  with  elderly  respectable 
householders grasping sheets of music, which they rendered, in time to a conductor on a 
chair beneath, with great precision. It was Life boat day and the elderly people were 
singing sailor’s chanties and Tom Bowling. This seemed to me a very amusing and 
instructive spectacle; and being famished for music, I could not get past, but stood and 
felt thrilled with an absurd visionary excitement; and walked over Hungerford Bridge 
making up stories.  
 
(The diary notes that ‘Lifeboat day was marked by entertainment in Trafalgar Square 
organized by the League of Arts and consisting of Morris dancing and folk songs by a 
choir of 500 voices. ‘Tom Bowling’ is a nautical song by Charles Dibdin dating from 
the late 18
th century.’) 
 
(p.309) 
Thursday 4 November, 1919 
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 I was hauled  out of  the  background  to talk  to Katie at the Richmond’s concert  on 
Sunday…So we talked in the intervals of Mozart. 
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Volume Two: 1920-1924 
 
(p.14) 
Monday 26 January, 1920 
 
Yesterday being my birthday and a clear and bright day into the bargain showing many 
green and yellow flushes on the trees, I went to South Kensington and heard Mozart and 
Beethoven. I don’t think I did hear very much of them, seated as I was between Katie 
and Elena, and pitched headforemost into outrageous banter of the usual kind with the 
Countess.  
 
(p.32) 
Tuesday 20
th April, 1920  
 
To the Bach choir last night; but one of our failures. Is it the weather? I’d made out on 
walking, such a perfect day; and wasted the cream of the morning on the telephone. 
Then  the  weather;  great  bouncing  gusts  all  set  about  with  rain  soaking  one;  buses 
crowded, left typewriting paper in the bus; a long time waiting at the Club – then Bach 
unaccompanied isn’t easy – though at last (after L. had gone home) I was swept up to 
the heights by a song. Anna Magdalena’s song.   
 
(The diary notes that ‘among the works performed on 19
th April by the London Bach 
Choir  were  three  unaccompanied  motets.’  It  also  notes  that  Woolf  was  probably 
referring  to  ‘Bist  Du  bei  mir’  which  was  no.25  in  the  Klavierbüchlein  für  Anna 
Magdalena by Bach most likely to have been composed by G.H. Stölzel and sung by 
Ethel McLelland) 
 
(p.72) 
Monday 25
th October, 1920 
 
The fire burns; we are going to hear the Beggars Opera.  
 
(The diary notes that The Beggars Opera by John Gay was played at the Lyric Theatre 
in Hammersmith by Giles Playfair in 1920.)  
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(p.114) 
Friday 29
th April 1921 
 
But every afternoon for a week I’ve been up to the Aeolian Hall; taken my seat right at 
the back; put my bag on the floor and listened to Beethoven quartets. Do I dare say 
listened? Well, but if one gets a lot of pleasure, really divine pleasure, and knows the 
tunes, and only occasionally thinks of others things – surely I may say listened.  
 
(The diary notes ‘During a Beethoven Festival Week, 25-30 April, at the Aelian Hall, 
the  London  String  Quartet  played,  in  chronological  order,  all  17  Beethoven  string 
quartets.’) 
 
(p.128) 
Thursday 11 August, 1921 
 
Sometimes it seems to me that I shall never write out all the books in my head, because 
of the strain. The devilish thing about writing is that it calls upon every nerve to hold 
itself taut. That is exactly what I cannot do – Now if it were painting or scribbling music 
or making patchwork quilts or mud pies, it wouldn’t matter. 
 
(p.174-5) 
Thursday 30 March, 1922 
 
John Goss sings.  
 
(The diary notes that John Goss was a baritone soloist) 
 
(p.212) 
Monday 13 November, 1922 
 
We went to the Beggars Opera the other night, L. being at Liverpool. 
 
(p.216) 
Sunday 3 December, 1922  
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This autumn has been perhaps the busiest of my dilatory life. People and books- I sing 
that to the tune of Woman and Wine, which comes in the Beggars Opera. 
 
Sunday 7 January, 1923 
 
Woolf mentions a party at which there was singing and Oliver Strachey sings Handel. 
 
(p.244) 
Wednesday 13 June, 1923 
 
Nessa is back and the London season of course in full swing. So I judged yesterday in 
the Aeolian Hall, listening, in a dazed way, to Edith Sitwell vociferating through the 
megaphone…I should be describing Edith Sitwell’s poems, but I kept saying to myself 
“I don’t really understand…I don’t really admire.” The only view, presentable that I 
framed, was to the effect that she was monotonous. She has one tune only on her merry 
go round. And she makes her verse keep step accurately to the Hornpipe. This seems to 
be wrong; but I’m all sandy with writing criticism, and must be off to my book again 
USED 
 
(The  diary  notes  that  ‘The  occasion  was the  first  public  performance of  Façade,  a 
collaborative  effort by  the  Sitwells  and  the  composer  William  Walton, in which the 
words  and  the  voice  (both  Edith  Sitwell’s)  were  intended  to  play  an  equal  and 
interdependent part with the instrumental music. The poems were recited through a 
‘Sengerphone’ which protruded through the mouth of a grotesque head in the centre of 
a  drop-curtain  painted  by  Frank  Dobson.  The  performance  called  forth  almost 
universal obloquy from the press.’) 
(p.320) 
Sunday 1 November, 1924 
 
As usual, I am, or think myself, snowed under with work to do; and this is cut into by 
hours of solid pleasure – going to the pictures tonight and Suggis on Monday. For its 
music I want; to stimulate and suggest.  
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(The diary notes that Guuilhermina Suggia was a Portuguese cellist and performed on 
the 3
rd November in 1924 at the Wigmore Hall.) 
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Volume Three: 1925- 1930 
 
(p.19) 
Thursday 14 May, 1925 
 
But I meant to describe my dear old Desmond, whom it rejoiced me to see again, and he 
held out both his hands, and I set him in his chair and we talked till seven o’clock. He is 
rather worn and aged; a little, I think, feeling that here’s forty five on him and nothing 
achieved, except indeed the children, whom he dotes on – Micky to write, Desmond and 
Rachel trilling and warbling on flute and piano. 
 
(p.25) 
Wednesday 20 May, 1925 
  
(Concerning the Sitwell’s with whom she had dined the previous night) 
 
But why are they thought daring and clever? Why are they laughing sticks of the music 
halls and the penny a liners? 
 
(p.27) 
Friday 5
th June, 1925 
 
This is the spiritual truth about [Elizabeth] Bibesco: the fact being that she lies in bed, in 
green crepe de chine, with real diamonds on her fingers, and a silk quilt, and thinks she 
talks brilliantly to the most intellectual set in London – so she does, to Desmond, and 
Mortimer,  and  poor  Philip  Ritchie,  and  I  was  half  in  a  rage,  having  sacrificed  my 
Mozart 5tet to her, from which I should have got gallons of pure pleasure instead of the 
breakfast cup of rather impure delight. For it had its fun. 
 
(p.32) 
Tuesday 16 June, 1925 
 
This reminds me I must get back to D. Copperfield. There are moments when all the 
masterpieces do no more than strum upon broken strings. 
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(p.34) 
Sunday 27
th June, 1925 
 
But while I try to write, I am making up “To the Lighthouse” – the sea is to be heard all 
through it. I have an  idea that I  will invent a new name for my books to supplant 
“novel”. A new _____by  Virginia Woolf. But what? Elegy? 
 
(p.34-5) 
Sunday 19
th July, 1925 
 
So a whole tribe of people and parties has gone down the sink to oblivion – Ott’s tea 
parties  and  complaints;  Gwen  Raverat  set  sturdy  dusty  grim  black,  yesterday;  Tom 
hedging a little over the Bank; Sybil Colefax drinking tea and protesting her desire to 
give up parties; her party when Olga Lynn dropped her music in a rage and had to be 
pacified by  Balfour……Then little  Eddie Sackville-West and Julian Morrell to dine 
(and I am to have his piano) and Philip in to fetch her; and then a party at Ott’s with 
Ching playing the piano. 
 
 
(The diary notes “This scene, at a Colefax party probably given on 1 July at Argyll 
House,  is  described  by  Ogla  Lynn  (1882-1957),  a  diminutive  Lieder  singer  much 
favoured by Society, in her memoirs Oggie (1955); her rage was occasioned by the 
entry of Margot Asquith (Lady Oxford), who created such a disturbance that the singer 
had to stop.) 
 
 
(p.37) 
Thursday 30 July, 1925 
 
My summer’s wanderings with the pen have I think shown me one or two new dodges 
for catching my flies. I have sat here, like an improviser with his hands rambling over 
the piano. The result is perfectly inconclusive, and almost illiterate. 
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(p.39) 
Saturday 5 September, 1925 
 
I really forget anything more from the lips of E[lena]. I believe it was all the same: how 
she would like a house with a piano: and they meant to retire and buy a house with a 
piano. 
 
(p.42) 
Monday 14 September, 1925 
 
Now, with my Studio habitable, and another servant perhaps, I shall aim at haphazard, 
bohemian meetings, music (we have the algraphone, and that’s a heavenly prospect – 
music after dinner while I stitch at my wool-work – I go to Lewes this afternoon to meet 
Nessa and buy wools)… 
 
 
(p.57) 
Tuesday 19 January, 1926 
 
Of a dim November fog; the lights are dulled and damped. I walked towards the sound 
of a barrel organ in Marchmont Street. 
 
 
(p.63) 
Saturday 27 February, 1926 
 
Lord B[erners]. Was stockish, resolute, quick witted: analysed his own instability. His 
father was a sea captain; wished him not on any account to be a long haired artist; his 
mother used to say “My little boy plays so nicely – you should hear him play” but she 
minded his not hunting and riding. So, he said, he was inhibited as a musician. His 
talent clung (I think he said) like a creeper to the edge of a cliff. One day he wrote two 
marches for fun. Stravinsky saw them, and thought them good, and they were published. 
So  he  was  accepted  as  a  serious  musician,  with  only  four  lessons  from  Tovey  in 
counterpoint. He had an astonishing facility. He could write things that sounded all right. 
Suddenly, last year, all his pleasure in it went. He met a painter, asked him how you  
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paint;  bought  ‘hogsheads’  –(meant  hog’s  bristles)  and  canvas  and  copied  an  Italian 
picture, brilliantly, consummately, says Clive. He has the same facility there: but it will 
come to nothing he said, like the other.   
 
(The diary notes ‘Donald Francis Tovey (1875-1940), pianist, composer and scholar, 
was one the greatest personalities in the musical world of his day; he had been Reid 
Professor of Music at Edinburgh University since 1914.’) 
 
 
(p.72) 
Saturday 27 March, 1926 
 
And was just striking oil when in comes Angus to tell me Eddy was on the phone: 
would I go to Rimsky Korsakov with him on Tuesday. I agreed-more, asked him to 
dinner.  
 
(The diary notes “A concert performance of Rimsky Karsakov’s opera The Legend of 
the Invisible City of Kitezh was to be given at the Royal Opera House, Covent Garden, 
on 30 March.” - Woolf actually did not attend claiming that she ‘detested engagements’) 
 
(p.84) 
Wednesday 12 May, 1926 
 
The  Strike  was  settled  about  1.15  –  or  it  was  then  broadcast…5  minutes  later  the 
wireless. They told us to stand by and await important news. Then a piano played a tune. 
Then the solemn broadcaster assuming incredible pomp and gloom and speaking one 
word to the minute read out: Message from 10 Downing Street. The T.U.C. leaders have 
agreed that Strike shall be withdrawn. 
 
(p.87) 
Thursday 20 May, 1926 
 
I should have been reading her (Vita’s) poem tonight: instead finished Sharon Turner – 
a prosy, simple, old man; the very spit and image of Saxon. A boundless bore, I daresay, 
with the most intense zeal for “improving myself”, and the holiest of affections, and 13  
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children, and no character or impetus – a love of long walks, of music; modest, yet 
conceited in an ant like way. 
 
(p.90) 
Wednesday 9 June, 1926 
 
We are very hungry, by the way; Nelly is preparing a nice roast chicken and ices for 
dinner, which I shall enjoy. Then we shall play the Gramophone. 
 
 
(p.126) 
Thursday 3 February, 1927 
 
Without eyes and ears (but Mrs Webb listens in and prefers Mozart to Handel, if I may 
guess) one can come down with more of a weight upon bread and butter or whatever the 
substance is before one. 
 
 
(p.128) 
Monday 21 February, 1927 
 
Why not invent a new kind of play – as for instance 
Woman thinks:… 
He does. 
Organ plays. 
She writes. 
They say: 
She sings: 
Night speaks: 
They miss 
 
I think it must be something in this line – though I can’t now see what. Away from facts: 
free, yet concentrated; prose yet poetry; a novel and a play. 
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(p.129) 
Monday 28 February, 1927 
 
Coming back last night I thought, owning to civilization, I, who am now cold, wet, and 
hungry, can be warm and satisfied and listening to a Mozart 4tet in 15 minutes. And so I 
was. 
 
(p.135) 
Thursday 5 May, 1927 
 
Nelly away; Pinker [dog] away; Clive coming back; Opera in swing; Francis to see me 
about writing; fine spring weather. 
 
(p.135) 
Wednesday 11 May, 1927 
 
Mary was at the opera, on a hot evening like this think of listening to Wagner he  (Clive 
Bell) said. 
 
(p.139) 
Saturday 18 June, 1927 
 
(Concerning Woolf’s writing of The Waves)  
 
But it needs ripening. I do a little work on it in the evening when the gramophone is 
playing late Beethoven sonatas. (The windows fidget at their fastenings as if we were at 
sea.) 
 
(p.153) 
Saturday 21
st August, 1927 
 
Some little scenes I meant to write down. 
One was on the flats towards Ripe one blazing hot day. We stopped in a bye road about 
3 in the afternoon, and heard hymn singing. It was very lonely and desolate. Here were 
people singing to themselves, in the hot afternoon. I looked and saw a middle class  
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‘lady’ in skirt and coat and ribboned hat, by the cottage door. She was making the 
daughters of the agricultural labourers sing; it was about three o’clock on a Tuesday 
perhaps…It  strikes  me  that  they  hymn  singing  in  the  flats  went  on  precisely  so  in 
Cromwell’s time.  
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Volume Four: 1931-1935 
 
(p. 5) 
Wednesday 7 January, 1931 
 
We shall play the Grosse Fugue [Beethoven] tonight – Ethel, I daresay, will ring up. 
 
(p. 9) 
Wednesday 4 February, 1931 
 
Today Ethel comes. On Monday I went to hear her rehearse at Lady Lewis’s…The 
rehearsal was in a long room with a bow window looking on…Ethel stood at the piano 
in the window, in her battered felt, in her jersey and short skirt conducting with a pencil. 
There was a drop at the end of her nose. Miss Suddaby was singing the Soul, and I 
observed that went through precisely the same attitudes of ecstasy and inspiration in the 
room, as in a hall. There were two young or youngish men. Ethel’s pince nez rode 
nearer and nearer the tip of her nose. She sang now and then; and once, taking the bass, 
made  a  cat  squalling  sound  –  but  everything  she  does  with  such  forthrightness 
directness that there is nothing ridiculous. She loses self-consciousness completely. She 
seems  all  vitalized;  all  energized:  she  knocks  her  hat  from  side  to  side.  Strides 
rhythmically  down  the  room  to  signify  to  Elizabeth  that  this  is  the  Greek  melody; 
strides back; Now the furniture moving begins, she said, referring to some supernatural 
gambols connected with the prisoner’s escape, or defiance or death. I suspect the music 
is too literary – too stressed – too didactic for my taste. But I am always impressed by 
the fact that it is music – I mean that she has spun these coherent chords harmonies 
melodies out of her so practical, strident mind. What if she should be a great composer? 
This fantastic idea is to her the merest commonplace: it is the fabric of her being. As she 
conducts, she hears music like Beethoven’s. As she strides and turns and wheels about 
to us perched mute on chairs she thinks this is about the most important event now 
taking place in London. And perhaps it is. Well – I watched the curiously sensitive, 
perceptive Jewish face of old Lady L. trembling like a butterflies antennae to the sound. 
How sensitized to music old Jewesses are – how pliable, how supple. 
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(The diary notes that Ethel Smyth was rehearsing her setting of Henry Brewster’s poem 
The Prison. Elsie Suddaby was a noted soprano and Lady Lewis was the widow of Sir 
George Lewis, and her house played regular host to musicians, artists and writers of 
the day.) 
 
(p.14) 
Thursday 19 March, 1931 
 
Ethel yesterday, very  uneasy about her character; and possible misrepresentations.  I 
think deluding herself about her own motives in countering reviewers: (purely for the 
sake of other musicians, women in particular: I’ve nothing to lose: have suffered neglect 
all my life). ..It seems possible to me that nature gave her everything except the power 
of expression in her music: hence the race and violence and restlessness of her nature: 
the one outlet is stopped up. 
 
(p. 29) 
Thursday 2 June, 1931 
 
Ethel again…I try to find out what motive lies behind Ethel and her calomel. I think; 
(but then I am not a psychologist) that she wants me to be everlasting; that she wants me 
to be unhurt by any amount of talk about the Prison: that she wants to have things – to 
her own will: that she dislikes other people’s illnesses which interfere with her vitality; 
that she likes to rationalize everything: that she suspects, on principle, all shrinking, 
subtlety and sensibility…I don’t know. It is very characteristic, and akin to the methods 
she pursues about her music. There too, to explain her lack of success, she fabricates a 
theory (about her kinship with the common man, and her consequent failure to attract 
the sophisticated, who control the Ring, so that Bax Vaughan Williams and co. are done.  
But she not). 
 
(p. 30) 
Tuesday 23 June, 1931 
 
Tonight we go to the Gala Opera with Christabel. Stalls costing 25/- each. 
 
(p.31)  
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Wednesday 24 June, 1931 
 
Last night we went to the gala opera; sat in the stalls, two rows from the stage, with 
Christabel and a woman, who came in late, called Lady Abingdon. 
 
(The diary notes: ‘The Gala Performance on 23 June during Sir Thomas Beecham’s 
‘Season of Russian Opera and Ballet’ at the Lyceum Theatre, consisted of performances 
of acts from three operas, Don Quixote, Prince Igor, and La Fiancée du Czar, and the 
ballet Petrouchka) 
 
(p. 42) 
Thursday 3 September, 1931 
 
We listened to a Bach concert with the clouds thickening purple over Caburn, the light 
springing, and the pale cadaverous glow in the chalk pit. At one moment the brown 
horses stampeded – flinging out their great legs wildly. The worst of it is that my brain 
fills too fast – overflows. 
 
(The diary notes that the concert was conducted by Sir Henry Wood as part of the 
Promenade Concerts at the Queen’s Hall and that Brandenburg Concerto No. 2 in F; 
Fantasy and Fugue in C minor; and Suite No. 5. for Oboe and Strings were the pieces 
performed.) 
 
(p. 44) 
Saturday 19 September, 1931 
 
But O – again – how happy I am: how calm, for the moment how sweet life is with L. 
here, in its regularity and order, and the garden and the room at night and music and my 
walks and writing easily and interestedly at Donne of a morning, and poems all about 
me. 
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(p. 69) 
Tuesday 2 February, 1932 
 
But I had such a good visit from Eddy…I assure you he’s a phenomenon. Musical. How 
I pity him! Forced to live in England with that gift – you don’t know the loneliness. 
Compare the people at [illegible]. They talk of cricket golf: in Berlin, they have their 
ham and beer and talk of the way the violin plays the G sharp. Eddy has the duties of his 
position – a very great one:  very real duties…what was I going to say – He played Der 
Wald. He says nobody knows Ethel Smyth till they’ve heard all this. Who made the 
theme? I did. Well it’s the pure flower of the romantic movement. And we sat reading 
our books and he played and played. 
 
(The diary notes that Der Wald was Ethel Smyth’s second opera.) 
 
(p.77-8) 
Tuesday 16 February, 1932 
 
To sit to Nessa; gay and debonair; to tie up parcels; to the Busch Quartet where I met 
Elena R. and reflected upon the transiency of human beauty, passion, and illusion; and 
so up to lunch. 
 
(The diary notes that the concert was a performance of music by Brahms, Dvořák, and 
Beethoven given by the Busch Quartet at the Wigmore Hall.) 
 
 
(p.111) 
Friday 24 June, 1932 
 
So to the Zoo: a mist rising; white bears elongated like El Grecos: stinking meat held 
near my nose: bear bit a boy’s arm off; bears dived; white explosion; red and yellow 
fairy lamps; distant music; the sea lions… 
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(p.128) 
Thursday 13 October, 1932 
 
It was an odd sight – Desmond with Rachel on his arm. Everybody stood up…Then a 
dribble back of relatives. Then the Wagner wedding march. 
 
(p.165) 
Monday 26 June, 1933 
 
The present moment…doctors, scarlet, purple in streets; poor little students in gowns: 
so to dine, and read Archibald Marshall’s memoir; and music; thunder, I dare say; and 
so to open my windows, and go up: the moment done. 
 
(p. 172) 
Saturday 12 August, 1933 
 
Still, Saturday, I can’t focus; am disoriented; sleepy; physically tired, but quite calm; 
the dear old repetitions soothe me again: L; Pinka; dinner; tea; papers; music; I have a 
dread of ‘seeing’ people… 
 
(p.243) 
Saturday 15 September, 1933 
 
I was glad we went to the service on Thursday. It was a very hot summers day. And all 
very simple and dignified. Music. Not a word spoken…They played Bach. Then the 
coffin moved slowly through the doors. They shut. They played again – Anon., I think: 
old music. Yes, I liked the wordlessness. 
 
(The  Diary notes that Roger  Fry’s funeral took place on 13 September at Golder’s 
Green Crematorium.) 
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(p.247) 
Tuesday 2 October, 1934 
 
And we went to Sissinghurst. Vita playing the Gramophone at the top of the pink tower. 
A blazing day. 
 
 
(p.284) 
Monday 4 March, 1935 
 
Then  the  concert.  How  long  how  little  music  in  it  that  I  enjoyed!  Beecham’s  face 
beaming,  ecstatic,  like  a  yellow  copper  idol:  such  grimaces,  attenuations,  dancings, 
swingings: his collar crumpled…In the artists room afterwards there was Zelie with the 
red lips and another ex prima donna and a dissolute musician, all waiting their turn to 
plague Beecham. 
 
(The Diary notes, ‘In one of his series of Sunday concerts at the Queen’s Hall, sir 
Thomas  Beecham,  conducting  the  London  Philharmonic  Orchestra,  included  the 
Prelude to Act II of Ethel Smyth’s opera The Wreckers, together with works by Wagner, 
Beethoven, Schubert and Berlioz…’) 
 
(p.296) 
Tuesday 2 April, 1935 
 
And does Louie cheat? A bill for a chicken that we had at Christmas again throws doubt 
on her. We must have it out about the milk this week. Not a week I want altogether. 
Angelica’s concert on Thursday: a [Labour Party] meeting at Rodmell… 
 
(p.311) 
Sunday 12 May, 1935 
 
The dullest day of them all. But we got to [Augsburg; and we had a room with a bath, 
and then went on to] Heidelberg, which is – yes – a very distinguished University town, 
on the Neckar. The dons and their daughters were having a musical evening. I saw them 
tripping out to each others houses with pale blue Beethoven quartets under their arms.  
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(p.313) 
15 May, 1935 
 
Rome. Tea in café. Ladies in bright coats and white hats. Music. Look out and see 
people like movies. Abyssinia. Children begging. Café haunters. Ices. Old man who 
haunts the Greco. 
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Volume Five: 1936-1941 
 
Interestingly, Woolf writes nothing about music in her diary in 1936, but there are many 
references to her writing of Three Guineas and The Years. It is not until 1937 that we 
get the first mention of musical entertainment when Woolf describes an evening at the 
Albert Hall – but this remains the only entry about music for the entire year. There are 
only four references to music in the diary from 1938. There is nothing about music from 
when the war begins in 1939 until the last diary entry from Monday, 24 March 1941 – 
four days before Woolf drowned herself in the river Ouse. 
 
(p.99) 
Friday 25 June, 1937  
 
All very stagey empty and unreal. Wogan with his arm in a sling: looked so tragic when 
unwatched, so I thought, listening to the Basque children singing on the gramophone. 
Robeson sang: a sympathetic, malleable, nigger, expressive, uninhibited, all warmth and 
the hot vapours of African forests.  
 
(The diary notes that Vanessa Woolf describes Robeson (an American singer and actor) 
in a letter to Quentin Bell as ‘the real star of the evening – he is superb to look at…and 
his voice fits his looks’)  
 
 
(p.129) 
Saturday 12 March, 1938 
 
Hitler  has  invaded  Austria:  that  is  at  10  last  night  his  army  crossed  the  frontier 
unresisted. The Austrian national anthem was heard on the wireless for the last time. 
We got a snatch of dance music from Vienna.  
 
(p.152) 
Tuesday 21 June, 1938 
 
(During a trip to the Scottish borders she mentions music in its religious capacity when 
she mimics a conversation she overhears between old Scottish ladies.)  
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The choir’s beautiful…I hear the prayers the young men the music. 
 
(p.155) 
Saturday 17 July, 1938 
 
Last night at the Robsons. Old French woman in skimpy black, beautiful eyes playing 
Beethoven  and  looking  round  like  Mitz  at  Juliette:  their  faces  playing:  voluptuous 
absorption and sorrow and exaltation. Lovely brown swollen cello.  
 
 
(p.173) 
Thursday 22 September, 1938 
 
Yet I was getting into that old, very old, rhythm of regular reading, first this book then 
that; Roger all the morning; walk from 2 to 4; bowls 5 to 6.30: then Madame de Sevigné; 
get  dinner  7.30;  read  Roger;  listen  to  music;  bind  Eddie’s  Candide;  read  Sigfried 
Sassoon; and so bed at 11.30 or so. A very good rhythm; but I can only manage it for a 
few days it seems. 
 
 
(p.197) 
Monday 9 January, 1939 
 
Rodmell is a grind on the brain: in winter especially. I write three solid hours, walk 2: 
then we read, with intervals for cooking dinner, music, news till 11.30. 
 
(p.216) 
Friday 28 April, 1939 
 
He (Leonard) said I lived more in a world of my own. I go for long walks alone. So we 
argued. I was very happy to think I was so much needed. Its strange how seldom one 
feels this: yet ‘life in common’ is an immense reality. For instance, I can’t go to The 
Wreckers tonight with Ethel Smyth because 1. I have a little temperature: 2: ( and more  
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serious) I’d rather stay at home with L. Its no use fighting against this. Its one of the 
facts.  
 
(The diary notes that The Wreckers was Ethel Symth’s opera and was being performed 
for the last time that evening at Sadler’s Wells.) 
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